Sunday, September 19, 2010
Paasch on haecceity
This is something to return to. I have been struggling with Scotus' account of haecceity for years. The standard place is the six questions in Distinction III of book II of his Ordinatio (Opera omnia, ed. C. Balic and others (Rome, 1950-), vol. 7, p. 458ff). There is a very similar discussion in the earlier questions on the Metaphysics (Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Libri VI–IX, edited by G. Etzkorn, R. Andrews, G. Gál and others, Opera Philosophica 4 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute Press, 1997).
Scotus' argument, as far as I can make it out, is that there exists an identity less than numerical identity (minor unitate numerali). This is the identity of a species, the one of "man is one species, giraffe is another". But a species is essentially repeatable. If you can have one man, you can have another man, another individual of the same species.
But the same is not true of individual identity. We cannot repeat Socrates as we can repeat man. One of Scotus' targets here is the theory of Porphyry, that an individual is defined by a collection of differentia. We start with the most general genus, i.e. being of some kind, then descend to living being, then animal, then rational animal. As we get more specific, the number of features required to define the species increases. Finally we get to the most specific species, namely the individual - descendentibus nobis per divisionem a generalissimus ad specialissima iubet Plato quiescere. Scotus rightly argues against this. Being individualised can't be like being the most highly specified species at the bottom of the tree of being. Being a species is essentially to be divisible into further species. "... the nature of the most specific species is not of itself this, just as something divisible is not from its nature of itself this, so that it is of itself repugnant to it to be divided into parts, because then it could not receive something through which formally such division would belong to it".
It is not clear what Scotus' haecceity is - he practically defines it as what it is not. Paasch is concerned with the question of whether a haecceity really can be unrepeatable. More later.
Thursday, August 26, 2010. "Are Scotus's haecceities really unrepeatable?"
Friday, August 20, 2010 "What makes a haecceity unrepeatable?"
Saturday, August 14, 2010 "What are haecceities?"
Saturday, August 7, 2010 "Scotus: haecceities must be some positive entity"
Friday, July 30, 2010 "Individuation is a question of the formal cause"
Meanwhile, I see that according to his Facebook page, Paasch is working on a PhD in philosophy and theology at Oxford, when he is not working as a bartender, introducing his favorite customers to excellent vintage cocktails he has dug out of old cocktail books. Well then! Mine's an Old Fashioned please.
Since I went on the wagon I'm
certain drink is a major crime,
For when you lay off the liquor
You feel so much slicker -
Well that is, most of the time.
But there are moments sooner or later,
When it's tough, I've got to say, not to say, "Waiter
Make it another old fashioned please".
My favourite drink. More information on Wikipedia.
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Reverse Straw Man
For obvious reasons it is difficult to bring off, and requires considerable skill at generating confusion about the initial purpose and objectives of the dispute, and so usually confined to domestic disputes, arguments with teenagers, drunken discussion in bars and so on. But it can be found in serious philosophical dispute, typically when your opponent realises with horror, halfway through, that they are wrong, and need to cover their tracks. Because of its inherently symmetrical nature, you can employ it yourself, i.e. pretend you were actually arguing for A along. When your opponent proudly presents you with irrefutable evidence for A, you reply that you gave that argument half an hour ago.
The tactic is best used in verbal discussion where it is difficult for anyone to remember what anyone said. If on an internet thread it is more difficult, as someone is bound to quote your very words back at you. A simple tactic is to accuse them of quoting you out of context, and perhaps throw in an accusation of bad faith: "It is quite clear I was arguing for A, please do not quote my words out of context". This has the risk of making them angry, but in that case they will either resort to capital letters and ranting, in which case they have lost, or they will present a carefully reasoned and detailed case that you could not have meant that, even in context. Because this requires supplying the original context, as well as a carefully reasoned and detailed argument around it, it will be too long for anyone to read or listen, and so they have also lost.
Straw man (which involves confusion about the aims and conclusion of the argument) is closely related to ground-shifting. Ground-shifting is when you change your argument or evidence half-way through the argument. There is a good characterisation of it here. The author correctly notes that the skillful employment of it requires deliberate and purposeful unclarity about definitions.
Monday, September 13, 2010
'Anybody who knows ...'
Suppose we want to prove the validity of an ordinary language consequence having the following form.
(*) If it was the case that A was identical with B then it is the case that A is identical with B
We can try to do this by translating the placeholders A and B (which substitute for grammatically singular OL terms) into the 'a' and 'b' of the predicate calculus (which substitute for logically singular terms), and translating the tensed statements of OL into the 'nec' or 'necessary' of predicate calculus, as follows:
(1) a=b (Assumption for conditional proof)
(2) a=b -> (Fa -> Fb)
(3) Nec(a=a)
(4) a=b -> (Nec(a=a) -> Nec(a=b)) (Substitution Instance of (2))
(5) Nec(a=a) -> Nec(a=b) (Modus Ponens, 1&4)
(6) Nec(a=b) (Modus Ponens, 3&5)
(7) a=b -> Nec(a=b) (Conditional Proof, 1-6)
The problem is that the 'proof', if understood as a proof of the ordinary language consequence, can't possibly be valid. Substitute 'the president of the US' for 'A' and 'John F. Kennedy' for 'B' to give
(*) If it was the case that the president of the US was identical with John F. Kennedy then it is the case the president of the US is identical with John F. Kennedy
But ex vero nunquam sequitur falsum: the false cannot follow from the true. Whenever the antecedent is true and the consequent false, consequentia non valet, the consequence is not valid. But the antecedent is true - the president of the US was (in September 1963) identical with John F. Kennedy, and the consequent false - the president of the US is (in September 2010) not identical with John F. Kennedy. So the consequence is not valid. If the formalised part of the proof is valid (which I am not denying), it follows that the translation of our ordinary language consequence into the formal consequence (i.e. (7) above) is wrong. But that is just the place we forgot to look.
