tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post8816676029074483308..comments2023-10-08T15:51:17.426+00:00Comments on Beyond Necessity: Aristotle on singular termsEdward Ockhamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-75378991870406788672016-01-20T20:03:32.887+00:002016-01-20T20:03:32.887+00:00On a related note, from 2006On a related note, <a href="http://ocham.blogspot.co.uk/2006/12/buridan-on-individuation.html" rel="nofollow">from 2006</a>Edward Ockhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07583379503310147119noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21308815.post-2195808972632445652016-01-17T20:36:06.986+00:002016-01-17T20:36:06.986+00:00"Supposition is determinate when a common ter..."Supposition is determinate when a common term supposits disjunctively for its supposita in such a way that one can descend to all its supposita under a disjunction, as is plain with 'Some man runs'. For it follows: 'Some man runs; therefore Socrates runs or Plato runs, and so on'. The supposition is called 'determinate' not because a term suppositing determinately in this way supposits for one suppositum and not for another. Rather the supposition is called 'determinate' because for the truth of a proposition in which a common term supposits determinately it is required that the proposition be made true for some determinate suppositum."<br /><br />From Spade's translation of Walter Burley's _Longer Treatise On the Purity of the Art of Logic_, 102-3.Chris McCartneyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04229474918154303571noreply@blogger.com