A philosophical scandal

Freddoso writes:

It is something of a philosophical scandal that most of the major works of
William of Ockham, himself an Englishman, have yet to be translated into
English. The Summa Logicae, which contains Ockham's most
extensive treatment of logic and philosophy of language, is a case in point.
Even given the translation of part II found here and Michael Loux's recent
translation of part I, more than half of the Summa Logicae remains
untranslated [Ockham's Theory of Propositions, Indiana 1998] .

Freddoso was writing in 1998, and since then the second part of Part III has been translated by John Longeway (and discussed here in a number of posts). But still (as far as I know) there is no translation of the first part of III (on syllogisms, which covers Aristotle's Prior Analytics) and the third part (on consequences, which broadly cover the Topics). There is also much of the Ordinatio that remains.

This is partly explained by the fact that Ockham has had no 'champions'. Aquinas' work has received attention since the nineteenth century because of his role in the intellectual history of the Catholic church. Scotus has always received the support of the Franciscans (although there is less of Scotus in English than Aquinas). Because of Ockham's perceived apostasy, and perhaps because he was perceived as a 'Catholic philosopher' by the early moderns, has received no such attention.

But it is still a scandal that the works of one of England's greatest philosophers have never been completely translated into English.

Ockham: the founder of European empiricism

I am finally getting to the meaty parts of Longeway's book*. He says at the beginning (p.2), and in the 'Ockham and his [medieval] predecessors approached some of the most fundamental problems of a scientific empiricism, both ancient and modern'and that 'Ockham may reasonably be regarded as the founder of empiricism in the European tradition'. This is strong and heady stuff and was a clinching reason for buying the book. After 100 pages, we are getting towards some of the reasons.

I understand Longeway's argument as follows. According to Ockham (Summa I.26), there are three kinds of definition. (1) A nominal definition is a way of setting the meaning of the defined term, and so a is true in virtue of the meaning of the term. E.g. 'a bachelor is an unmarried man. (2) Two kinds of real definition. A metaphysical definition indicates genus and difference, for example 'a man is a rational [differentia] animal [genus]'. (3) A natural definition (Spade translates this as physical definition) is one which signifies obliquely essential parts of the thing defined. For example, 'a triangle is a figure contained by three straight lines'.

Ockham argues (Summa II.ii.35, cited in Longeway p. 112) says that any attempted demonstration will depend upon either the nominal definition of the attribute, and so beg the question, or a metaphysical definition, which is essentially inexplicable and provides no scientific assistance, or a natural definition. Only demonstration using natural definition is truly scientific.

Let's flesh this out. The Aristotelian model for scientific demonstration is as follows.

A B is a C
An A is a B
Therefore, an A is a C

To explain why A is C, Aristotle says we must find a 'middle term' B which is common to A and C. But it is clearly not enough for B simply to be synonymous with C, otherwise the syllogism would beg the question. For example

An unmarried man is a bachelor
John is an unmarried man
Therefore, John is a bachelor.

To understand the term 'batchelor' you have to understand that it means 'unmarried man'. Thus the conclusion moves us no further than the minor premiss 'John is an unmarried man' It expresses the same thing in different terms, having the same meaning, and the 'reasoning' is trivial. Nor is a 'metaphysical definition' of any assistance. We can have a direct intellectual grasp of a thing, but only of its genus, as a whole, 'without any insight into its metaphysical structure' (p.114). 'A demonstration rooted in a grasp of metaphysical definition of the primary subject of an attribute can only occur after this life'.

The only case where true demonstration is possible is in the case where the middle term involves a natural definition. And this can only happen where the subject is something composite. Longeway cites (p. 113) the example of a triangle, with spatial parts arranged in such a way that an analysis of its structure will tell us that it has the attribute in question. This is what happens in geometry and mathematics.

