I know about the difference between a pointer and the thing pointed to. I'm a software engineer. Its all a lot clearer in an artificial language; one day philosophers will realise that.This is breathtaking both in its ignorance and (for that reason) in its arrogance. For the entire history of Anglo-American philosophy since Frege in the 1880s and Russell in the 1900s onwards is about using the insights acquired from the development of the predicate calculus - mainly by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica - to address ancient philosophical problems.
Russell says "I remain convinced that obstinate addiction to ordinary language in our private thoughts is one of the main obstacles to progress in philosophy"*. Russell's early work explored the idea that the misleading subject-predicate form of traditional Aristotelian logic was responsible for the pernicious defects of monism. His theory of descriptions is intended to show that by using a formal language to analyse a problematic sentence like 'the king of France is bald', we can resolve an apparently intractable philosophical problem. Following that, almost the entire program of Anglo-American analytic philosophy (AAA) is to address philosophical problems by analysing ambigous, vague statements expressed in ordinary language into precise, crisp, verifiable statements in some formal or artificial language. Obviously the distinction between 'pointer and thing pointed to', which is essential to Tarski's theory of truth, has a significant place in this program.
So what is it that philosophers are not realising?
*Quoted in R.M. Sainsbury, "The Perfect Language", Russell, Routledge 1979, p.140