Kilwardby on the usefulness of logic

As I argued before, Ockham's nominalism is not simply about whether universals exist or not.  It is more radical than that: problems in philosophy and theology arise from misunderstandings and disagreements about logic.  This is not an idea that originated with him, as the following quote* from the mid thirteenth-century theologian Robert Kilwardby shows.

The origin of this science [i.e. logic] ... was as follows.  Since in connection with philosophical matters there were many contrary opinions and thus many errors (because contraries are not true at the same time regarding the same thing), thoughtful people saw that this stemmed from a lack of training in reasoning, and that there could be no certainty in knowledge without training in reasoning.  And so they studied the process of reasoning in order to reduce it to an art, and they established this science by means of which they completed and organised both this [science] itself and all others; and it is the science of the method of reasoning on all [subject] matters.

Note that 'logic' in the medieval period covered more than formal logic, and covered metaphysics, semantics, informal and demonstrative reasoning as well. Nor did symbolic logic exist.  Medieval logic is the logic of natural language, as ordinary people use it in argumentation.

*De ortu scientarum, ed. Albert G. Judy, London, The British Academy, 1976, chapter 53.

On defining nominalism

"According to Ockham, everything in external reality is singular".  This is not a good way of characterising Ockham's nominalism, for it could equally apply to some of the brands of realism which he criticises and caricatures.  For example, a realist who holds that a universal is a singular thing, inhering in some way in many things, also holds that everything (including universals) is singular. But they would clearly not be a nominalist.

A similar observation applies to the so-called  Ockham's razor.  "Do not multiply entities beyond what is necessary". Sure, but realists agree with that too. The disagreement is over what counts as necessary.  Realists would hold that universals are necessary, of course.

Ockham and Bradley's regress

I am currently working on chapter 51 of Ockham’s Summa Logicae, and I have spotted something that looks very much like Bradley’s regress. He writes

Nec illud quod subiungitur de materia et forma, subiecto et accidente, toto et partibus, et spiritibus unitis corporibus concludit rem relativam mediam inter illa unita. Eadem enim quaestio remaneret de illa re media: quomodo facit unum cum eo in quo poneretur? Aut enim se ipsa, et eadem ratione standum fuit in primis unibilibus; aut alia unione, et tunc procedetur in infinitum.

I am still working on a translation, but it means something like this. The context is Ockham’s argument against the existence of relation as a distinct category of thing separate from the things that are related. He says that the joining of matter and form, subject and accident, whole and parts etc into one object does not imply the existence of a relation-entity intermediate between the two. For the same question would apply to the relation-entity. How is the relation made one with the thing (such as the unity of matter and from) in which it is posited? Either by itself, and by the same reasoning we should have stopped at the first two things capable of being united (e.g. matter and form alone), or by another union, and then there would be an infinite regress.

But this is Bradley’s regress, or something very similar to it.  Bradley did not invent his regress!

An interesting side note: the Latin phrase eadem ratione standum fuit in primo seems to be a stock phrase always used in the context of regress proofs. Burley uses the same argument, and the same phrase here, arguing that if something X exists, this is either because of its essence, or from something added to its essence. If because of its essence, then existence is part of essence. If because of something else Y added to the essence, then Y exists either because of its essence, or by something added to its essence. If by something Z added to Y, then we have to ask the same thing about Z, and so on ad infinitum. But if by its essence, then by the same reasoning we should have stopped in the first place (eadem ratione fuit standum in primo). I.e. if it is enough for Y to exist because of its essence, the same reasoning applies to the starting point X, and we should have stopped there.

A similar argument, and the same phrase, is used by Thomas in lecture 3 on Book 10 of the Metaphysics. When a man is said to be one, the term one does not express a different nature from man, just as being does not express a different nature from the ten categories; for, if it did express a different nature, an infinite regress would necessarily result, since that nature too would be said to be one and a being. And if being were to express a nature different from these things, an infinite regress would also follow; but if not, then by the same reasoning we should have stopped at the first instance (pari ratione standum fuit in primo). See also Summa I Q6 a3 arg3, where he argues that good is good essentially, and not by something added to it, Summa I Q27 a3 arg1, where he argues that no other procession exists in God besides that of the Word, Summa IIa Q109 a6 arg3, arguing that a man does not need grace in order to prepare for grace, and De Potentia Q3 arg 7 arg7, arguing that the forces of nature suffice for the action of nature without God operating therein.