This means that there can be no true scientific explanation of things which are essentially simple. Ockham thinks we cannot explain heat, for example, because we cannot explain it in terms of of composition and mathematics. As Longeway explains it "The natural definition of an attribute is of no assistance here for the straightforward reason that a simple quality such as heat has no variety or structure of essential parts, but is rather uniformly alike in every one of its parts. No mechanism by which heat heats is there to uncover. It just heats. And this can only be known from experience" (p. 113)

We can only apply mathematical techniques to things in nature which they are composite, and which can be defined in terms of their material parts. Thus (for Ockham) we cannot have a scientific explanation of substance. Ockham still holds to the Aristotelian view that the causal properties of a substance cannot be explained in terms of the substance's parts. According to Aristotle, substances are essentially simple. Their properties follow from their substantial form (the essence of a substance, corresponding to a species). A substantial form is what is signified by the definiens of a definition. A substantial form is a universal (since only universals are definable - see Metaphysics Z8 1034a6-8). A substantial form is immaterial (because a substance is a combination of material and form). A substantial form is simple (Metaphysics Z12). If the properties of a species could be explained by composition, a substance would not be an essential unity, and so would not be a substance, but a collection of substances.

This is interesting, but doesn't really explain why we should regard Ockham as the founder of European empiricism. As Longeway points out, real progress only began when Descartes and Boyle "insisted on mathematical-mechanical modes of explanation connecting one accident of material substance to another, rather than explanations of the first attributes of material substance". (p.115) One of the essential ingredients of modern science is the rejection of the Aristotelian doctrine of substantial forms. (See Locke about this here, especially section 10). Since Ockham did not reject substantial forms, why should we regard him as the founder of modern science?

Longeway gives no convincing reply to this line of reasoning, except for suggesting that once Ockham has shown the impossibility of scientific explanation using metaphysical definition, it is tempting to look for explanations in terms of natural definition.

we know that early modern scientists were so tempted, and Descartes and others
rejected the assujmption immaterial substantial forms underlying biological
properties precisely because such an assumption did nothing to provide an
understanding why animals and plants have the properties in question. (p 115)

Since our only tool for understanding why is analysis in terms of material parts and the application of mathematics, it would be natural to be tempted by materialist reductionism in biology.

* Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham: A Translation of Summa Logicae III-II: De Syllogismo Demonstrativo, and Selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio.

Indifference to science

A few things have reminded me of philosophers' indifference to actual science. The first was my own fault. I linked to this explanation of why glass is transparent, but after second thoughts and a bit longer on Google, the explanation seems completely wrong. I suspect the explanation (if you can follow it) in Wikipedia is the correct one, although (as I constantly remind my readers) you should beware of anything you read in Wikipedia. The second reminder is the supply of amusing and interesting scientific explanations by medieval authors quoted in Longeway's book. All of them are wrong. Grosseteste gives an explanation of thunder that involves hot and cold air mixing, expanding and producing flame, then quenching the flame with an audible explosion (the thunder). Any explanation of thunder that does not involve electricity (and the associated concepts of charge) is clearly wrong. And how about this wonderfully dodgy piece of neuroscience (from Albertus Magnus, quoted in Longeway p.56).

(1) In everyone in which there is an appetite for pain in what opposes him, there is an accession of blood to the heart from the evaporation of gall;
(2) in someone who is angry there is an appetite for pain in what is opposed to him;
(3) therefore, in one who is angry there is an accession of blood to the heart from the evaporation of gall.

The science mentioned by philosophers is often very bad. That in itself does not mean they are indifferent to science, but I believe they are indifferent as well. They are philosophers, and the actual science does not affect any philosophical point being made. I can easily change the example given in my earlier post as follows

Propter quid
Light passes through any substance which neither reflects it nor absorbs it
Glass neither reflects nor absorbs light
Therefore light passes through glass.

I will leave the construction of the corresponding quia form as an exercise. Note also that you would need to combine this with further syllogism involving an account of why glass neither reflects nor absorbs light (a substance absorbs light when its electron orbitals are spaced such that they can absorb a quantum of light (or photon) of a specific frequency, and does not violate selection rules). But none of that matters. The philosophical point is the same. Similarly, we could alter Albert's example to use a favourite example (probably equally dodgy) of modern philosophers of science as follows.

