tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post5653798969135055480..comments2023-10-08T15:51:17.426+00:00Comments on Beyond Necessity: Metaphysical reasoningEdward Ockhamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-33426558079104260902011-01-26T19:39:28.739+00:002011-01-26T19:39:28.739+00:00>>Is this the deeper logical structure you h...>>Is this the deeper logical structure you hint at?<br /><br />Yes, but it would take me some time to justify it. Geach's example is something like (don't have the paper to hand) "Jack thinks there is a goblin in the shed, and Jackie thinks that he [the goblin] has put a spell on everyone".<br /><br />The problem is that the pronoun 'he' occurs within the scope of the 'thinks that'. How do you represent those two thoughts in formal logic?<br /><br />1. Jack thinks that for some x, x is a goblin and x is in the shed. Jackie thinks that ???<br /><br />You have to make it clear that Jackie is thinking about the 'same' goblin as it were. But you could only do that by quantifying outside the 'that' clause. And if you do, you immediately have existential import.Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-86611649021782017292011-01-25T14:27:40.762+00:002011-01-25T14:27:40.762+00:00>>Surely it does.
Well, there's an ambig...>>Surely it does.<br />Well, there's an ambiguity, isn't there? A psychologist conducting experiments into visual illusions would ask a subject 'tell me what you see' rather than 'tell me what you hallucinate'. And we see the straw as bent though we know it's straight. Bill and I are emphasising the phenomenology.<br /><br />Re the unsolved problem. Yes, but the subjects in these examples, the rabbit, the goldmine, aren't introduced under existential quantification. That's the nub of this argument. To get a quantifier we have to rewrite the sentences: 'Bill thinks there is a pink rabbit and he is seeing it.' 'Jake thinks there is a goldmine in Surrey and is seeking it'. Is this the deeper logical structure you hint at?David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-41312030993301925272011-01-25T13:18:39.798+00:002011-01-25T13:18:39.798+00:00>>'Bill sees a pink rabbit' doesn...>>'Bill sees a pink rabbit' doesn't imply 'there is a pink rabbit'. <br /><br />Surely it does. 'Bill is hallucinating a pink rabbit' doesn’t, though.<br /><br />>>Or even 'This Escher drawing is of an impossible object'.<br /><br />Agree.<br /><br />>>Regarding predications, they seem to be of the image or conjectured entity.<br />Bill sees a rabbit. It's pink.<br />Jake seeks a goldmine. It's in Surrey.<br />There is a sense in which the 'is pink' and 'is in Surrey' predications are not of the rabbit or the goldmine at all, but are further characterisations of the subject's mental state, as in your earlier 'Jake is seeking goldmine-in-surrey-ly'.<br />>><br /><br />More later on this. The use of pronouns or names to refer back to subjects introduced by means of general existential assertions is a famous unsolved problem in philosophy of language.Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-75298823852538749322011-01-25T10:39:41.877+00:002011-01-25T10:39:41.877+00:00Don't images pass the intentionality test? ...Don't images pass the intentionality test? 'Bill sees a pink rabbit' doesn't imply 'there is a pink rabbit'. Or even 'This Escher drawing is of an impossible object'.<br /><br />Regarding predications, they seem to be of the image or conjectured entity.<br /><br />Bill sees a rabbit. It's pink.<br />Jake seeks a goldmine. It's in Surrey.<br /><br />There is a sense in which the 'is pink' and 'is in Surrey' predications are not of the rabbit or the goldmine at all, but are further characterisations of the subject's mental state, as in your earlier 'Jake is seeking goldmine-in-surrey-ly'.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-42870899408699272352011-01-24T21:14:37.823+00:002011-01-24T21:14:37.823+00:00I didn't understand Bill's argument at all...I didn't understand Bill's argument at all. If I turn the linguistics tap of completely, and try to visualise, all I get is mental images. These are not intentional, they are just, well images.<br /><br />On your second point, that we appear to be making predications of <i>something</i>, I don't really understand. Consider<br /><br />Bill thinks that some x is a woman and x is naked etc. <br /><br />Then there is clearly predication going on, but it is all within the scope of the quantifier. <br /><br />S thinks that Ex Fx<br /><br />does not imply<br /><br />Ex S thinks that FxEdward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-55267546751454639362011-01-24T15:48:16.636+00:002011-01-24T15:48:16.636+00:00This is the clearest presentation of the argument ...This is the clearest presentation of the argument so far. I can see why you say that Bill and Peter have not understood.<br /><br />But...Bill asks us to imagine an x such that <br /><br />x is a woman<br />x is naked<br />x is holding Maimonides<br />etc<br /><br />We appear to be making predications of <i>something</i> and these predications seem causally to influence my imagining (as Bill knew they would). Something more is happening than merely having these predications 'before the mind', or would the Ockhamist deny this? How does the account go on from here?David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.com