A number of new readers have joined since I started the topics on 'reference' more than a year ago. To avoid going over the same ground again, I will link to some earlier posts for background. Of course, this is all work in progress, and anything may change.
For example, Anthony objects that I am attempting "to develop a theory of reference based on fictional stories". Correct, and that is the whole point. As I argued earlier, the semantics of empty proper names do not obviously differ from that of non-empty names, and it seems that the names of historical characters individuate in just the same way as fictional ones. See also this post about the reference of 'God' and 'Allah'.
I have argued further here that there cannot be such a thing as reference failure. To understand a proper name is to understand which person its sentence is about.
This means (I have argued) that reference cannot be relation between a term – a linguistic item - and an item in non-linguistic reality. The verb 'refers to' is therefore logically intransitive. I explain the notion of logical intransitivity here, and its application to reference here. This leads to the "'Frodo'-Frodo" theory of reference.
15 comments:
"the semantics of empty proper names do not obviously differ from that of non-empty names"
Maybe it's not obvious, but the difference between existents and non-existents is that existents exist.
That Fido was born in Italy in 1941 implies that Fido was not born in France in 1942. But Frodo may have been born in Italy in 1941 and have been born in France in 1942. The story may contain both facts, even though they are contradictory.
Existents have identity. Non-existents do not.
I find the Donnellan distinction, at least the little of it I read in the previously posted link, to be a good answer to many of your objections to direct reference. Proper names, when used qua proper names, directly refer to existents. But proper names are sometimes, maybe even often, used "attributively", as shorthand for descriptions.
>>Maybe it's not obvious, but the difference between existents and non-existents is that existents exist.
I am not talking about the difference between existents and non-existents (whatever that may be) but the difference between the semantics of empty proper names and non-empty proper names.
>>Frodo may have been born in Italy in 1941 and have been born in France in 1942
No. All contradictions are false, as are all fictional statements. So there are two reasons why that statement is false (one logical, one contingent - I take it that Frodo's non-existence is contingent).
>> I am not talking about the difference between existents and non-existents (whatever that may be) but the difference between the semantics of empty proper names and non-empty proper names. <<
By semantics, do you mean the meaning, or the study of the meaning? If the latter, do you mean the proper study, or the de facto study?
And what about the Donnellan distiction? Do you recognize that proper names are sometimes used referentially and sometimes used attributively?
>> All contradictions are false, as are all fictional statements. <<
If all fictional statements are false, what's the point of studying their meaning?
>>By semantics, do you mean the meaning, or the study of the meaning? If the latter, do you mean the proper study, or the de facto study?
The former, broadly speaking. 'Semantics of X', in this sense, broadly means the 'semantic properties or features of X'.
>>And what about the Donnellan distiction? Do you recognize that proper names are sometimes used referentially and sometimes used attributively?
No. More later.
>>If all fictional statements are false, what's the point of studying their meaning?
That's a bizarre question, but let me answer it anyway. Explaining how they have a meaning (at least for singular fictional propositions) is a challenging question, and therefore the question is worth studying. According to one major theory of meaning, singular fictional propositions (i.e. declarative sentences) don't have a meaning at all.
"is a challenging question, and therefore the question is worth studying"
I'm not going to touch that one.
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I hope you can bear with one more question about this. What does it mean for a proper name to be "empty"? Doesn't this mean it doesn't refer to anything? What does it mean for a proper name to be "non-empty"? Doesn't this mean that it refers to something?
Now that I think about it, I think your answer to this was that "some things are not things". But I believe I showed that you were wrong about that. You said "Admittedly your problem remains." and "Right :(" (http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=21308815&postID=1219405985927824012). Have you since found a solution?
>>What does it mean for a proper name to be "empty"?
It means that there is nothing to which it refers. Note that I hold this to be consistent with the fact that an empty name can refer to something. This is part of the notion of logical transitivity which I discussed in earlier posts.
>>Doesn't this mean it doesn't refer to anything?
No, see above. The analogy is with 'John wants a cigarette'. This implies that John wants something (namely a cigarette). But doesn't imply that there is a cigarette that he wants. The point of his wanting a cigarette is that there isn't one.
>>What does it mean for a proper name to be "non-empty"? Doesn't this mean that it refers to something?
No. Per above. Every name, whether empty or not, refers to something. But only non-empty names are such that something is referred to by them. By analogy with, every desire is a desire for something (a house in the country). But only some desires are such that there is a thing, an object, of which they are the desire.
>>Now that I think about it, I think your answer to this was that "some things are not things". But I believe I showed that you were wrong about that.
No, I was perfectly comfortable with that.
"No, I was perfectly comfortable with that."
Are you also perfectly comfortable with "A non-thing thing exists"?
>>Are you also perfectly comfortable with "A non-thing thing exists"?
Not at all, by no means.
"This implies that John wants something (namely a cigarette). But doesn't imply that there is a cigarette that he wants. The point of his wanting a cigarette is that there isn't one."
No, the point of his wanting a cigarette is that he can't easily gain access any cigarettes. There are cigarettes.
Granted, you can alter this sentence, to something like "John wants Frodo to come to his birthday party". But now we're back to the original question of what is meant by this sentence. I'd say it is probably better phrased as "John wants 'Frodo' to come to his birthday party", or maybe even "John wants someone to come to his birthday party in a Frodo-costume" (even though John himself would adamantly deny that he wants someone to come to his birthday party in a Frodo-costume - he would say he "wants the real Frodo").
"Some thing is not a thing" is not equivalent to "A non-thing thing exists"?
What about "Some thing is not existent" and "A non-existent thing exists"? These are Brentano equivalents, right?
[quote]The categorical proposition "Some man is not learned" has the same meaning as the existential proposition "A non-learned man exists" or "there is a non-learned man".[/quote]
http://www.logicmuseum.com/cantor/Eximport.htm
>>What about "Some thing is not existent" and "A non-existent thing exists"? These are Brentano equivalents, right?
The distinction between 'indefinite' predication (is a non-man) and the negation of the definite (is not a man) is not discussed by Brentano as far as I know. Anthony, can we talk about this one later?
"Anthony, can we talk about this one later?"
Sure.
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