tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post7192745652394551721..comments2023-10-08T15:51:17.426+00:00Comments on Beyond Necessity: Men and non-menEdward Ockhamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comBlogger33125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-65252888919978884152012-01-21T16:16:23.105+00:002012-01-21T16:16:23.105+00:00Here<a href="http://tillyandlola.blogspot.com/2012/01/semantic-graphs-and-truth.html" rel="nofollow">Here</a>David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-87006067917761512962012-01-20T12:00:48.246+00:002012-01-20T12:00:48.246+00:00I feel we have almost done this question to death ...I feel we have almost done this question to death but here is yet another take. We go from 'AS, who <i>was</i> a man, has died' to 'AS <i>is</i> no longer a man'. The latter is too readily seen as the indefinite negation 'AS is a non-man'. Rather, I suggest that the grammatically present-tensed 'is no longer' is a superficial contraction of the logical 'AS was a man and not (AS is a man)', where the negation in the second conjunct is pure. This, and its existential generalisation, are readily rendered in MPL using distinct tensed predicates 'was a man' and 'is a man' and are not problematic, I submit, except in so far as the latter quantifies over non-existents. <br /><br />More on semantic graphs soon, I hope.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-8689450671231001902012-01-19T13:00:56.898+00:002012-01-19T13:00:56.898+00:00I like your account as a sort of psychological acc...I like your account as a sort of psychological account of narration. But how does it explain truth-conditions? What would have to be true in order for 'someone crossed the Rubicon 2,000 years ago' to be true?Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-7708096355471679172012-01-19T11:32:01.360+00:002012-01-19T11:32:01.360+00:00Hi Ed,
Regarding quantification, I have a suggesti...Hi Ed,<br />Regarding quantification, I have a suggestion <a href="http://tillyandlola.blogspot.com/2012/01/explaining-quantification.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-4014766689210318122012-01-18T02:31:55.103+00:002012-01-18T02:31:55.103+00:00I guess I must have a favorite fictional character...I guess I must have a favorite fictional character. I have no idea what character that is, though.<br /><br />Anyway, enough with this thread.Anthonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15847046461397802596noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-84598072104215469342012-01-17T10:28:01.354+00:002012-01-17T10:28:01.354+00:00Which is your favourite character in Lord of the R...Which is your favourite character in Lord of the Rings? Alternatively, do you have a favourite fictional character?Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-42627824691692981682012-01-16T23:57:53.701+00:002012-01-16T23:57:53.701+00:00How can your favorite philosopher be someone who d...How can your favorite philosopher be someone who doesn't exist?<br /><br />Edward Ockham is not a medieval philosopher, is he?Anthonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15847046461397802596noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-85575530282620065362012-01-16T14:44:33.333+00:002012-01-16T14:44:33.333+00:00>>quantification over apparent non-existents...>>quantification over apparent non-existents ... maybe ... is the real nub of our problem <br /><br />Yes. On the reasonable assumption that there is an implicit tense in the statement "for some x, Man(x) and not Lives(x)".<br /><br />There is an uncanny resemblance between this question and the medieval dispute about whether 'Caesar is dead' is true or false. <a href="http://www.logicmuseum.com/opposition/simonfavnullohomine.htm" rel="nofollow">Here</a>, e.g.Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-78392840277955498152012-01-16T14:39:26.353+00:002012-01-16T14:39:26.353+00:00>>Is that what is obvious?
No, what is obvi...>>Is that what is obvious?<br /><br />No, what is obvious is that the name of my favourite medieval philosopher is visible to you in at least two places on this very blog.<br /><br />Edward <i>Ockham</i>Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-46675670408580217132012-01-16T00:26:09.651+00:002012-01-16T00:26:09.651+00:00Morning Ed,
I have studied the post again. You a...Morning Ed,<br /><br />I have studied the post again. You are saying that the medievals understood 'some man is not a man' in the same way we understand 'some man is a man no longer', but you claim this can't be rendered in MPL. As it's equivalent to 'some man is a dead man' why not try 'for some x, Man(x) and not Lives(x)' ?<br /><br />Brentano turns this into 'a Man-not-Living exists' which is proven by the instance Alan Shepard. <br /><br />If you object that this merely gets us back to quantification over apparent non-existents then maybe this is the real nub of our problem and we need to investigate it in more detail. This surely is the bullet that has to be bitten.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-66780973762235278002012-01-15T19:28:01.342+00:002012-01-15T19:28:01.342+00:00>> Well it is so obvious that I thought you ...>> Well it is so obvious that I thought you might be making fun of me!<br /><br />You don't have a favorite medieval philosopher, because there are no medieval philosophers, because medieval philosophers don't exist? Is that what is obvious?Anthonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15847046461397802596noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-91343195526015458752012-01-15T17:03:17.823+00:002012-01-15T17:03:17.823+00:00Sure, I think we agree that meaning is not about r...Sure, I think we agree that meaning is not about relations between words and the world. I'm not suggesting the semantics involve the extension. But to get to truth conditions for a sentence we need to get to extensions of terms, and the term 'the Romans' has different extensions in 'Caesar ruled the Romans' and 'The Romans like espresso'.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-61498308254021548212012-01-15T16:29:56.359+00:002012-01-15T16:29:56.359+00:00>>what about 'Caesar ruled the Romans...>>what about 'Caesar ruled the Romans'?<br /><br />Well obviously it makes sense, but to explain its semantics is the problem. It can't possibly consist in a relation between the predicate '-ruled the Romans' and some existing thing, i.e. something. It could only be true if Caesar still exists, but once ruled the Romans, or still does.Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-86247794135817118592012-01-15T16:27:46.588+00:002012-01-15T16:27:46.588+00:00>>Yes, I'm serious. Why wouldn't I b...>>Yes, I'm serious. Why wouldn't I be?<br /><br />Well it is so obvious that I thought you might be making fun of me!Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-30897409277323370092012-01-15T16:22:18.551+00:002012-01-15T16:22:18.551+00:00>>But Ockham sets reduce to simple reference...>>But Ockham sets reduce to simple reference.<br /><br />Unfortunately, yes. They run out of steam when we need a referring term like 'the Romans' when we don't have a list of names, or just don't want to repeat such a list. Hence not much cop for maths. We need something like an 'anonymous referring term', which if not oxymoronic, is what MPL variables offer.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-69562432317003926522012-01-15T16:14:29.598+00:002012-01-15T16:14:29.598+00:00Didn't we agree sometime back that identity ov...Didn't we agree sometime back that identity over objects is co-reference over terms? So 'DB is not Caesar' is '<i>DB</i> and <i>Caesar</i> do not co-refer'. <br /><br />So there is no predication here. But even so, if the claim is that predication is a relation between predicate and existing subject, then 'Frodo is a hobbit' is hardly predication. But surely we'd want to say that it is?<br /><br />>> A term can have only one extension, namely the present one. <br />Are you sure? What about 'Caesar ruled the Romans'?David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-84312044224519733832012-01-15T15:51:32.684+00:002012-01-15T15:51:32.684+00:00So you don't have a favorite medieval philosop...So you don't have a favorite medieval philosopher? Your answer is to ignore the question?<br /><br />Who is the world record holder for highest career batting average?Anthonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15847046461397802596noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-41012023291095569692012-01-15T15:33:56.639+00:002012-01-15T15:33:56.639+00:00But Ockham sets reduce to simple reference. Thus &...But Ockham sets reduce to simple reference. Thus "DB is not Caesar and DB is not Pompey and DB is not Crassus and EO is not Caesar and EO is not Pompey and EO is not Crassus" which does explicitly signify any set. And then you have the problem of explaining "DB is not Caesar". This converts to "Caesar is not DB" and you have the problem of predicating "-is not DB" of something which doesn't exist. If predication is a relation between predicate and subject, then it must be a relation between predicate and existing subject. Which it can't be in the case of non-existent Caesar.<br /><br />>>We are not using a concept term with the attendant risk that ambiguity is introduced by its extension varying over time.<br /><br />But 'extension' is still a problem, as I have said. A term can have only one extension, namely the present one.Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-88636091944093953152012-01-15T15:24:22.833+00:002012-01-15T15:24:22.833+00:00Let's try 'Ockham sets' rather than th...Let's try 'Ockham sets' rather than those devilish mathematical sets. If 'the First Triumvirate' refers to Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus then 'the then-men' can refer to Caesar and Tiberius, say. And 'the now-men' can refer to DB and EO. And surely we can say 'Neither of the then-men is or was either of the now-men?<br /><br />We can also say 'Suppose these are the only men ever to have existed.' The meaning of this is quite clear despite the use of both past and present tenses, neither of which is wholly appropriate to all four intended objects.<br /><br />In fact, I don't think tense matters at all here. We are stating the referents of our terms quite explicitly. We are not using a concept term with the attendant risk that ambiguity is introduced by its extension varying over time. It's this latter effect that seems to be the critical factor in generating paradox.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-59065351423801589932012-01-15T13:21:06.439+00:002012-01-15T13:21:06.439+00:00Yes, I'm serious. Why wouldn't I be?Yes, I'm serious. Why wouldn't I be?Anthonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15847046461397802596noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-77879626969834404582012-01-15T10:21:34.694+00:002012-01-15T10:21:34.694+00:00>>Edward, who is your favorite medieval phil...>>Edward, who is your favorite medieval philosopher?<br /><br />Er, are you serious?Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-80954687946432494192012-01-15T00:20:55.406+00:002012-01-15T00:20:55.406+00:00Edward, who is your favorite medieval philosopher?...Edward, who is your favorite medieval philosopher?Anthonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15847046461397802596noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-23917795810262480702012-01-14T22:51:05.772+00:002012-01-14T22:51:05.772+00:00"But of course nothing is a then thing."..."But of course nothing is a then thing."<br /><br />You say of course, but I disagree. My choices seem to be between believing that some things are not things, and believing that past-things exist. I choose the latter.<br /><br />Of course every thing is a thing.<br /><br />---<br /><br />I am intrigued by the claim that medievals had a notion of "some things are not things" which was true, though. I haven't yet read your latest post, which hopefully explains this.Anthonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15847046461397802596noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-56553756635562752562012-01-14T14:32:11.033+00:002012-01-14T14:32:11.033+00:00Sets are evil. Or at least they would be, if they ...Sets are evil. Or at least they would be, if they existed.Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-55696316386288535642012-01-14T13:40:00.020+00:002012-01-14T13:40:00.020+00:00I see the object-ion.
I'm not so sure about ...I see the object-ion. <br /><br />I'm not so sure about 'satisfaction' but I agree about 'objectual' substitution. Very Russellian. Mont Blanc, etc. <br /><br />I agree that the only things are the now-things, but we can <i>refer</i> to the then-things, surely. BTW I'm seeing 'now-things' and 'then-things' as sets used to explain what we mean rather than alternative concepts that could be used in the object sentences. Hence the 'one of the x-things' wording. And sets I see as referring devices, of course.<br /><br />I think the theory is heading in the right direction. But I think you need sets.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.com