Why is there anything at all?

The Maverick has been banging on about why there is anything at all, and I have been following it but not commenting (one of those questions that are just too difficult, although that did not stop Wittgenstein having a go*). However I did find something about this by Siger of Brabant**. I give his Latin below, together with my rough translation, made hastily over breakfast. I'm not sure how Siger's reply falls into the categories given by Bill.

Latin

English

Non enim omne ens entitatis suae causam habet nec omnis quaestio de esse habet causam. Si enim quaeratur quare magis est aliquid in rerum natura quam nihil, in rebus causatis loquendo, contingit respondere quia est aliquod Primum Movens immobile et Prima Causa intransmutabilis. Si vero quaeratur de tota universitate entium quare magis est in eis aliquid quam nihil, non contingit dare causam, quia idem est quaerere hoc et quaerere quare magis est Deus quam non est, et hoc non habet causam. Unde non omnis quaestio habet causam nec etiam omne ens.

For not every being has a cause of its being, nor does every question about being have a cause. For if it is asked why there is something in the natural world rather than nothing, speaking about the world of created things, it can be replied that there is a First immoveable Mover, and a first unchangeable cause. But if it is asked about the whole universe of beings why there is something there rather than nothing, it is not possible to give a cause, for it's the same to ask this as to ask why there is a God or not, and this does not have a cause. Hence not every question has a cause, nor even every being.

*According to Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein said that he sometimes had a certain experience which could best be described by saying that "when I have it, I wonder at the existence of the world. I am then inclined to use such phrases as 'How extraordinary that anything should exist!'"
**Questions on Metaphysics 4 (ed. W. Dunphy, editions de l'Institut superieur de philosophie, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981 pp. 169-170)

Additions to the Logic Museum

Two new things in the Logic Museum. One a well known piece by Boethius of Dacia, but a new translation and in parallel with the Latin. The other by Siger of Brabant, previously untranslated and also with the Latin (of course: The Logic Museum never publishes a translation without the original).

The pieces concern the familiar question of whether universal propositions are true when nothing is denoted by the subject. Boethius takes an 'externalist' line, arguing that nothing is true, unless there is a corresponding truth in reality. Every A is B asserts a combination of A and B, i..e a really existing combination, ergo is false when no A exists. Other writers of that school and period thought that the proposition, when 'per se' or 'essential' must be true even when no A exists, and even when nothing exists. The questions by Siger reflect the latter position more.

I will shortly be publishing another related set of questions attributed to Scotus, on the very same topic, but publication was delayed owing to my uncertainty about the attribution (it is supposed to be by Scotus, by I am not so sure).

A Happy New Year to all my readers.