At this point, the formalist will object that the translation "would be accepted by just about anybody who knows how to translate from ordinary language to formal logic". And that is another problem: a cultural problem, not a logical or philosophical one. We were taught as students the 'correct' way to translate awkward and messy ordinary language statements into the clean language of MPC. I too was taught this (using what was only 10 years old then, but has since become a classic text) quite some time ago. Having learnt this, we 'know' how to translate from ordinary language to formal logic. And, proud of this knowledge, we are now 'anybody who knows', and we can put down anyone who does not know.
What a formidable barrier to progress.
Sunday, September 12, 2010
The Tibbles Puzzle
(1) Tibbles previously was identical with T.
(2) Tibbles now is identical with T*.
(3) T is not identical with T*
(4) Therefore (by substitutivity) Tibbles is not identical with T. Contradiction with (1) above.
Well, supposedly a contradiction. Tibbles is not now identical with T, but this does not contradict (1), which says that Tibbles was then identical with T. Is there any contradiction in being identical with some A in the past, and yet not being identical with A in the present? Does "A was identical with B" always entail "A is identical with B"? More later
Thursday, September 09, 2010
Concerning plurals
Concerning plurals, there is no problem about expressing the things you
mention within the system for plurals that I developed. (That by itself doesn't
answer the metaphysical question initially posed. But it provides some
linguistic resources for discussing it. Also note that van Inwagen himself uses
plural language when he asks when some things compose a single thing. The
relation ‘These compose that’ is non-distributively plural in its first argument
place. There is no representation of that in standard (singular) first-order
logic, without the help of set theory or mereological summing or something like
that as a means to introduce a singular representative of some things.)
Naïve set theory ordinarily allows the building of a hierarchy of sets
(some sets are members of other sets), and the plural language does not in
itself introduce anything like that.
Russell spoke of ‘a set as many’ (as well as another conception of ‘a set
as one’). But by calling it ‘a set’ he is already undermining the idea of there
being many. I think that Russell just didn’t follow this idea out in a coherent
way.
Wednesday, September 08, 2010
The Perils of Analysis
Suppose that there exists nothing but my big parcel of land and such partsVan Inwagen's argument employs a method that is fundamental to all analytic philosophy. We have two ordinary language statements A and B below, and we want to decide whether B follows from A.
as it may have. And suppose it has no proper parts but the six small parcels. .
. . Suppose that we have a bunch of sentences containing quantifiers, and that
we want to determine their truth-values: 'ExEyEz(y is a part of x & z is a
part of x & y is not the same size as z)'; that sort of thing. How many
items in our domain of quantification? Seven, right? That is, there are seven
objects, and not six objects or one object, that are possible values of our
variables, and that we must take account of when we are determining the
truth-value of our sentences. ("Composition as Identity," Philosophical
Perspectives 8 (1994), p. 213)
(A) There is a large parcel of land having two smaller parcels as proper parts.
(B) There are three things (the large parcel of land and the two smaller parcels)
If the inference is valid, then there is a third thing 'over and above' the two smaller things, and there is an 'ontological distinction' between the large parcel of land and its parts. Otherwise there are only two things, and the existence of the 'large parcel of land' simply reduces to the existence of the parts. It is not 'ontologically distinct'. This is an important philosophical conclusion, if we can establish it.
The procedure is to translate both statements into the language of predicate calculus, which has a determinate proof procedure, and see whether the inference holds. Thus
(A*) For some x, x is a large parcel of land having proper part x1 and proper part x2 and x1 /= x2.
(B*) For some x, for some y, for some z, x/=y and x/=z and y/=z
Clearly, given the additional premiss that no object x is identical to any of its proper parts (i.e. x /= x1 and x /= x2) we can establish that B* follows from A*. Thus the apparently simple translation from a natural language statement into the language of modern predicate calculus apparently leads to a philosophical conclusion. And a lot of modern analytic philosophy is like that. We are worried about whether the ordinary language statement A implies the ordinary language statement B. For ordinary language has no agreed and determinate proof procedure. So we translate A into a statement A* of the predicate calculus, which does have an agreed and determinate proof procedure, and we translate B into B*. Then we determine whether A* implies B*, which seems to solve the problem. But of course it doesn't, for the real question is whether the translation is correct. If we are unsure whether A implies B, how can we be sure that either of the translations (of A onto A* and B into B*) are correct? If the translation is obvious, how is it we were unsure of the implication in the first place?