See also Albertus, Metaphysics IV iv (scanned but not corrected or translated), where he argues that there is no medium between odd and even.

It’s interesting because the stock phrase suggests a stock argument, and therefore its use by writers prior to Ockham suggests the argument did not originate with him. But it is a stock argument against multiplying entities. We must choose reason 1 which tells us not to multiply entities, and reason 2 which tells us we must multiply. If we choose reason 2, we get another entity, but then must choose between reason 1a, which tells us to stop there, and 2b which tells us to continue multiplying. But if we choose 2b, we get an infinite regress. Therefore choose reason 1a. But now the crucial point: reason 1a is the same as reason 1, therefore by the same reason whoy not just stop at 1 - pari ratione standum fuit in primo.

Ockham uses this argument all over the place in the Summa, and it is pretty much the basis of his nominalism. But the examples above suggest that it did not originate with him. His genius lay in seeing its application in metaphysics and logic, in using it as the foundation for his nominalistic program, and in writing the Summa, which is a masterpiece of extended argument, intermixed with polemic and some entertaining ranting and abuse. (More on the ranting and abuse later).

The Maverick gives an interesting symmetry argument that Ockham’s maxim about not multiplying entities according to the multiplicity of terms does not support classic nominalism, namely the view that there is no singular entity, no 'universal', signified by a common term. He writes

If the Razor forbids the multiplication of categories of entity according to the multiplicity of categories of terms, then I agree, but fail to see how this supports nominalism. There are singular terms and there are general terms. Someone who maintains that only general terms, but no singular terms, enjoy extralingusitic reference would be well within the stricture laid down by the Razor as your formulate it.

I don't disagree. Clearly more is required, and we have to look to Ockham’s semantics to get classic nominalism. Ockham, in common with most 13th and 14th century philosophers of language, held that there is a relation of ‘supposition’ between terms and extra-mental objects. Thus ‘man’ supposits for Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and so on. Exactly the same relation holds between singular terms like ‘Socrates’ and the object they supposit for (in this case, Socrates). The only difference between common and singular term is that the latter are naturally suited to supposit for only one individual, whereas the former can supposit for as many as you like.

Given this, and given the Razor, classical nominalism certainly does follow. It is fruitless to posit a singular entity designated by the common term ‘man’, which Socrates, Plato, Aristotle etc., fall under in some odd way, when you can explain it in the simpler way above. A common term does not signify a singular entity. Rather, it signifies many entities.

In summary, Ockham's maxim does not on its own support classic nominalism.  We have to add his semantics as well.

On not multipying entities

There is a nice post today by the Maverick on “The Use and Abuse of Occam's Razor: On Multiplying Entities Beyond Necessity” There are few points to raise. Maverick writes “Occam's Razor is standardly taken to be a principle of theoretical economy or parsimony that states: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity.” True, it is standardly taken thus, but as Thorburn showed nearly 100 years ago, Ockham did not say exactly that. He actually said that plurality is not to be posited without necessity (Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate). Moreover, it is not ‘his’ razor. Scotus (on the lines of whose thinking Ockham’s thinking is largely developed) used it, and it is probably earlier than that. He also says that is vain to bring about through more what can be brought about by fewer (frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora).

Furthermore, the maxim does not really capture the spirit of Ockham’s nominalism, which is better expressed by his claim that one cause of error is ‘to multiply entities according to the multiplicity of terms, and that every term has a (corresponding) real essence’ (Secunda radix est multiplicare entia secundum multitudinem terminorum, et quod quilibet terminus habet quid rei).