In everyone in which there is an appetite for pain in what opposes him, there is an appropriate stimulation of c-fibers in the hypothalmus
in someone who is angry there is an appetite for pain in what is opposed to him;
therefore, in one who is angry there is an appropriate stimulation of c-fibers in the hypothalmus

Aristotle's point is that every scientific explanation involves interposing a 'middle' B between some empirical truth of the form 'A is C', so we get a demonstration of the form

All B is C
This A is B
Therefore this A is C

which is meant to explain why the empirical truth is really true. All scientific demonstration involves 'finding a middle', and this point can be illustrated whether or not the scientific truth 'All B is C' is bad science or not. This is all about the philosophy of science, not science itself.

Which raises a further interesting point. Given that these medieval philosophers (Grosseteste, Albert, Aquinas, Ockham) were doing philosophy of science, not science itself, does that mean that all the medieval writing about 'science' was really philosophy of science? Which raises the difficult question of whether there really was a scientific revolution in the thirteenth century. And raises yet another question: do we need the philosophy of science, or an approach resembling the one adopted by the Aristotelian philosophers, in order to explain the most fundamental and difficult problems of science? Recall the Aristotelian definition of science: knowledge arrived at by demonstration. What kind of demonstration explains the phenomenon of anger? How do we explain anger in terms of the mechanical stimulation of 'c-fibres'? What kind of stimulation would explain anger at further bouts of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve? Is philosophical indifference to science, merely indifference to science of a certain kind? But enough for now.

Why light passes through glass

The Longeway book arrived very quickly (2 days) and is a credit to Amazon . Compare this with Waterstone's, who had no copy in any of their London shops, and who said that ordering may take weeks or months, or with the university libraries in London (only UCL library had a copy, but this horribly-designed and uncomfortable building is to be visited only as a last resort).

There is much to say about the book. The introduction is long and as interesting as the reviews suggest. One example, illustrating Longeway's attention to detail, is the way he notices the interesting passage by Aristotle at 88a11. This is in some ways more interesting than the later and better known passage about the lunar eclipse beginning at 89b26. In the case of the eclipse it is theoretically possible for us directly to observe to cause of the eclipse (namely, as he says at 90a24, if we were living on the moon). In the case the transparency of glass, by contrast, it is theoretically impossible for us to observe directly the passage of light through the 'pores' in glass. The passage is also interesting for the insight that some ancient Greek scientists thought that the transparency of glass could be explained through some atomic or molecular theory.

On why glass actually is transparent, see this elementary explanation. It is intended for children, although I didn't follow it that well. It says the reason is that the molecules in liquids are disorganised and random, and so light can pass through them. It cannot pass through solids, because the arrangement of molecules is ordered (I didn't follow this reasoning). Light passes through all liquids, glass is a liquid, therefore light can pass through glass (I did follow this, however).

Note we can express the second reasoning in both Aristotelian propter quid and quia forms, as follows.

Propter quid
Light passes through liquids
Glass is a liquid
Therefore, light passes through glass

Quia
Light only passes through liquids
Light passes through glass
Therefore glass is a liquid

My earlier observations apply here as well. Both syllogisms are essentially trivial and hardly count as 'reasoning' at all. The real reasoning involves how we arrive at the (superficially implausible) premiss that glass is a liquid.

Longeway on Ockham on science

There's a neat review here of John Longeway's translation of book III-II of Ockham's Summa Logicae*. I can't vouch for it, as I haven't got hold of the book itself (it is on the reading list), but it seems coherent and well-written (my first line of defence against nonsense on the Internet).

The book is an English translation of Ockham's commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, and includes an extensive commentary and a history of the intellectual background to Ockham's work. Longeway argues for Ockham's importance as the founder of empiricism in the West. According to the review:

... he avoided that error of Early Modern empiricism that now seems most
objectionable: the attempt to construct our public world from purely subjective
experience. Ockham is a direct realist, relying on the causal relation between
concept and object to establish the concept's reference. In his view, what makes
belief cognition is the right causal relation between the knower and what is
known, not the possession of a sufficient justification for one's belief.

Definitely worth acquiring. Unfortunately (and surprisingly) not yet in the Warburg Library, so we shall see if Waterstones can deliver.

* Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham: A Translation of Summa Logicae III-II: De Syllogismo Demonstrativo, and Selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio.