tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post1094702612674058006..comments2023-10-08T15:51:17.426+00:00Comments on Beyond Necessity: A problem for the Brentano thesisEdward Ockhamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-18694535928097459852011-01-10T09:38:40.406+00:002011-01-10T09:38:40.406+00:00Correct. However, the problem is that in both mod...Correct. However, the problem is that in both modern and traditional logic the particular proposition is convertible. I.e. in traditional logic ‘some A is a B’ (e.g. some man is an animal) converts to ‘some B is an A’ (some animal is a man’). This is even more obvious in modern logic: ‘Ex man(x) and animal(x)’ is equivalent to ‘Ex animal (x) and man(x)’.<br /><br />It’s obvious for the reasons you state that something odd is going on, and it’s not a problem for the Brentano equivalence, but rather for the convertibility of simple propositions. I had planned to deal with this in a later post.Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-14139510505115509062011-01-09T21:19:44.854+00:002011-01-09T21:19:44.854+00:00Thinking about the cigarette example has suggested...Thinking about the cigarette example has suggested another aspect of intentional contexts. Suppose Fs are Gs. From 'Bill bought an F' we infer 'Bill bought a G'. We can generalise within the context. But from 'Bill wants an F' can we infer 'Bill wants a G'? I'm not so sure. If Bill were given a G that wasn't also an F his want might well not be satisfied. His specification isn't being met. I think this accounts for the nagging worry I had reading BV's <a href="http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/01/two-motivations-for-a-relational-account-of-intentionality-peter-lupu.html" rel="nofollow">interpolation on Peter Lupu's post.</a> He says ' You can't want a motorcycle without wanting a heavy metallic spatiotemporal particular'. Hmm. I don't want no stinkin' heavy metallic spatiotemporal particular, I want a Harley!David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-12485558038822715962011-01-09T18:42:40.948+00:002011-01-09T18:42:40.948+00:00>> 'Jake is looking for something' ...>> 'Jake is looking for something' can be true, without requiring that the something exists, contra Brentano.<br /><br />Perhaps I'm being fastidious, but is it contra Brentano? To get via Brentano to an existence assertion of the form 'an A-B exists' we first need to get to 'some A is B'. But we can't get from 'Bill wants a cigarette' to 'some cigarette is wanted by Bill'. Maybe the only cigarettes are Gauloises and Bill hates Gauloises. <br /><br />It seems to me that the 'intentional object', the <i>something</i> in all these cases is less of a description and more of a specification:<br /><br />Jake is looking for an entity that meets the spec (a) is a gold mine and (b) is in Surrey. Bill's want will be satisfied by an entity that (a) is a cigarette and (b) is not a Gauloise. Andy is thinking about an entity that meets the spec (a) is horse, (b) has wings. <br /><br />In a nutshell: something != some thing.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.com