He says this at the end of chapter 51 of the monumental and magnificient Summa Logicae, of whose structure you can get a flavour here. Chapters 40-62 are a long discussion of Aristotle’s categories, and Ockham’s objective, after some essential preliminaries set out in chapters 1-17, is to show that most of the ten categories are not really types of being at all, but really types of term. For example, chapter 51 is part of chapters 49-54 on Aristotle’s category of relation (ad aliquid, relatio). Ockham wants to show that the term ‘relation’ is not a name for a particular type of thing, outside the mind, really distinct from some absolute thing (res extra animam, distincta realiter a re absoluta). Otherwise, whenever a donkey moved down on earth below, every heavenly body would be changed in itself, because of the change in its spatial relation with the donkey. Or we might mistakenly suppose that a father is a father by some extramental thing such as ‘paternity’.

We are led into these errors from the ease with which Latin (and other romance languages, but Ockham rarely talks about these) is able to construct abstract terms like ‘fatherhood’ from concrete terms like ‘father’. He discusses this in chapter 5 and subsequently. Such terms have a similar beginning verbally, but different endings, and the abstract nearly always has more syllables than the concrete. Ockham argues that the concrete and the abstract are really synonyms. To say that Socrates has humanity is no more than to say that Socrates is a man. For this reason there are no abstract names corresponding to many concrete names. E.g. though we frequently use the names ‘cow’, ‘donkey’, ‘goat’, there are no corresponding abstract terms like ‘cowhood’ or ‘donkeyness’. And the ancient philosophers did not use this diversity “except as an ornament of speech, or for some other accidental reason, just as in the case of synonymous names.” [--]

On miracles, the supernatural and the burden of proof

Vallicella of Phoenix has an interesting and worthwhile series of posts on the burden of proof, of which the latest is here. In that, he writes

For one who plays the scientific 'game' and abides by its rules, there is no question but that the burden of proof lies on the one who asserts that there are miracles. No scientist worth his salt could hold that there is a presumption in favor of the existence of miracles. It is the other way around: there is an exceedingly strong, if not quite indefeasible, presumption in favor of their nonexistence, and indeed of the nonexistence of anything nonnatural. But this onus-assignment is relative to the scientific 'game' and partially constitutive of it.

Two points. First, I don’t believe there is any scientific ‘game’. The burden of proof is simply to show that any event, or kind of event exists. The default position is to reject all existence claims – not just miracles.

Second, I don’t believe there is any such kind of thing as a miracle (or supernatural event). But there are kinds of accounts, which fall into several easily identifiable patterns. For example, if we define ‘miracle’ as the purported referent of an account which is inherently implausible and unsupported by any strong evidence (and usually and in addition there exists evidence that the claim is being made for reasons unrelated to scientific objectivity) of course the default position is to reject miracles, and the burden of proof is to supply the evidence that is conspicuously lacking.

It is not that scientists hold a strong presumption in favour of the nonexistence of a certain type of event (‘the nonnatural’), as Vallicella appears to suggest. Rather, that there is a strong presumption by scientists in favour of rejecting the existence of anything referred to by a certain type of account. The ‘burden of proof’ is merely the requirement to supply a certain kind of account.

Ockham's arguments against universals

I am reading, and having a stab at translating, chapters 15-17 of Ockham's Summa Logicae.  This is one of a number of places where Ockham argues against the view that a universal is something really existing outside the mind (one of the important others being questions 4-6 of Dist. 2, Book I of his commentary on the Sentences**).  I have copied one of his arguments is below, in the original Latin, with the translations by Loux*** and Boehner****.

Neither of the translations exactly reflects the Latin - perhaps because of the difficulty in making sense of the Latin.

Latin*	Loux	Boehner
Item, sequeretur quod aliquid de essentia Christi esset miserum et damnatum, quia illa natura communis exsistens realiter in Christo et in damnato esset damnata, quia in Iuda. Hoc autem absurdum est.	Again, it follows that something of the essence of Christ would be miserable and damned, since that common nature really existing in Christ would be damned in the damned individual; for surely that essence is also in Judas. But this is absurd.	Furthermore, it follows that something of the essence of Christ would be miserable and damned; since that common nature which really exists in Christ, really exists in Judas also and is damned.Therefore, something is both in Christ and in one who is damned, namely in Judas. That, however, is absurd.

