Dangerous children's books

Stephen Law is writing a children's book.  I was entertained by this part

The discovery that electricity is what makes our muscles move was discovered a long time ago – back in 1791, by Luigi Alysio Galvaniby. He found that the muscles of dead frogs twitched when they were struck by an electric spark.
In fact, when someone’s heart stops beating, doctors sometimes use a machine to restart their heart with a jolt of electricity. The patient is brought back to life with an electric shock.
Why does electric shock work? Well, the heart is a big muscle that pumps blood around the body. Your heart beats each time it gets a little electric shock from your brain. So when it stops beating, it can sometimes be restarted with an extra big shock of electricity.
But beware. A big shock of electricity can stop your heart beating forever. Electricity is dangerous stuff.

The writer's train of thought is almost in neon.  Kids, electricity, wires, applying high voltage to body parts, electrocution of young ones, lawsuits against author of children's book, disappearance of any profit from book, possible homelessness etc.

Stephen (judging from the photo on his blog) is from that generation who remember plugs that you could unscrew and thus easily get access to copper wires with high voltage, so you could see which things explode when you electrocute them. First, this is no longer possible, as plugs are just solid plastic now.  Second, kids aren't interested in stuff like electricity any more, except insofar as it powers computers and moronic video games.

Also, why is anyone writing a book for kids, these days?

Arguments from similarity

I thought some more about the evolution argument I discussed yesterday, and decided that, the argument is sufficiently general to be addressed by general logical principles, and does not require detailed knowledge of the science of DNA. The argument is that Unqualified appeals to similarity do not demonstrate common descent any more than they demonstrate common design. Which is absolutely correct. The argument “X’s are similar, therefore X’s have a common descent” lacks a middle, and is therefore invalid. To make it valid, we need a premiss that connects the term ‘similar’ to the term ‘have a common descent’. The premiss ‘X’s that are similar have a common descent’ would clearly do, but is clearly untrue. For example, pebbles that have been washed over by the tide for many years are all similar in that they are smooth, but they have no common descent. Snowflakes all display a common form, but have no common descent, etc.

The real principle we need to appeal to is that things which are similar are (or are highly likely to be) similar by a common nature or cause. The scholastics had a wonderful word for this: ratio, which has a common meaning that cannot be translated by any single word, but which in the present context would be translated by ‘reason’ or even ‘explanation’. When we see things with an identical or similar structure, there should be a explanation or reason for this. Pebbles washed by the tide are smooth for the very reason that they are washed by the tide, being knocked against other pebbles, smoothing the pointy bits. Snowflakes are similar because they are all water, which has a consistent molecular structure (at least I assume so, otherwise I’ll leave this to experts).

Primates and humans share similar DNA. There should be a reason for this. One reason is that God made the DNA similar. But is there a simpler explanation? Surely there is. Science tells us that DNA is a highly complex molecule. Common experience tells us that DNA is very ‘weak’ – it degrades quickly outside its natural environment, which is a living organism. So DNA cannot randomly occur. We also know, from common experience, that it can occur by reproduction. Humans reproduce other humans, primates reproduce primates, plants reproduce plants. (I have a spider plant in the attic that I have replicated for more than 20 years by the usual well-understood techniques). So, one simple explanation for the similarity of DNA is that it replicates itself. It reproduces its form in matter (Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen etc. molecules).

Thus, the simplest explanation of the similarity of form of DNA is by replication or reproduction. This does not require invoking a designer who caused the similarity.

Evidence for evolution?

An interesting article here.  Interesting because, though apparently by a Christian fundamentalist anti-evolutionist, who in my experience are not the most cogent or reasonable of apologists, it does indeed appear cogently and reasonably written.  For example, he says "Unqualified appeals to similarity do not demonstrate common descent any more than they demonstrate common design".

Since I know practically nothing about evolution, and rarely watch nature programs mainly because I dislike animals (smelly, poor conversationalists), I leave it to others to comment.

Objective reality

Some of the more serious minded are getting irritated by this.  Someone called Dr. Pamela Gerloff, who claims to hold a "doctorate in Human Development" from Harvard University tells us that it is possible to cure yourself of cancer, heal other people, fix broken TVs simply by the power of the human mind (or awareness), by "seeing them as perfect".  She quotes, with apparent approval, one practitioner saying "If a nuclear bomb were to go off right now next to you, you wouldn't have to be affected by it."

The comments, both from the ones who find it a little unconvincing, and from others who are more sympathetic, are worth reading.  Philosopher Stephen Law writes "Are you actually suggesting that if we really, really believe we can fly by flapping our arms, and jump of the roof, then we will fly? Surely this takes the "power of positive thinking" too far?!".  Gerloff's reply included this gem:

From my point of view, and in my ongoing experience of life, I do not make the kind of judgments, decisions, and conclusions that you do about what is "objectively real" and what is not. When I say "anything is possible" I mean that in my operative framework of reality, I find it useful to approach the world *as if* anything is possible. It is possible/potentially not possible all at once.

I generally recommend people not to get upset about this sort of thing,  because in nearly all cases, and I think in this one, the problem is a simple logical confusion.  Clearly Gerloff does make the same judgments about what is 'objectively real' as we all do. I am sure she looks carefully when she crosses a busy street, and turns the gas burner off after she finishes cooking, and all those things.

Also, it's clear that even to disagree that there is such a thing as objective reality requires the existence of an objective.  Suppose Gerloff says "there is no objective reality".  Perhaps she means by that, that all reality is personal, or subjective, or constitutes her "operative framework of reality", or something like that.

But then she is saying that it is true that there is no objective reality.  And if I disagree with her (as I do), I have to say that this is false.  And to do that, I have to deny what she is saying.  I.e. whatever it was that she is saying is true, I am saying is false.  So that same thing - the thing she is asserting, and the thing I am denying - has to be common to both of  us.  We both have to get hold of the same proposition or thought or statement in order for her to assert it, and for me to deny it.

So, in order for me to disagree with Gerloff, there has to be an objective reality.   And I do disagree with her. Hence there is an objective reality.

Does evolutionary biology refute the doctine of original sin?

Maverick philosopher asks here whether the doctrine of Original Sin is empirically refutable by evolutionary biology. He argues not, because it is absurd to suppose that the doctrine of the Fall 'stands or falls' with the truth of a passage in Genesis literally interpreted. I think he is right if it is the literal interpretation – of original biologically human parents – that is the intended target. But, as I argued earlier, evolutionary biology addresses the ‘spiritual’ interpretation of the Fall also. The doctrine of Original Sin is roughly this:

1. We are beset by a host of evils (e.g. crime, illness, sexual desire) that make our existence in this life wretched.
2. This present wretched state is a punishment.
3. The punishment is for an act committed by distant ancestors.

Interpreting ‘evil’ as a threat to our survival, evolutionary biology explains this as the result of life having evolved by competition for survival. Since competition for survival always involves the danger of extinction, it is only natural that our life should be ‘wretched’ in this sense. (That sexual desire is an evil is a view of Augustine’s that we should leave for later).

The second assumption – that this state is a kind of punishment – is in no way consistent with evolutionary biology. In evolutionary biology, there is no one to mete out punishment. And the third assumption, that we are being punished for something that others did, makes no sense for the same reason. And even if others committed a crime, it violates natural justice to suppose that we should be punished for what they did, without participation or choice in their act.

Augustine’s argument is that since God allows young infants to suffer, original sin must exist. An all-powerful god would not allow innocent beings to suffer, therefore even children cannot be innocent. And since they have done nothing in their own life to merit punishment, it follows that they are being punished for the sins of their distant ancestors. Evolutionary biology entirely rejects this argument, of course.

In summary, evolutionary biology rejects a spiritual, as well as a literal, interpretation of the theological doctrine of original sin.

Genetics and the fall

Maverick philosopher posts here on the fall, arguing that there need be no inconsistency between the Biblical account of man’s fall (which has the world beginning with two human beings, who are then punished by God for an act of sinful pride), and the genetic account, which has human beings beginning with about 10,000 individuals, who in turn were descended from apes.

Genetics may not contradict the Biblical account (assuming a ‘spiritual’ rather than a ‘literal’ account), but it seems to contradict Augustine. As I commented a year ago, Augustine aims to prove that original sin exists, citing the ‘host of cruel ills’ which the world is filled with. These can be restrained by laws and punishments, but law and punishment is itself a means of restraining the evil desires that we are born with. Even great innocence is not a sufficient protection against the evil of this world, for God permits even young infants to be tormented in this life, teaching us ‘to bewail the calamities of this life, and to desire the felicity of the life to come’ (City of God XXII).

But genetics suggests the explanation of this host of cruel ills is not original sin at all. Pain is explained as a self-defence mechanism, teaching us which dangers to avoid. Fear is an awareness and an anticipation of danger – felt as unpleasant because it is the anticipation of something unpleasant (pain or death). That danger exists at all is explained partly by the competition for survival, partly by the fragility of DNA. Likewise death. Genetics and science tell us that no one was responsible for this predicament, in the way that Augustine (and the Bible) tell us that our ancestors (Adam and Eve) were responsible. Now Maverick writes:

But in the encounter with the divine self which first triggered man's personhood or spiritual selfhood, there arose man's freedom and his sense of being a separate self, an ego distinct from God and from other egos. Thus was born pride and self-assertion and egotism. Sensing his quasi-divine status, man asserted himself against the One who had revealed himself, the One who simultaneously called him to a Higher Life but also imposed restrictions and made demands. Man in his pride then made a fateful choice, drunk with the sense of his own power: he decided to go it alone.

But does self-consciousness explain pride and selfishness? Against: if the essence of self-consciousness involves pride and selfishness, and if pride and selfishness are bad, how can self-consciousness be good? Yet surely self-consciousness is good. Moreover, does self-consciousness explain pride and selfishness anyway? Many animals, who are not supposed to be self-conscious, also exhibit pride and selfishness. Indeed, according to Richard Dawkins, a gene is selfishness itself. Its sole aim is to replicate itself. Thus, bacteria and wild yeast and giraffes are selfish.

Is God fair to scientists?

Is God fair? We have to assume that God will punish, harshly, those who do not believe his word. In which case, why did God design the universe in such a way that those of an intelligent and inquisitive disposition would conclude that the universe was not designed by God in the way he said he designed it?

Take the case of epicycles, of which ‘Belette’ comments.

“The massive difference, now, over say Copernican days is that the observations and calculating ability we have are so much better than before. It is no longer possible tlo believe in epicycles, because observations demonstrate clearly that they don't work, except in the trivial sense that any path can be fit by enough epicycles to an arbitrary degree of precision.”

I agree. One of Galileo’s motivations for his heliocentric theory was his observation of the phases of Venus. These cannot be observed properly without a telescope. Venus is lit by the sun from angles that are not consistent with the Ptolemaic system. There is a good explanation of this in the Wikipedia article on the Ptolemaic system. Why did God design the geocentric system in such a complex way that those of an inquisitive disposition, after inventing telescopes, would observe such apparent inconsistencies? In 1838, Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel successfully measured the parallax of the star 61 Cygni, which is also difficult to explain in the geocentric system. Why did God go to the trouble of designing the geocentric universe in such a complicated way that an detailed observations such those of Bessel appeared to contradict the way God said (in the Bible) that he had in fact designed things?

Note, I am not arguing that the geocentric model is wrong. What I mean is that, if God says it is correct, and if, as seems to be the case, detailed observation and deduction (such as by Galileo and Bessel) suggests that it is not correct, and if God punishes harshly those who disbelieve what he says, then it seems as though God is not being fair. He has designed the universe in such a way that the way it appears to be designed is not the way he has said it was designed, and thus designed it in a way that invites punishment of the inquisitive and intelligent.

What reply can we make to this? Well, we could avoid fundamentalism by distinguish between literal and analogical truths. When it says in Psalm 93 that “the world also is established, that it cannot be moved”, perhaps it does not mean that the earth is literally immoveable. Perhaps it is immoveable in a spiritual sense. Or that it cannot be moved from its orbit around the sun, all things being equal. Perhaps it is a statement about the constancy of physical constants, such as gravitational acceleration etc. Yes, that is a reasonable objection, but then we can turn the whole question around. Why did God make statements that are so easily open to a literalist misinterpretation? If so, then it seems God is discriminating against fundamentalists. Is that fair? Surely not.

Or it could be argued that the inquisitive and intelligent are simply wrong. A careful examination of the matter (see the websites linked to in earlier posts) shows that the geocentric theory is the correct one. I reply: whichever theory is correct, it remains that God’s design has misled an extraordinary large number of people. Either he is being unfair to astronomers and scientists, or he is being unfair to fundamentalists. We have to choose, and either way it seems that he is not being entirely fair.

Or it could be argued that the inquisitive and intelligent have violated a version of the charity principle. They have followed a line of observation and reasoning that leads them to conclude that God has not told the truth. But logic, as well as the principle, should tell them that God would not have designed the universe in such a way as to contradict what he says. If any theory or reasoning of yours leads to a contradiction with sacred scripture or the teaching of the church, there is something wrong with your reasoning. Indeed, as Ockham argues – as discussed in my last post), we should even make exceptions to the laws of logic when this happens*.

So, is God not being fair to someone?  And is that not inconsistent with an essence into which goodness, justice, fairness etc. are built into as though by definition?


* Yes, I realise that Ockham’s point is more subtle than that. But this is internet land, where we lay things on with trowels.

More fixed earth

There is more information about the geocentric theory here. This suggests a problem. The original motivation for the geocentric theory was its apparent simplicity, given that the heliocentric theory requires an extra assumption – a tilted earth – to explain the seasons. But it turns out the geocentric theory also needs an extra assumption to explain the seasons, and the apparent motion of the sun that corresponds to this.

A good way to imagine this is to look at a potters wheel as it turns . . . it turns once every 24 hours . . . at the center is the Earth . . . place your finger in the clay, you make a circle, this is the sun . . . now slowly move your finger out 3% of the radius of your first circle . . . now move your finger inward 3% . . . that is the motion of the sun albeit the sun would also move in a spiral helix up and down while it is moving out and in by 3% of the radius . . . there are two motions here, one is up then down the other is in then out again. So there is the spiral up and down motion to account for the seasons but the size of the spiral is constantly changing to account for changes in the distance over the course of a year.

Yes but why does the sun move that way? The assumption of a tilted earth plus gravity seems a simpler explanation and thus (pace Dr Connolley) should be preferred. Obviously the underlying rationale for neo-geocentricism (‘neo-geo’) is the Bible and God, but that raises another question: is God fair? It seems unfair to create a universe whose nature seems almost designed to be misunderstood, once observed carefully. Observations by Galileo and other astronomers, phenomena like Foucault’s pendulum, and many other observable phenomena, suggest a reality that is quite different from the literal truth of the Bible. Geological observations suggest the Earth is much older than 6,000 years. Why did God create the Earth in a way that seems almost designed to mislead? Why did God create dinosaur bones, without mentioned dinosaurs in the Bible? Was that fair of God?

It could be replied that, correctly understood (where correct understanding means theories like ‘neo-geo’), these phenomena do not contradict the literal truth of the Bible. But then, clearly, many millions or billions of people, including all eminent scientists since Galileo’s time, have not correctly understood the evidence. Was it fair of God to create a world whose true nature misled so many brilliant people?

Wittgenstein on relativity

William has given us an interesting link here.

Meeting a friend in the corridor, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) said: "Tell me, why do people always say that it was natural for men to assume that the sun went around the earth rather than the earth was rotating?"

His friend said: "Well, obviously, because it just looks as if the sun is going around the earth."

To which the philosopher replied: "Well, what would it look like if it had looked as if the earth were rotating?"

How clever of Wittgenstein. He is not asking what it would have looked like if the earth were rotating, but what it would have looked like if it had looked as if the earth were rotating. Implying that to look as though the observer is moving with respect to their environment is the same as looking as though the environment is moving with respect to the observer.

But is that true? As a postgraduate I house-shared with a research assistant who was working on the neurophysiology of perception. Some of his work showed that the world actually looks different dependent on whether the observer is moving with respect to a stationary environment, or the other way round. There are a number of kinaesthetic sensors in the body which respond to bodily motion or rotation, and these interact with the visual sense in various ways. You can fool these sensors in all sorts of ways – for example you can create the illusion of acceleration by tilting their seat backwards, which is how flight simulators like this work. The answer to Wittgenstein’s question could well be “well, it would look exactly like that” – namely, looking as if the earth were moving, rather than the sun.

Does the earth actually rotate?

Perhaps not.  Listen to these curious and entertaining broadcasts, particularly these two sessions, about the 'nine assumptions' of Copernican science. The argument is broadly this: if you start with the first assumption that the earth rotates (as opposed to what your senses tell you, namely that the earth is fixed, and that the sun and moon revolve around it), then you need eight further assumptions in order to make the first one consistent with what we observe.  This, as the broadcasters say, is not science.  And they have a point, no?  We tend to reject any theory whose basic assumption we have to save by a series of further assumptions. Isn't the simplest theory of the solar system the Aristotelian and biblical one, which is evidently supported by our senses?

How often does the moon rotate around the earth?

Connolley makes a curious objection here to my claim that the moon rotates around the earth once a day. What is wrong with that? Doesn’t it? From the beach on holiday this effect was clearly visible. I concede that it does not do this exactly once a day. But simplification is a virtue, as Connolley himself shows when he refers to ‘two tides a day’ (actually there are two tides every 24h and 50 minutes).  So what, broadly speaking, is wrong with my claim?

On simple explanations

Clever Connolley caught me out with a comment here on simple explanations. Mencken says that the reason for the 'inferior man' hating knowledge is because it is complex. All superstition is a short cut to make the unintelligible simple. Connolley, apparently agreeing with Mencken, chides me for wanting a simple explanation for global warming.

But is Mencken right? The appeal of true scientific explanation generally does lie in its simplicity. There are obvious exceptions - the proof of the four colour theorem for example. But consider the explanation of an eclipse. That is pretty simple. The moon goes round the earth, the earth goes round the sun. The sun lights up the earth. Occasionally the moon gets in the way and casts a shadow. How simpler could it get? The theory that the eclipse is caused by a dragon crossing the sun, by contrast, requires a theory of dragons, and no theory of dragons - at least not one that gives a comprehensive treatment of them, including their metabolism, genetic structure etc - could be simple at all.
 
Or consider Augustine's explanation of why evil exists:

That the whole human race has been condemned in its first origin, this life itself, if life it is to be called, bears witness by the host of cruel ills with which it is filled. Is not this proved by the profound and dreadful ignorance which produces all the errors that enfold the children of Adam, and from which no man can be delivered without toil, pain, and fear? Is it not proved by his love of so many vain and hurtful things, which produces gnawing cares, disquiet, griefs, fears, wild joys, quarrels, lawsuits, wars, treasons, angers, hatreds, deceit, flattery, fraud, theft, robbery, perfidy, pride, ambition, envy, murders, parricides, cruelty, ferocity, wickedness, luxury, insolence, impudence, shamelessness, fornications, adulteries, incests, and the numberless uncleannesses and unnatural acts of both sexes, which it is shameful so much as to mention; sacrileges, heresies, blasphemies, perjuries, oppression of the innocent, calumnies, plots, falsehoods, false witnessings, unrighteous judgments, violent deeds, plunderings, and whatever similar wickedness has found its way into the lives of men, though it cannot find its way into the conception of pure minds? (City of God, Book 22 chapter 22)

The explanation - that Adam and Eve offended God, and that these evils are a punishment - appears simple at first sight, just like the dragon explanation.  But it is not, for it requires a theory of God, and also a theory of Paradise, which is problematic.  Sociobiology could probably provide a simpler one (although I'm not sure it has, yet).

Superstition is not necessarily a simpler theory. So, what distinguishes superstition from science?

More fads and fallacies

The argument about Gardner’s book goes on at Wikipedia. Mostly incoherent ranting, but there was an interesting comment here:

The main arguments given above are that the two critics are biased against the
book and have a POV that shouldn't be considered. Just by putting this out
plainly in itself shows the ridiculousness of the statement. It doesn't matter
at all if the critics are biased against the work, their critique [sic] is still
critique, no matter how incorrect it may be toward the work. Especially
considering the fact that all critics will have a POV, whether it is for or
against a subject. Picking and choosing which critic [sic] comments we should
include (which in terms of the people trying to remove this section above means
only including positive comments toward the work) is something that is
fundamentally against the purpose of Wikipedia and the neutrality we are trying
to achieve. We do not decide which critics' comments to include, we include all
of them.

Leaving aside the confusion between criticism which is biased (which usually means, the critic has some financial, emotional or other non-intellectual reason for making the criticism), and criticism which is plain mistaken, and leaving aside the fact that none of the main arguments referred to has actually claimed that the two critics ‘have a POV that shouldn't be considered’, there is an important point here. Wikipedia editors aren’t allowed to edit on the basis of their own view about what is correct. If I edit an article about the flat earth I can’t let my own view about the shape of the earth obtrude into my contributions. As the comment says, it doesn’t matter if the critics of the boook ‘The Earth is Round’ book are biased against the the work, their criticism is still criticism, no matter how incorrect it may be toward the work.

Now there is a Wikipedia policy called ‘due weight’. This requires that each article fairly represents all significant viewpoints that have been published by reliable sources, in proportion to the prominence of each viewpoint. And it notes that “the article on the Earth does not directly mention modern support for the Flat Earth concept, the view of a distinct minority; to do so would give 'undue weight' to the Flat Earth belief”. But in practice this only works for subjects where the majority view is manifest and obvious. In the case of a book such as Gardner's, which was published more than 50 years ago, giving due weight to criticism is difficult or impossible. As I noted in my earlier post, it is easy for the proponents of junk science to cherry-pick criticism from sources – some of which may even be reliable in the Wikipedia sense (i.e. published in a peer-reviewed journal) – to give the appearance of neutrality.

General semantics and general nonsense

I have been blocked again, and my changes to the article about Martin Gardner’s best known book reverted. This is all part of a long-running battle I have had with nonsense and junk science in Wikipedia for over three years. I fear that junk science is beginning to win.

I had corrected two claims in the article about Martin Gardner's excellent Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science. Gardner does not give ‘five common characteristics’ of cranks, as the article said, but only two (although he lists five ways in which the second charateristic – paranoia – is made manifest). And he certainly does not claim, as the article suggested, that we can judge a theory according to the psychological characteristics of its author. On the contrary, Gardner explicitly restricts himself ('except in a few cases') to theories so close to 'almost certainly false' that there is no reasonable doubt about their worthlessness. Thus, Velikovksy’s impossible theory of planetary motion, the flat earth theory, Atlantis, and of course ‘General Semantics’. He is not giving criteria to detemine the correctness of a scientific theory. Rather, he is taking theories that are generally recognized as bunk, and making observations about the people who promote them.

The series of articles on and around ‘General Semantics’ illustrates very well how easy it is for junk science to spread its tentacles through Wikipedia, creating the appearance of a coherent, well-sourced alternative scientific system, even when the reality is general nonsense. The article on General Semantics (not to be confused with actual semantics, please) does not represent the subject for what it is - a poorly organised, verbose, philosophically naive, repetitious mish-mash of sound ideas borrowed from abler scientists and philosophers, mixed with neologisms, confused ideas, unconscious metaphysics, and highly dubious speculations about neurology and psychiatric theraphy, according to Gardner (p. 281). Apart from a small 'criticism' section at the end, it is presented as though it were a serious academic discipline. There are many links to and from the article. For example, from Non-Aristotelian logic, although Korzybski’s rambling have very little to do with anything written by Łukasiewicz’s. From Semantic differential and Structural differential and (naturally) Neurolinguistic programming. Not to forget Map-territory relation and Institute of General Semantics. There is even a whole category for the subject.

Some of these articles are about genuine scientific subjects, with links inserted to give credibility to the junk. Others are just junk. Who can tell the difference?

Gardner, writing in 1952 , had a serious concern about the abandonment of ‘science ethics’ by American publishers in the mid-1950s. What difference did it make if the general public was misled? Gardner replied that it is not at all amusing when people are misled by nonsense and lies masquerading as science. “Thousands of neurotics desperately in need of trained psychiatric care are seriously retarding their therapy by dalliance with crank cults. Already a frightening number of cases have come to light of suicides and mental crack-ups among patients undergoing these dubious cures. No reputable publisher would think of releasing a book describing a treatment for cancer if it were written by a doctor universally considered a quack by his peers".

In 1952 his target was popular publishing. Today we have Wikipedia, an internet publication accessible to billions of readers, regarded by many of them (and by most of the popular media) as a reliable reference source. What would Gardner be doing about it if he were alive now? And who will take his place?

Reply to Freeman

Charles Freeman has commented on my last post in a way that misunderstands my point so fundamentally that it probably needs stating again, more clearly. It was as follows.

1. Many of Aristotle's scientific explanations are obviously wrong.

2. On the assumption that Greek science ended in the 4th century, Greek science had about 700 years to correct these obvious errors. But it didn't (in the sense that it did not arrive at a consensus of where Aristotle was wrong).

The first point is not simply that Aristotle was wrong. It was that he was obviously wrong. For example, he states in De Caelo (tr. Guthrie, Cambridge 1960 pp. 49-51) that if a weight falls a certain distance in a given time, a greater weight will move faster, with a speed proportional to its weight. This is obviously wrong: obvious in a way that his statement about why glass is transparent is not obviously wrong. To refute his theory about glass requires instrumentation and a complex atomic theory, neither of which was available to Aristotle. So while his transparency theory is wrong, it was not obviously wrong. But to refute his theory about falling bodies requires only a few simple experiments. In the 6th century A.D., loannes Philoponus challenged this as follows.

But this [i.e. Aristotle's theory] is completely erroneous, and our view may be
corroborated by actual observation more effectively than by any sort of verbal
argument. For if you let fall from the same height two weights of which one is
many times as heavy as the other, you will see that the ratio of the times
required for the motion does not depend on the ratio of the weights, but that
the difference in time is a very small one." [M. R. Cohen and I. E. Drabkin, "A
Source Book in Greek Science" (McGraw Hill. N.Y.) 220 (1948) - my emphasis].

So my first point stands: some of Aristotle's scientific observations are obviously wrong, in a way that the technology and understanding of the time could easily have shown. On my second point, that Greek science did not correct these obvious mistakes, the history shows that clearly enough. You may object that Philoponus was Greek, and that he spotted at least one obvious error. I reply: Philoponus' observation does not amount to a scientific consensus. We make progress in science when we arrive at a view that is not necessarily correct, but which is accepted by a majority, or a significant majority, of the scientific community. This was not properly achieved until Galileo. And note also that Philoponus was writing somewhat later than Freeman's 'cutoff point' of 381 AD. Moreover, he was a Christian thinker.

The problem of Aristotle

I have just noticed The Closing of the Western Mind by Charles Freeman. The thesis is that after Constantine declared Christianity the state religion in 312, the church successfully quashed any challenges to its religious and political authority, in particular any challenges arising from the tradition of Greek rationalism and (in effect) held up human development for a thousand years until the Renaissance.

The difficulty with any such view is that it must face up to the 'problem of Aristotle'. If there really was a 'spirit of Greek rationalism', why did Greek science and philosophy apparently not advance much beyond Aristotle, writing in the fourth century BC, and Constantine in 312 (that's about 700 years)? And if Christian dogma was really that stifling, how was it that Western science developed from the rediscovery of Aristotle's work at the end of the 12th century to the scientific revolution in the 17th century (that's about 500 years)?

It is particularly difficult to explain given that (as I noted here, and as everyone knows) Aristotelian science is so spectularly wrong. Nearly all his scientific views are false, indeed spectacularly and obviously false, and in a way that the simplest experiment would confirm. How did the Greeks did not notice this? As Hannam notes (God's Philosophers chapter 11), simple observation of the trajectory of an arrow or of a ball thrown through the air, noted by Albert of Saxony as early as the 14th century, would have refuted a considerable part of Aristotle's physics.

Why and how was it that the medieval West eventually progressed well beyond Aristotle's science, when Greek culture did not? Constantine's state religion seems completely irrelevant.

Hasty generalisation?

After a demanding and sometimes painful week with Longeway I am taking it relatively easy with James Hannam's Gods of the Philosophers. "With an engaging fervour, James Hannam has set about rescuing the reputation of a bunch of half-forgotten thinkers, and he shows how they paved the way for modern science" says Boris Johnson, no less.

It is an engaging and entertainingly written book, whose purpose is to show the extent of scientific progress in the Middle Ages, and to dispel some prevalent and persistent myths about the period. I can't find serious fault so far (I have reached the 'condemnations' of 1277). While it has no news for students of the period, being mostly taken from (generally reliable and authoritative) secondary sources, the subject desperately needs a popular audience, and Hannam has succeeded brilliantly

Yet it has attracted fierce criticism. Charles Freeman, author of The Closing of the Western Mind, attacked the book in an essay in New Humanist, arguing that it presents a distorted view of the medieval period.

God’s Philosophers is ... poorly structured, without a
coherent argument and often misleading, either through making assertions for
which there is no, or contrary, evidence or by omitting evidence that would
weaken its case. The review that called it “a spirited jaunt” was spot on. It
catches the mood of serendipitous ramblings, anecdotes and asides that make it
an easy read but hardly a serious contribution to our understanding of medieval
and sixteenth century science. Its success is mystifying.

Hannam replied, and Freeman followed with a further critique.

I won't attempt any serious analysis of these, except to note Freeman's frequent accusation of Hannam's 'sweeping assertions'. Generalisation is difficult to avoid when you are attempting to cover nearly a thousand years of intellectual history in 300 pages. So far, Hannam has avoided it very well. His main arguments is are from example. He gives many stories and accounts, all sourced, showing the extent of medieval innovation. Many of them are simply intended to debunk myth and prejudice (I was particularly struck by the revelation that the synthesis of hydrochloric, sulphuric and nitric acid first occurred in the West in the thirteenth century, and not earlier in the Middle East). The only hint of generalisation I have found so far is on page 105. Hannam writes:

The condemnations [of 1277 when 219 propositions were banned in Paris] and
Thomas's Summa Theologiae had created a framework within which natural
philosophers could safely pursue their studies. The framework first defined
clear boundaries between natural philosophy and theology. This allowed the
philosophers to get on with the study of nature without being tempted to indulge
in illicit metaphysical speculation. Then the framework laid down the principle
that God had decreed the laws of nature but was not bound by them. Finally, it
stated that Aristotle was sometimes wrong [...] and if Aristotle could be wrong
about something that he regarded as completely certain, that threw his whole
philosophy into question. The way was clear for the natural philosophers of the
Middle Ages to move decisively beyond the achievements of the Greeks (God's
Philosophers p. 105).

The passage is not sourced, and Hannam does not explain clearly the logic for his assertion. It is one of at least three views which Hyman and Walsh summarise it as follows.

Most scholars agree that these condemnations had a profound effect on the
history of medieval thought, but they disagree as to the nature and significance
of that effect. The condemnations have been called [1] a brutal victory
Augustinianism over Aristotelianism, but Aristotle flourished in the schools
after as well as before. It has been said [2] that by freeing the later Middle Ages
from the domination of a rigid Averroistic Aristotelianism, the way was opened
for the development of natural science as the inquiry into nature rather than
the dogmatic reiteration of the Aristotelian corpus. But surely this exaggerates
the monolithic character of the acceptance of Aristotle even by masters such as
Siger of Brabant, and underestimates the continued influence of Aristotle and
Averroes on the development of natural science. A more general and widely
accepted view [3] is that with the Condemnation of 1277, the scholastic effeort to
inforporate and renovate philosophy came to an end. But this surely
underestimates the philosophical advances, especially the methodological ones,
of the later period.

But it is a recognised view for all that. So far there is very little of distortion or falsification. I recommend the book.

Ockham: the founder of European empiricism

I am finally getting to the meaty parts of Longeway's book*. He says at the beginning (p.2), and in the 'Ockham and his [medieval] predecessors approached some of the most fundamental problems of a scientific empiricism, both ancient and modern'and that 'Ockham may reasonably be regarded as the founder of empiricism in the European tradition'. This is strong and heady stuff and was a clinching reason for buying the book. After 100 pages, we are getting towards some of the reasons.

I understand Longeway's argument as follows. According to Ockham (Summa I.26), there are three kinds of definition. (1) A nominal definition is a way of setting the meaning of the defined term, and so a is true in virtue of the meaning of the term. E.g. 'a bachelor is an unmarried man. (2) Two kinds of real definition. A metaphysical definition indicates genus and difference, for example 'a man is a rational [differentia] animal [genus]'. (3) A natural definition (Spade translates this as physical definition) is one which signifies obliquely essential parts of the thing defined. For example, 'a triangle is a figure contained by three straight lines'.

Ockham argues (Summa II.ii.35, cited in Longeway p. 112) says that any attempted demonstration will depend upon either the nominal definition of the attribute, and so beg the question, or a metaphysical definition, which is essentially inexplicable and provides no scientific assistance, or a natural definition. Only demonstration using natural definition is truly scientific.

Let's flesh this out. The Aristotelian model for scientific demonstration is as follows.

A B is a C
An A is a B
Therefore, an A is a C

To explain why A is C, Aristotle says we must find a 'middle term' B which is common to A and C. But it is clearly not enough for B simply to be synonymous with C, otherwise the syllogism would beg the question. For example

An unmarried man is a bachelor
John is an unmarried man
Therefore, John is a bachelor.

To understand the term 'batchelor' you have to understand that it means 'unmarried man'. Thus the conclusion moves us no further than the minor premiss 'John is an unmarried man' It expresses the same thing in different terms, having the same meaning, and the 'reasoning' is trivial. Nor is a 'metaphysical definition' of any assistance. We can have a direct intellectual grasp of a thing, but only of its genus, as a whole, 'without any insight into its metaphysical structure' (p.114). 'A demonstration rooted in a grasp of metaphysical definition of the primary subject of an attribute can only occur after this life'.

The only case where true demonstration is possible is in the case where the middle term involves a natural definition. And this can only happen where the subject is something composite. Longeway cites (p. 113) the example of a triangle, with spatial parts arranged in such a way that an analysis of its structure will tell us that it has the attribute in question. This is what happens in geometry and mathematics.

This means that there can be no true scientific explanation of things which are essentially simple. Ockham thinks we cannot explain heat, for example, because we cannot explain it in terms of of composition and mathematics. As Longeway explains it "The natural definition of an attribute is of no assistance here for the straightforward reason that a simple quality such as heat has no variety or structure of essential parts, but is rather uniformly alike in every one of its parts. No mechanism by which heat heats is there to uncover. It just heats. And this can only be known from experience" (p. 113)

We can only apply mathematical techniques to things in nature which they are composite, and which can be defined in terms of their material parts. Thus (for Ockham) we cannot have a scientific explanation of substance. Ockham still holds to the Aristotelian view that the causal properties of a substance cannot be explained in terms of the substance's parts. According to Aristotle, substances are essentially simple. Their properties follow from their substantial form (the essence of a substance, corresponding to a species). A substantial form is what is signified by the definiens of a definition. A substantial form is a universal (since only universals are definable - see Metaphysics Z8 1034a6-8). A substantial form is immaterial (because a substance is a combination of material and form). A substantial form is simple (Metaphysics Z12). If the properties of a species could be explained by composition, a substance would not be an essential unity, and so would not be a substance, but a collection of substances.

This is interesting, but doesn't really explain why we should regard Ockham as the founder of European empiricism. As Longeway points out, real progress only began when Descartes and Boyle "insisted on mathematical-mechanical modes of explanation connecting one accident of material substance to another, rather than explanations of the first attributes of material substance". (p.115) One of the essential ingredients of modern science is the rejection of the Aristotelian doctrine of substantial forms. (See Locke about this here, especially section 10). Since Ockham did not reject substantial forms, why should we regard him as the founder of modern science?

Longeway gives no convincing reply to this line of reasoning, except for suggesting that once Ockham has shown the impossibility of scientific explanation using metaphysical definition, it is tempting to look for explanations in terms of natural definition.

we know that early modern scientists were so tempted, and Descartes and others
rejected the assujmption immaterial substantial forms underlying biological
properties precisely because such an assumption did nothing to provide an
understanding why animals and plants have the properties in question. (p 115)

Since our only tool for understanding why is analysis in terms of material parts and the application of mathematics, it would be natural to be tempted by materialist reductionism in biology.

* Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham: A Translation of Summa Logicae III-II: De Syllogismo Demonstrativo, and Selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio.

Indifference to science

A few things have reminded me of philosophers' indifference to actual science. The first was my own fault. I linked to this explanation of why glass is transparent, but after second thoughts and a bit longer on Google, the explanation seems completely wrong. I suspect the explanation (if you can follow it) in Wikipedia is the correct one, although (as I constantly remind my readers) you should beware of anything you read in Wikipedia. The second reminder is the supply of amusing and interesting scientific explanations by medieval authors quoted in Longeway's book. All of them are wrong. Grosseteste gives an explanation of thunder that involves hot and cold air mixing, expanding and producing flame, then quenching the flame with an audible explosion (the thunder). Any explanation of thunder that does not involve electricity (and the associated concepts of charge) is clearly wrong. And how about this wonderfully dodgy piece of neuroscience (from Albertus Magnus, quoted in Longeway p.56).

(1) In everyone in which there is an appetite for pain in what opposes him, there is an accession of blood to the heart from the evaporation of gall;
(2) in someone who is angry there is an appetite for pain in what is opposed to him;
(3) therefore, in one who is angry there is an accession of blood to the heart from the evaporation of gall.

The science mentioned by philosophers is often very bad. That in itself does not mean they are indifferent to science, but I believe they are indifferent as well. They are philosophers, and the actual science does not affect any philosophical point being made. I can easily change the example given in my earlier post as follows

Propter quid
Light passes through any substance which neither reflects it nor absorbs it
Glass neither reflects nor absorbs light
Therefore light passes through glass.

I will leave the construction of the corresponding quia form as an exercise. Note also that you would need to combine this with further syllogism involving an account of why glass neither reflects nor absorbs light (a substance absorbs light when its electron orbitals are spaced such that they can absorb a quantum of light (or photon) of a specific frequency, and does not violate selection rules). But none of that matters. The philosophical point is the same. Similarly, we could alter Albert's example to use a favourite example (probably equally dodgy) of modern philosophers of science as follows.

In everyone in which there is an appetite for pain in what opposes him, there is an appropriate stimulation of c-fibers in the hypothalmus
in someone who is angry there is an appetite for pain in what is opposed to him;
therefore, in one who is angry there is an appropriate stimulation of c-fibers in the hypothalmus

Aristotle's point is that every scientific explanation involves interposing a 'middle' B between some empirical truth of the form 'A is C', so we get a demonstration of the form

All B is C
This A is B
Therefore this A is C

which is meant to explain why the empirical truth is really true. All scientific demonstration involves 'finding a middle', and this point can be illustrated whether or not the scientific truth 'All B is C' is bad science or not. This is all about the philosophy of science, not science itself.

Which raises a further interesting point. Given that these medieval philosophers (Grosseteste, Albert, Aquinas, Ockham) were doing philosophy of science, not science itself, does that mean that all the medieval writing about 'science' was really philosophy of science? Which raises the difficult question of whether there really was a scientific revolution in the thirteenth century. And raises yet another question: do we need the philosophy of science, or an approach resembling the one adopted by the Aristotelian philosophers, in order to explain the most fundamental and difficult problems of science? Recall the Aristotelian definition of science: knowledge arrived at by demonstration. What kind of demonstration explains the phenomenon of anger? How do we explain anger in terms of the mechanical stimulation of 'c-fibres'? What kind of stimulation would explain anger at further bouts of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve? Is philosophical indifference to science, merely indifference to science of a certain kind? But enough for now.

Why light passes through glass

The Longeway book arrived very quickly (2 days) and is a credit to Amazon . Compare this with Waterstone's, who had no copy in any of their London shops, and who said that ordering may take weeks or months, or with the university libraries in London (only UCL library had a copy, but this horribly-designed and uncomfortable building is to be visited only as a last resort).

There is much to say about the book. The introduction is long and as interesting as the reviews suggest. One example, illustrating Longeway's attention to detail, is the way he notices the interesting passage by Aristotle at 88a11. This is in some ways more interesting than the later and better known passage about the lunar eclipse beginning at 89b26. In the case of the eclipse it is theoretically possible for us directly to observe to cause of the eclipse (namely, as he says at 90a24, if we were living on the moon). In the case the transparency of glass, by contrast, it is theoretically impossible for us to observe directly the passage of light through the 'pores' in glass. The passage is also interesting for the insight that some ancient Greek scientists thought that the transparency of glass could be explained through some atomic or molecular theory.

On why glass actually is transparent, see this elementary explanation. It is intended for children, although I didn't follow it that well. It says the reason is that the molecules in liquids are disorganised and random, and so light can pass through them. It cannot pass through solids, because the arrangement of molecules is ordered (I didn't follow this reasoning). Light passes through all liquids, glass is a liquid, therefore light can pass through glass (I did follow this, however).

Note we can express the second reasoning in both Aristotelian propter quid and quia forms, as follows.

Propter quid
Light passes through liquids
Glass is a liquid
Therefore, light passes through glass

Quia
Light only passes through liquids
Light passes through glass
Therefore glass is a liquid

My earlier observations apply here as well. Both syllogisms are essentially trivial and hardly count as 'reasoning' at all. The real reasoning involves how we arrive at the (superficially implausible) premiss that glass is a liquid.