* Opera Philosophica I - Summa Logicae, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. : Editiones Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, 1974. 899 p., eds Boehner, Philotheus, Gál, Gedeon, 1915- Brown, Stephen.
** Opera Theologica II - Scriptum in librum primum sententiarum, Franciscan Institute, 1967-79, pp. 99-224.
*** Loux, Michael J. 1974. Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
**** In Ockham: Philosophical Writings, a selection, Philotheus Boehner, Stephen F. Brown, 1990.

Carentional objects

Are there intentional objects? Well, are there carentional objects? Let me explain. Suppose we are house hunting, but reject the following houses because

(A) Number 15 lacks a bathroom
(B) Number 18 lacks a kitchen
(C) Number 6 lacks a garden

What is the common property or quiddity or essence of bathrooms at number 15, kitchens at number 18, gardens at number 6? Why, they are ‘things that are lacked’! So let’s define a Latin term ‘carentionality’ to signify the essence or common property of all objects corresponding to the accusative of the verb ‘lacks’! Let’s translate (A) as ‘Number 15’s lacking has a carentional object’ or ‘Number 18 stands in a carentionality relation to some kitchen’.

We could even restate Bill Vallicella's famous aporetic triad as follows:

(1) Some objects lack the nonexistent
(2) Carentionality is a relation between an object, and the object that is lacked
(3) Every R is such that, if R obtains,then all its relata exist

But of course the whole point of the accusative of ‘lacks’ is precisely that there is no object corresponding to it. Otherwise nothing is lacking! The realist will perhaps object that this house is lacking something (a bathroom, a kitchen, a garden). The nominalist agrees, but disagrees that this implies that the house possesses something, or stands in some relation to something, as a result. The logic of ‘is lacking’ is entirely different from, indeed opposite to, the logic of ‘possesses’.

We could even truly say ‘something is lacking in this house – a bathroom’. But that just proves how careful we must be in analysing ordinary English sentences. For we cannot formalise that sentence as ‘for some x, x is in this house and x is lacking’.

Note also the similarity between ‘is lacking’ and ‘is wanting’ as in ‘a single man with a good fortune is in want of a wife’, which is a truth universally acknowledged.

Further thought: there is a whole class of verbs – which in most cases are the same words as the recognised ‘intentional’ verbs, which take an impersonal, non-animate subject. For example

Number 15 lacks a garden
Our bedroom wants a good clean.
That paper deserves an A grade.
This chair is missing a leg.

In all cases, they have the characteristic feature of the properly ‘intentional’ verbs of there not being an object corresponding to their accusative. I.e. there is no garden at no 15, our bedroom has not had a cleaning, the paper didn’t receive an A grade, the chair doesn’t have a leg and so on. In most or all cases we can replace the accusative noun with ‘something’, e.g. if the house lacks a garden, it lacks something, if the chair is missing a leg, it is missing something, and so on. Why is it that these constructions do not tempt us into ‘metaphysical’ theories about the accusative? I’m assuming not, anyway. We aren’t tempted to say that the chair is missing the non-existent. Or to invent a word like ‘carentional’ (from the Latin ‘to lack’) to describe some relation between the chair and some ‘queer’ entity.

Meinong's gambit

In yesterday’s post I argued that not only is the inference

(*) Vallicella is discussing a non-existent thing, therefore something is non-existent

invalid, but that practically everyone will agree it is invalid. Even the most hardened and extreme realist or Meinongian will concede the possibility that nothing is non-existent (even though, as a matter of fact, they believe that some things actually are non-existent). It follows that they cannot use Meinong's gambit to explain intentionality. They can’t explain Bill’s thought as being somehow about a non-existing thing, because they concede that he could have the same thought even if there were no such objects at all.

With this in mind, we can approach the problem which (according to Bill Vallicella here) is central to the phenomenon of intentionality. Bill says that the problem can be expressed in terms of an aporetic triad, saying that while each of these propositions has some claim to plausibility, all three cannot be correct. At least one must be false. Which?

W1. We sometimes think about the nonexistent.
W2. Intentionality is a relation between thinker and object of thought.
W3. Every relation R is such that, if R obtains,then all its relata exist.

I will begin by ‘Ockhamising’ these propositions so that they express the same problem, but in language more acceptable to an Ockhamist. (E.g. I argued here that a term like ‘the nonexistent’ is question-begging).

O1. The proposition ‘Bill is discussing a nonexistent thing’ can be true even when there are no nonexistent things.
O2. The proposition ‘Bill is discussing a nonexistent thing’ expresses a relation between two things.
O3. Every relation is such that if it obtains, all of its relata exist.

With my previous comments in mind, the answer may now be obvious. We can assume that the first proposition is true. The third proposition must also be true. As argued above, the realist cannot plead the ‘nonexistence’ amendment. He can’t argue that the third proposition is false because Bill’s thought may relate him to a nonexistent thing. For the problem remains even when there are no nonexistent things. It is not that we sometimes think of the nonexistent. It is that the predicate "Bill is thinking of ---" may not apply to anything at all, rather than applying to some nonexistent something. Thus, even if there were nonexistent things, this would not explain the problem of intentionality, i.e. the problem that all three propositions above are inconsistent.

It remains that the second proposition must be false. Indeed, isn’t this obvious? The simplest and most economical hypothesis to explain this is that while the proposition ‘Bill is discussing a nonexistent thing’ has grammatically the form of a relation, and is syntactically similar to ‘Bill is meeting his wife’, it does not actually express or signify a relation. What other explanation is there? The second proposition has no claim to plausibility at all.

This explanation involves no recourse to ‘queer objects’ of any kind. The underlying logic of the proposition must be different to the underlying logic of ‘Bill is meeting his wife’. As is manifest and provable, for the latter implies ‘someone is such that Bill is talking to her’. ‘Something is such that Bill is discussing it’.

Distinguishing queer from straight

In my previous post I gave four criteria for distinguishing ‘queer’ from ‘straight’ terms. The most important of these was the last one: a queer term does not refer to or denote anything, and thus does not pick out any category or kind of thing. Bill Vallicella and Peter Lupu are now impatiently challenging me on this. What are the considerations or criteria on the basis of which we decide how to draw the distinction between terms which refer or denote*, and those which do not refer or denote?

There are several techniques used by Ockham throughout Summa Logicae. The one I will use is as follows. Take any proposition p containing a possibly queer occurrence of some term F. Construct a proposition q that uses the term to assert that there are F’s – preferably avoiding the use of ‘exists’ or its cognates, to prevent the realist from driving a wedge between ‘something’ and ‘some existing thing’. Then show, by logical analysis, that p does not entail q, i.e. it is possible that p is true but q false. We can easily do this using an earlier example.

(1) Jake is looking for a gold mine in Surrey, therefore some gold mine is in Surrey.

Even the most hardened realist will agree that the inference is not valid. For it is perfectly possible that the antecedent is true, and that Jake is looking for a gold mine in Surrey, but the consequent false – for there is no gold mine in Surrey, and so ‘some gold mine is in Surrey’ is false. Note my careful use of the categorical sentences ‘some gold mine …’ and ‘no gold mine …’ here, and the avoidance of the word ‘exists’. This is necessary in case the realist argues that there is no existing gold mine in Surrey, i.e. there are gold mines, but they are not ‘existing’ or ‘existent’ ones. We reply: that there is no gold mine in Surrey, not even in this qualified sense. It is not that there is no existent gold mine, as though there could be some non-existent gold mine. That is an abuse of language, and it leads far from the truth. There are no gold mines in Surrey at all.

This reasoning can be confirmed as follows. Consider

(2) Vallicella is discussing a non-existent thing, therefore something is non-existent

The realist cannot explain away the truth of the antecedent, as he might try to do with ‘gold mine in Surrey’, by reference to non-existent things. For he agrees that the inference is invalid, therefore he agrees that the consequent is false, and so nothing is non-existent. It is not merely that the non-existent does not exist (as though there were some things, which happen to exemplify the property of non-existence). It is that nothing - not even a non-existent thing - is non-existent.

Thus I have distinguished a ‘queer’ from a ‘straight’ term by purely logical means. Tomorrow, I shall address Vallicella’s ‘aporetic triad’. We can think of the non-existent; ‘thinking of’ is a relation; a relation must relate existing relata. Does the triad make sense? And if it does, which of the propositions is false?

* I have changed Lupu’s wording from “refers in a way that entails ontological commitments” because I do not understand it. If a term refers, by definition it refers to something, and so there is something to which it refers. By Brentano’s equivalence (i.e. ‘there exists an F’ is convertible with ‘there is an F’), it has existential commitment.

Queer entities and the supernatural

Before I go on to discuss what distinguishes ‘queer’ terms from ‘straight’ ones, I should add a third characteristic of queer terms to the two which I gave in my post yesterday. (The first characteristic was that a queer term does not refer to anything. The second, that it must appear, at least to some people, to refer, even though it doesn’t. This is what makes for its ‘queerness’, that illusory quality that deceives some people into believing it has a reference. Its queerness is the linguistic equivalent of an optical illusion).

A further characteristic is necessary to distinguish queer terms from other non-referring terms like ‘dragon’, ‘goblin’, ‘ghost’ and so on. The reason that some people believe these terms refer is unconnected with the reason that metaphysicians believe that there exist such things as intentional objects, or universals, or haecceities. People believe that ghosts exist because they believe that certain objectively verifiable phenomena are evidence for the existence of ghosts. For example, the photograph on the left undoubtedly exists. It is a real photograph that anyone reading this blog can see. And some people may believe it is evidence for ghosts.

But metaphysicians do not use physical items like photographs, recordings, eye-witness reports or anything which is observable, as evidence for the existence of universals or haecceities or whatever. The only evidence required is an argument or a line of reasoning of some kind. To persuade you of the existence of universals, a metaphysician requires only your time, a modicum of intelligence, the ability to read a text, possibly extending over innumerable volumes, considerable patience with his or her obscurities of expression, and a grain of salt. Nothing else is required. The text can be as old as you like. No specific knowledge of the world is required, other than of language and of technical abstract terms, some of which may be invented by the author. This is the ‘evidence’ of the metaphysician. The only laboratory required is an armchair, the only tool a thick pair of reading glasses.

Thus, the third characteristic of a ‘queer term’ is that the reason for believing that it refers must not consist of observable or empirical evidence. The reason must consist of a text that has no reference to the world except the use of abstract terminology. (I was about to say ‘abstract objects’, but these of course are ‘queer’, and Ockhamists generally avoid using queer terms, although they frequently have to mention them).

In summary, a ‘queer term’ is a categorical term such that

1. It does not refer to or denote anything.
2. Some people (metaphysicians) believe that it does denote or refer
3. Their reason for believing this is not based on empirical observation (or revealed by supernatural agency for that matter).

Ockham's nominalism

At this stage, I should discuss Peter Lupu’s objections (mostly in the extended comment on Vallicella’s blog here) to the nominalist program.

I should first explain what I think the nominalist program is. I am taking my lead from a principle that William of Ockham neatly formulates in his Summa Logicae book I, chapter 51, where he accuses 'the moderns' of two errors, and says that the root of the second error is “to multiply entities according to the multiplicity of terms and to suppose that every term has something real (quid rei) corresponding to it”. He says grumpily that this is erroneous and leads far away from the truth. ('Radix est multiplicare entia secundum multitudinem terminorum, et quod quilibet terminus habet quid rei; quod tamen abusivum est et a veritate maxime abducens'). See also an early definition of nominalism here.

What does he mean? Well he says that it is an error. He implies it is a common one, by attributing to the moderns and by the fact he mentions it all. Thus he implies that there exist terms which do not have something real corresponding to them.

If Ockham is correct, the relevant distinction to draw is between queer and straight terms. Straight terms have something real corresponding to them, queer terms don’t. Furthermore, there must at least be some temptation to imagine that queer terms refer to or denote something, otherwise there would be little point in making it.

Which brings me to the main point raised by Peter Lupu, who asks “What are ‘queer-entities’ and how do we determine whether a given entity is “queer” or “straight”? There are two parts to his question. In answer to the first, there are no such things as queer entities, if Ockham is right. There are only ‘queer terms’. These, by definition, are terms that don’t refer to or denote anything, and so by implication there are no ‘queer entities’.

This is what makes any debate with realists difficult. Realists, namely those who think that queer terms refer, will persist in using the queer terms as if they did refer, and so will ask what kinds of thing are referred to, what is their ‘ontological status’ and so on. Ockhamists will naturally refuse to use these terms as if they referred, and refer the names of the terms instead, typically by using real or scare quotes.

There is a similar difficulty in the debate between those who believe in ‘paranormal phenomena’ and those who don’t. Believers talk about ‘the phenomena’ (without scare quotes) as though there were such things as alien abductions, electronic voice phenomena, telepathic radiation and so on. But to use such talk is to presume the existence of such things, as though the only real debate were about their precise nature and properties. Non-believers will rightly refuse to use such terms, and will instead talk about the reports of such things, or of the supposed evidence for them. Reports and evidential phenomena are real enough. The question is whether there exist any things of which they are reports, or evidence.

That deals with Peter's first question. What are queer entities? We can't say, because there are no such things, just as we can't say what kind of things ghosts are. But we can say what 'queer terms' are. These are terms that are categorical, but which (a) have no reference or denotation and (b) appear, or are believed by many, typically on grounds of reason alone, to have a reference or denotation.

Peter’s second point, on how we determine whether given entity is “queer” or “straight”, I will leave for the next post, although clearly the first point applies here also. If the nominalist is right, we cannot ask this question of anything, just as we cannot ask whether a UFO came from Alpha centauri or Betelgeuse. We can only ask whether a given term is queer or straight. More to follow.

Ghosts and metaphysics

Peter Lupu makes the following objection to my claim that there are no substantive theses of metaphysics. Claims such as “there are no universals” are substantive metaphysical theses. But it is also a substantive thesis of nominalism, one which I (as a card-carrying nominalist) would surely uphold. The choice is mine!

I reply: is the thesis that there are no such things as ghosts, a substantive thesis in the theory of ghosts? No. Because it is not a thesis about ghosts. Any thesis in the theory of ghosts is about ghosts. But the thesis that there are no ghosts is a substantive theory not about ghosts, but about the world. Namely, that the world contains no ghosts. Not being a thesis about ghosts, it is not part of the theory of ghosts.

Analogously, the nominalist holds that there are no universals. His thesis is a substantive one, to be sure. But it is not part of the theory of universals. Rather, it is a substantive part of the theory of the world, that it contains no such things as ‘universals’.

Ockham's Razor

"Ockham's Razor" is a misnomer. The phrase itself was not coined until 1852 by Hamilton. The modern formulation of the princple, 'Entities should not be multiplied without necessity', is not found in exactly this wording in the medieval literature, and it seems to have originated with the Scotist Commentator, John Ponce of Cork in 1639. The medieval wording, used by both Scotus and Ockham, was 'Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate' - 'plurality is not to be posited without necessity', and 'Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora' - 'it is vain to make through several, that which can be made through fewer'.

Neither of these capture Ockham's nominalism - a realist may agree that entities should not be multiplied without necessity, but he (or she) will argue against the nominalist that universals re necessary. Ockham neatly formulates a principle that captures his nominalism in Summa book I, chapter 51, where he accuses 'the moderns' of two errors, and says that the root of the second error is to multiply entities according to the multiplicity of terms and to suppose that every term has something real corresponding to it. He says grumpily that this is erroneous and leads far away from the truth. ('Secunda radix est multiplicare entia secundum multitudinem terminorum, et quod quilibet terminus habet quid rei; quod tamen abusivum est et a veritate maxime abducens').

There is more about the myth of the Razor here.