The 'method of analysis' is not fundamentally unsound. If we are certain of the 'logical form' of an ordinary language statement - i.e. a form that makes inferences to other statements determinate and certain, then analysis is a useful technique. Otherwise it is not. What is the logical form of 'this big parcel consists of two small parcels'? If it is the same as 'This pair of shoes consists of 2 shoes', then we should proceed with caution.
Friday, September 03, 2010
A perfect difficulty
But perhaps there is a difficulty, indicated by the distinction between the simple past tense (the ship was composed of the old planks) and the perfect tense (the ship has been composed of the old planks). The distinction (though familiar and its ordinary usage well understood*) is not philosophically clear, and grammar books tend to fudge the explanation. But it seems to be: we use 'has been F' as a predicate to qualify the object 'as it as now', and 'was F' to qualify the object 'as it was then'. Otherwise the grammatical distinction makes no sense. It must distinguish something, and the distinction seems to be the philosophically dangerous one that I said we should avoid.
A similar distinction is evident in the difference between 'in 10 years time people will have a better standard of living' and 'in a 100 years' time, people will live for much longer'. In the first 'people' apparently ranges over people who exist now. In second, it clearly ranges over people who have not been born yet, but will exist in the future. Perhaps there is some notion of tense built into the subject of a proposition. But it's puzzling, and there is not much I can say about it, as things are now.
* The idea for this post came after reading a paper by Braakhuis, who wrote 'In 1940 Grabmann has drawn attention to this collection'. The use of the perfect, rather than the simple past, misleadingly suggests that Grabmann is still alive, which he isn't (he died in 1949).
Thursday, September 02, 2010
Wednesday, September 01, 2010
Eliminativism: the elusiveness of the ordinary
(E) There are no A's. There are only B's.
(R) There are A's but A's are only B's.
Clearly (E) and (R) do not disagree about the basic ontology. They agree that there are only B's. But they fundamentally disagree about the definition of 'A'. The eliminativist (E) claims that an A, as the term 'A' is correctly and properly understood, cannot exist, because its definition would include features inconsistent with being a B. The reductivist (R) is saying that, as the term 'A' is correctly and properly understood, it is entirely consistent that an A can be a B, indeed that every A is a B.
But if it is merely a quarrel over definitions, why is there any disagreement at all? There is no disputing over definitions. Perhaps the answer lies in the difficulty that surrounds all philosophically interesting notions. The SEP says "Like many philosophically interesting notions, existence is at once familiar and rather elusive. Although we have no more trouble with using the verb ‘exists’ than with the two-times table, there is more than a little difficulty in saying just what existence is". That is, there are certain terms which we all understand and have no difficulty using with a standard sense in everyday life, but which we find terribly difficult to define. Hence there may be profound disagreement over which features are essential to the term, and hence profound disagreement between (E) and (R). Both agree that in using the term 'A' they are talking about the same kind of thing, and using the term in the same sense. But they disagree about what are the fundamental features of an A. The eliminativist believes that there is some feature of A's, correctly understood, that makes it inconsistent with an A being B. And since he believes there are only B's, he holds that there are no A's. The reductivist agrees that this feature is inconsistent with being B, but regards it is non-essential, and so it is possible - indeed true - that no A actually has the feature.
Considering the example of truth - which is as philosophically interesting as any - we have
(E) There is no truth. There is only warranted assertibility.
(R) There is truth, but truth is only warranted assertibility.
The disagreement here does not involve equivocation (as I previously thought). Both (E) and (R) both think they are talking unequivocally about the same thing: truth, an idea that we have no more trouble in employing than in using the two-times table. Both agree on the 'ontology': there is warranted assertibility and nothing more. Where they disagree is that (E) thinks that truth involves more than warranted assertibility, and is inconsistent with the ontologyl.(R) by contrast thinks that truth involves no more than that, and so its existence is consistent with the ontology.
So the disagreement is not about ontology or about which entities/features are to be eliminated. Both agree that 'truth involving more than just warranted assertibility' is to be eliminated. But (E) eliminates it by eliminating truth itself. (R) eliminates it by holding onto truth, but eliminating anything more than just warranted assertibility. The disagreement lies in the analysis of the everyday notion of truth, and not 'ontology'.
The deeper puzzle is how people can agree on the meaning of a term, and yet disagree about its definition. How can we agree on the meaning of 'existence' - a term which is no more difficult to use than a times-table, and yet disagree profoundly on how to define it? Why are there similar puzzles and disagreements over the nature of truth, individuation, identity, reference and all the rest? This problem goes back at least to Plato, and we appear to be no closer to solving it.
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
Reducing Hesperus
Sunday, August 29, 2010
On artefactual identity
A. If an artefact X1 has a replacement component, and X contained the replaced component, and the other components of X1 have been components of X since the replacement, and if the arrangement of components is the same in X1 as in X, then X1 = X.
B. If the components of Y are now the components of X, similarly arranged, then X=Y
C. If Fx and x=y, then Fy
D. If it is not the case that components of X = the components of Y, then it is not the case that X = Y.
E. Artifacts exist.
The only notion that may need elucidation is 'plural identity'. I propose the following definition: the x's = the y's if every one of the x's = some y, and every one of the y's = some x, which uses singular identity. Note I have made a significant change to C. That is because substitutivity is more fundamental than transitivity, and because (I think) we can derive transitivity. For let x = y, and y = z. The identity x = y allows us to substitute 'x' for 'y' in 'y = z'. Then x = z, which is transitivity.
We can then prove inconsistency as follows.
1. Suppose there are an X1 and an X such that A is true. Then X1 = X.
2. Suppose next that there is an X2 such that A is true regarding X2 and X1. Then X2 = X1, and from C above, X2 = X.
3. Repeat this process, ensuring that each replaced component is always one of the original components (and not a replacement component). Then, repeating this n times for the n original components, we have Xn such that Xn = X. Note that while all of the components of Xn are components of X (because of the identity, and because of C above), it is nonetheless true that at one time none of the components of Xn was a component of X. Indeed, it is true (again because of C above) that none of the components of X was at one time a component of X.
4. Take all the original components of Xn/X and reassemble them so that they are arranged exactly as they were when they were part of Xn/X, to make Y. Then (from B above) X = Y.
5. But from D above, since the components of Xn/X are currently different from those of Y, it is not the case that X = Y.
6. Thus X = Y and not X=Y. Contradiction.
Is Hume an eliminativist about objects?
[...] it is liable to the same difficulties; and is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity, that it at once denies and establishes the vulgar supposition. Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be identically the same, and uninterrupted; and yet have so great a propensity to believe them such, that they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they attribute these qualities.
Does this make Hume an eliminativist, or a reductionist? I have argued elsewhere that the distinction is arbitrary, and I shall argue that this applies to Hume's position also. If we define 'material object' as something which is mind-independent and permanent, then it is clear Hume is denying the existence of any such things. The only objects we are aware of, he says, are these fleeting and perishable sense-impressions, which have no continued and uninterrupted existence. So he is an eliminativist regarding material objects defined in this way. But as I have argued, we don't have adopt this definition. If we define 'material object' as something identical with our sense-impression, then uninterrupted existence turns into a mere accidental feature of objects. An accidental feature that, as Hume argues, may not apply to any object at all, just as 'carried by the ether' does not apply to light, as people once thought.
In summary: whether Hume is an eliminativist or reductionist about the term 'material object' depends entirely on how you choose to define the term. There are the observable phenomena - the sense impressions - and there is whatever unobservable X explains or underlies these phenomena. And that X can have any features you like. There are no 'essential features' of things that are essentially unobservable.
* A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I. 4. ii - "Of scepticism with regard to the senses". This section is essential reading for any understanding of Hume. People often don't read it because it occurs towards the end of the first book, and because there is a lot of focus on the causation stuff in Part III. Part IV, particularly sections 2-4, are by far the most interesting and enjoyable and indeed strange parts of the work.
Friday, August 27, 2010
Radical versus conservative ontology
This is closely connected with what I discussed here about Inwagen's paraphrase argument. If his paraphrase of a story about ships is intended merely to change our view about ships (e.g. that they are not identical with their component parts, and that there is something singular over and above the parts corresponding to the grammatically singular 'a ship') then the paraphrase is ontologically conservative. It still affirms the existence of ships, just as the electro-magnetic theory affirms the existence of light, but it changes our view of what ships are, just as the electro-magnetic story changes our view about light. By contrast, if the paraphrase really 'loses ships', then it is ontologically radical. It challenges our common-sense ontology in a way that modern psychology challenged demons.
It is also connected with the 'aporetic' set of propositions I discussed earlier. (I have modified proposition B to meet an objections made by earlier comments).
A. An artifact remains numerically the same if one of its components is replaced, without replacing the others.
B. If the components of X, are now the components of Y, arranged in the same way, then X=Y
C. Identity is transitive (if X=Y and Y=Z, then X=Z)
D. If artifact a and artifact b have numerically different components at the same time, a and b are numerically different.
E. Artifacts exist.
If the four propositions A-D are true, artefacts do not exist, which is the ontogically radical position. Otherwise, one of more of these four propositions is false. This would revise our view about the fundamental properties of artefacts, which is ontologically conservative. This is by way of background. I will return to the original plan tomorrow, when I will discuss whether modifying our account of numerical identity could resolve the logical inconsistency between the five propositions above.
Thursday, August 26, 2010
More on 'Replacement Identity'
It seems entirely implausible that when a small sliver of material, or molecule or sub-atomic particle is shaved off the bike, the bike is no longer identical with the bike that existed before. So some qualified version of Replacement Identity must be true. But then the Transitivity of Identity kicks in. If the bike is the same bike after a tiny part has been removed and then replaced, then it is the same bike. And still the same bike after another part has been shaved off and replaced. And so on until the whole bike has been completely replaced. The enemies of (A) must bite the bullet. Either it is false, even for sub-atomic changes in composition. That seems implausible. Otherwise Replacement Identity + Transitivity gets us to the paradoxical conclusion. More on Transitivity later, as I promised.
Bikes, now and then
These expressions don't make any sense to me. Surely 'then' and 'now' or 'yesterday' and 'today' are just adverbs modifying the verb, rather than an adjective modifying a referring phrase or description. Consider
This bike, which was repaired yesterday, has a new mudguard today.
The sentence contains just one subject: 'this bike'. It is modified by two predicates. The first - 'was repaired yesterday' - tells us something that happened at some previous moment to the bike. The second - 'has a new mudguard' - tells us something that is true of it today, now. It makes no sense to divide the subject into something that is or was 'the bike yesterday', and another, different thing, that is 'the bike today'. Both 'was repaired' - which is a predicate in the past tense - and 'has a new mudguard' - which is in the present tense - qualify this single bike. Or 'this bike now', if you really want.
If there really is an object such as 'this bike then', it is an object to which the predicate 'is now being repaired' applies. For it was true to say of the bike, then, 'this bike is being repaired'. By contrast, the past tense predicate 'was being repaired' applies to 'the bike now'. But as I say, modifying a subject expression by means of an adverb doesn't make sense.
The medieval writers keenly appreciated this. A noun or referring phrase has no tense attached to it. Its semantics does not include time. The sense of time is what a verb brings in. Hence past, present and future tenses, and hence qualifying adverbs like 'now' and 'then'.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Identity in replacement
A. An artifact remains numerically the same if one of its components is replaced, and the rest remain the same.
B. An artifact is numerically the same if all of its components are numerically the same.
C. Identity is transitive (if A=B and B=C, then A=C)
D. If artifact a and artifact b have numerically different components at the same time, a and b are numerically different.
E. Artifacts exist.
It is fairly easy to show they can't all be true*. Therefore one of them is false. In particular, if we accept A-D, we have to drop E. There can be no objects that conform to our intuitive idea of an artifact, which is the implied conclusion of the Ship of Theseus story.
In this post and three later posts, I will examine the four assumptions A-D to examine if the proposition-set is really aporetic (usually what appears to be an aporetic set dissolves upon enquiry, when we find that one or more of the propositions are not obvious or self-evident at all).
I will begin with the assumption that an artefact remains the same, when one of its components is replaced. My son recently wrecked the mudguard of my bike so badly that it fell off and is still lying in the front garden. I plan to take the bike to the repair shop to fit a new mudguard. Will the bike plus new mudguard be numerically identical with the bike as it was with the old mudguard (this is precisely what Peter van Inwagen appears to deny)? The question appears to involve deep metaphysical concepts like temporality and numerical identity, which makes it tempting to challenge it (on the grounds that deep metaphysical assumptions involve doubt and uncertainty from their very nature). But the question is actually quite mundane. Suppose, after getting the bike repaired, I say
(*) This bike had its mudguard replaced at the repair shop yesterday.
Is that true? Surely, on the assumption that I did take this bike to the repair shop, and that the crappy and bent mudguard was replaced with a shiny new one, what I say is unquestionably true. Yet it involves both 'metaphysical' assumptions. It involves identity through the very structure of the proposition. Identity: this bike = the bike that was taken to the repair shop. Temporality: the present reference to 'this bike', and the past 'had' of 'had its mudguard replaced'. Without the 'metaphysical' assumptions embedded in the proposition, we could not make the most simple, mundane and matter-of-fact statements about our ordinary everyday life. Such as replacing mudguards on bikes.
Note also (see my previous post) that we cannot re-tell this story by means of expressions like 'bikewise arrangement of parts'. For it is false to say that this bikewise arrangement of parts (which includes the new mudguard) is the arrangement of parts taken to the repair shop (which included the old mudguard).
I conclude that the principle of identity under replacement - which involves merely the assumption that we can refer to an artefact that exists now (this bike) by means of a past tense statement (the artefact that was taken to the repair shop) - is unquestionably true. Tomorrow (or whenever I can be bothered to write it): the transitivity of identity.
* Roughly as follows. If artifacts exist, suppose that some artifact X exists. Then suppose we replace one of its component to give artifact X1. Then (from A above), X=X1. Then replace one another component in X1 to give X2, as in the Ship of Theseus story. From A above, X1 = X2. And from C above, X = X2. Repeat this process for all the n original components to give Xn. Then X = Xn, by the previous argument.Now take the n replaced components, and assemble appopriately to make artifact Y. From B above, X = Y. From transitivity, X=Y and X = Xn so X = Y. Xn and Y are co-existing, i.e. exist at the same time. But Xn and Y have different components (since Y is made from the original components of X, and Xn is made from entirely new and different components). Thus, from D above, Xn /= Y. Since X = Xn, X /=Y. Contradiction: X=Y and X /= Y.
Reduction by re-telling
Yet this is precisely what Peter Inwagen's argument against the existence of ships appears to do, when he re-tells the story of the Ship of Theseus.
Once upon a time, there were certain planks that were arranged shipwise. Call then the First Planks. . . . One of the First Planks was removed from the others and placed in a field. Then it was replaced by a new plank; that is, a carpenter caused the new plank and the remaining First Planks to be arranged shipwise, and in just such a way that the new plank was in contact with the same planks that the removed planks had been in contact with, and at exactly the same points. Call the planks that were then arranged shipwise the Second Planks. A plank that was both one of the First Planks and one of the Second Planks was removed from the others and placed in the field and replaced (according to the procedure laid down above), with the consequence that certain planks, the Third Planks, were arranged shipwise. Then a plank that was one of the First Planks and one of the Second Planks and one of the Third Planks . . . . This process was repeated till all the First Planks were in the field. Then the First Planks were caused to be arranged shipwise, and in just such a way that each of them was in contact with the same planks it had been in contact with when the First Planks had last been arranged shipwise, and was in contact with them at just the same points. (Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell UP, 1990) 128-129)
Perhaps I have missed his point, but it appears to be that we can re-tell the story of the ship such that there is nothing in the standard version of the story that is not captured in the re-telling, and the re-telling does not mention ships, ergo there is no need for ships. If that is his argument, it involves the obvious fallacy I describe above. He begins "Once upon a time, there were certain planks that were arranged shipwise". What does that sentence mean? Does it mean the same as 'Once upon a time, there was a certain ship'? Does the expression 'shipwise arrangement of planks' mean the same as the word 'ship'? In which case the re-telling does mention ships, just as a German version of the standard story would mention ships (although by the word Schiff, of course). Or does it mean something different, something that is not a ship? In which case there is something in the standard version of the story (which begins with the assertion that there was a ship) that is not captured in the re-telling (which asserts only the existence shipwise arrangements of planks). Either way, the conclusion does not follow. Either the re-telling does assert the existence of ships, in which case it does not imply the non-existence of ships. Or it doesn't, in which case something has been lost in the re-telling, and the requirements of the argument are violated.
This casts some doubt on Vallicella's assertion here that Invagen "is a brilliant man". The argument does not strike me as brilliant at all. But perhaps I misunderstand it.
Monday, August 23, 2010
Argumentum ad baculum
Argumentum ad baculum: literally 'argument to the stick' or as we say 'appeal to force'. Wikipedia gives an odd example in its article here, claiming it is not fallacious.
If you drive while drunk, you will be put in jail.
You want to avoid going to jail.
Therefore you should not drive while drunk.
Surely it is fallacious? If you want to avoid going to jail, then it probably follows that you want to avoid driving while drunk (assuming that you know the consequences of driving drunk, and that you are rational enough to not want anything that is a consequence of what you don't want). But it doesn't follow that you shouldn't drive when drunk. 'Should not' or 'ought not' expresses a moral conclusion. This does not follow from any psychological assumption such as wanting or desiring. Now, the following version of the argument is probably valid
If you drive while drunk, you will be put in jail.
You should not be put in jail
Therefore you should not drive while drunk.
But that is different, because the second premiss contains an explicit moral judgment. I say it is 'probably' valid, because it relies on the assumption that if B is a consequence of A, and if you should not do B, then you should not do A. Which could be questioned.
As for the rest of the article, it made no sense at all. Many things in Wikipedia are well done. What is it about philosophy and logic that Wikipedia finds so hard?
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
Impersonal assertion
I shall argue against this in two ways.
1. Even if we concede that the subject of an assertion must be personal, it does not follow that we cannot analyse a sentence in such a way that a sign for assertion is made visible. I claim that we can analyse the sentence 'Tom runs' as
It is true / that Tom runs
which means the same, but which contains the sign 'it is true'. The other part is the that-clause 'that Tom runs', which signifies the content of the sentence. This is the same content referred to in sentences such as 'Alice believes that Tom runs', 'Carol hopes that Tom runs', 'Bob doubts that Tom runs' and so on. But no one who utters these sentences asserts that content. If I utter 'Alice believes that Tom runs', I have asserted that Alice believes something. But I have not asserted the thing that she believes: I have not asserted that Tom runs, only that Alice believes this. But when I utter 'It is true that Tom runs', I have asserted that Tom runs. Which suggests that 'it is true' is a sign indicating that I am asserting the content itself, rather than saying something about it (such that it is a belief, or a hope, of someone). The sign 'it is true' is a symbol which, suitably connected with a symbol for the content, signifies assertion.
2. In any case, we need the idea of impersonal assertion for statements whose author is unknown. For example "The next sentence in Genesis says the earth was without form and void, and darkness over it.
In summary. We can analyse a declarative sentence into another sentence which means the same, but which has two main parts: a sign for the content of the sentence and another sign which is used to indicate or signify that the speaker is personally asserting the content, rather than saying something about the content. It is not unreasonable to call this an assertion sign. And sometimes - when the author of the original sentence is unknown - it is equally reasonable to say that the sentence impersonally asserts its content.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Truth versus Equality
And he emphases a point that I have made frequently here (for example in this post), that Wikipedia is mostly good when it comes to the hard sciences, and particularly on the sort of facts and figures you might look up in Whittakers' Almanac, or the Guinness Book of Records, or Every Boy's Handbook, but a disaster when it comes to the humanities and social sciences.
And of course it is useless and anything politically contentious. I spotted this gem last week, from the article Modern history of Cyprus.
"Efforts to get Turkey to end its occupation and re-integrate the Northern areasIt has been there for months and seems to be part of an ongoing war between the Greek and Turkish Wikipedian-Cypriots. This edit is curious.
into a Federal structure continue but to little avail, as Turkey continues to
ignore the UN and the European Parliament and continue it's illegal occupation
of the island. The Cypriot government, in accordance with the opinion and
rhetoric of the UN do not recognize any sovereignty that the puppet Turkish
administration have and therefore do not allow International flights or free
trade in the occupied sections of the island. Discussions are taking place to
try and remove these 'embargoes' as it has been argued they violate the human
rights of the citizens in the Northern areas in a similar manner that the
Israeli imposed embargo on Gaza does."
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Plural quantification and scholasticism
Unde videtur quod quidquid potest facere unus, possint facere multi, et non e
converso, sicut multi trahunt navem quam unus trahere non posset - "it is clear
that whatever one can do, many can do, but not conversely. For example, many
persons drag the boat which one person could not drag". Summa Theologiae
III 67 a6 (See also Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 2 n. 11).
Aquinas was writing in the 1260's, but the idea is probably older than that. See e.g. Lambert of Auxerre:
Later, William of Ockham discussed the 'Apostles' example in his Summa Logicae II. 4.Similiter est suppositio confusa sed immobilis quando signum additur
termino communi in singulari vel in plurali et tenetur collective ut cum
dicitur: 'omnis homo trahit navem', positione facta quod omnes homines trahunt
navem et nullus per se, et similiter cum dicitur: omnes apostoli sunt
duodecim. "Similarly, confused but immobile supposition is when the
(quantifying) sign is applied to a common term in the singular or plural and is
understood collectively, as in 'every man drags the boat', assuming that all the
men are dragging the boat and none of them by himself. And similarly in 'all the
apostles are twelve'. (Logica, "De suppositionibus et de significationibus")
Sunday, July 18, 2010
How to tell a big lie
Howard Zinn, interviewed by Truth in Numbers.
Francesco Patrizi
The problem is that Francesco has at least three different identities. His place of birth was on the island of Cherso in 1529, which lies off the coast of Dalmatia, now in modern Croatia. The state of his birth was the Venetian Republic, which dominated the area until the early 1800s. His intellectual heritage is the Western philosophical tradition: he spent seven years at Padua studying Aristotelian philosophy, in Latin. He studied Plato, and seems to have had a knowledge of the original Greek texts, even owning a collection of Greek manuscripts [1].
Consequently, there is a war on Wikipedia about Francesco's identity. Is it defined by the Western intellectual heritage with its Latin and Greek origin? All that Francesco learned in his years at Padua and afterwards are derived from it. Is it the Republic of Venice, now in modern Italy? Francesco could not have been taught without the universities in Italy whose staff and administration were not paid for by Croatians. Or is it the modern state of Croatia, where his birthplace now lies?
Wikipedia, or at least its current version, defers to the first, calling him by the Latinised name of Franciscus Patricius. Adopting the second, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article [2] uses his Italian name. But in Croatia, of course, he is known as Frane Petrić, although (I am told) they made a mistake here: they used the Croatian diacritic sign on the consonant, invented only in the middle of the 1800s.
The whole issue presents problems when you are doing real history. How do we separate the contribution of an individual from the contribution of the tradition they are writing in? No intellectual contribution made by an individual, even by an original thinker such as Aristotle, is uniquely due to their special talent, although ability is a necessary condition. An equally important influence is individual teachers, who in Francesco's case would have been Italian. So in what sense does a country - a modern country like Croatia, say - own a persons's work?
The problem becomes particularly acute in a place like Wikipedia, where the only intellectual interest - that is to say, no intellectual interest at all - lies simply in a nationalistic dispute, in this case between Italians and Croatians. The talk page shows it beautifully. "He was Italian for culture and birth" says Giovanni Giove (presumably an Italian). "It is sad to see that User:Factanista has started an further edit war to imposte [sic] his nationalistic POV" says Giovanni. "It is you who is edit-warring " replies Factanista (presumably a Croatian). "I'm going to report the behaviour of User:Factanista to an administrator" says Giovanni. "Please do, you will be reported shortly yourself" objects Factanista.
The history of the article itself [3] is instructive. Hundreds of reverts and unreverts, as the intellectual battle unfolds. An Italian editor removes the word 'Croatian' [4] with the comment "oh please, lets avoid stupid national bickering". It is immediately reverted back [5] with the reply "then stop to deny his roots and ethnicity". Which of course makes it all the more absurd. What does ethnicity have to do with the work of a man who wrote, in Latin, about the Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato? It is different in the case of someone like Chopin who, though he studied in France and was influenced by the French tradition, wrote specifically Polish nationalistic pieces. This case, by contrast, is more like the case of Joseph Conrad, who was Polish but whose works are all in English. Or Wittgenstein, who was Austrian and who actually wrote in German, but who was taught by an Englishman** (Russell), and whose work was most influential in England where he lived and worked for most of this life. Ethnicity has very little to do with it.
What is really sad is how the article suffers as a result. In its current version (permanent link above) all but the first three paragraphs are copied verbatim from the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica article [6]. The introduction is mostly taken from the SEP article. I have commented on this irony before - that "an ultra modern high-tech medium like the Internet, when it reflects anything of importance, reflects the obselete views of 19th century scholars". None of the people who have edit-warred for at least four years over the ethnicity of this man, seem to have any interest in his thinking.
At least I found something valuable in my research today: When ethnicity did not matter in the Balkans by John Fine. About "The back-projection of twentieth-century forms of identity into the pre-modern past by patriotic and nationalist historians". Possible holiday reading.
*Many thanks to Peter Zuvela, who brought this to my attention.
** Wikipedia has Russell down as a Welsh philosopher, of course.
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Ochlocracy
Meanwhile here is what one philosopher said about the wisdom of the crowd.
"Philosophy: I'm a philosopher; why don't I edit the article on my subject? Because it's hopeless. I've tried at various times, and each time have given up in depressed disgust. Philosophy seems to attract aggressive zealots who know a little (often a very little), who lack understanding of key concepts, terms, etc., and who attempt to take over the article (and its Talk page) with rambling, ground-shifting, often barely comprehensible rants against those who disagree with them. Life's too short. I just tell my students and anyone else I know not to read the Wikipedia article except for a laugh. It's one of those areas where the ochlocratic nature of Wikipedia really comes a cropper".
By Wikipedia editor Mel Etitis, who is a well-known philosopher in real life. He left Wikipedia shortly after this comment in 2007.
Friday, July 16, 2010
Truth in numbers?
First, the theory: Those who support the truth are in a large majority. Of 100,000 people, probably all but ten would like to see the truth. But their interest is only feeble. The remaining ten support false beliefs of various kinds. They probably think these beliefs are true, but they are false for all that. And their false belief is passionate and determined. It follows that, if anyone is allowed to publicise their belief, and if there is a moderate cost to publicising it, such as arguing about it or being involved in an 'edit war'*, the proponents of error will always be victorious. For they are passionate in their error, whereas the others are only feeble in their truth.
Now, the evidence. No sane or normal or reasonable person contributes to Wikipedia, and so all contributors fall into the following broad classes: deviant, aficionado, quack, activist, cultist, crank. The reasons for their persistent interest, together with Wikipedia article examples, are as follows. I list them in approximate order of the power that belongs to them.
1. First are the deviants, usually the sexual deviants. The pedophile lobby has long been an active force on Wikipedia. They are powerful because, like everyone else, they are passionate about their sexuality, seeing it as in some sense normal, and also because no reasonable person is likely to edit articles about pedophilia, 'pederasty' and so on. Hence monstrosities like this, which is indistinguishable from monstrosities like (WARNING: pedophile website - not safe for work) this. See also the article about the PPA 'Wikipedia Campaign' at Wikisposure.
2. Aficionados ('fans') are a large and diverse group on Wikipedia. They are mostly harmless devotees of obscure subjects like Japanese comic books or American science fiction TV. The error lies not so much in the uncritical approach to the subject as the undue weight given to a subject which is essentially ephemeral and unimportant and unencyclopedic. This is probably harmless, although not in the case of Ayn Rand, who I have discussed before. The coverage of her ideas is extensive in Wikipedia, and out of all proportion to her real importance in philosophy, which is practically nil, particularly outside the United States. Aficionados are powerful in Wikipedia because they are mostly viewed as harmless, and because there is no 'weighting' policy in the encyclopedia. Quite reverse: they even have a policy: Wikipedia is not paper, and so there is no practical limit to the number of topics it can cover, or the total amount of content. The practice of a normal reference work, which is to assign pages in rough proportion to the received importance of a subject, does not apply here. Thus the academically marginal Ayn Rand receives more coverage than Aristotle, the father of Western philosophy and easily the most important figure in the Western intellectual tradition. The article on his Sophistical Refutations, for example, is no more than a list of contents. Compare this in size and scope with any article on the nonsensical and philosophically illiterate work of Rand, e.g. this.
3. Quacks are peddlers of fake cures, bogus medicine and psychological theory. There is plenty of this on Wikipedia. Their interest is commercial rather than idealistic. The Wikipedia administration does attempt to weed out blatant commercial advertising, but it is also corrupt. The subject that touches me the most is the rubbishy and fraudulent Neurolinguistic Programming. These articles had support at high levels of the Wikipedia administration, and so quite a few more neutrally-minded editors (including myself) were banned for attempting to trim them. See also EMDR, or Ken Wilber, or this lot, gulp.
4. Cults are groups with strange beliefs who have an interest in publicising their existence, recruiting new members, and usually suppressing the more unpalatable facts about their financial statements and other irregularities. Too many of these to mention, but some of the more amusing include the Brahma Kumaris, who seem to enjoy some support among Wikipedians, at least judging from the way that those who opposed them are so regularly blocked, simply for saying stuff like this ("You and your other adherents have wasted too much time of too many people's lives ... never mind mentioning the broken families and suicides that litter your religion's history"). The Scientologists did not fare so well, as is well known (their IP is currently blocked), but that is only because a group of prominent Wikipedians dislike scientology - it has nothing to do with any self-governing mechanism that prevents cults from promoting their views on the global electronic reference work. See for example Prem Rawat, defended for years by a prominent Wikipedia administrator, although he eventually came to grief.
5. Activists are the supporters of extreme political movements. These are also numerous, but the force can be less strong with them because there are often equally extreme political movements who are bitterly opposed, and so they 'edit war' the talk pages of the articles concerned. See the archives of the articles on The Troubles, the thirty-year conflict in Northern Ireland, which was intellectually as violent as the actual troubles were physically bloody. Or Islamic Republic is the same as Arab Republic. However, the articles on Yugoslav communism, e.g. on Tito seem to have got by with their strange point of view unscathed. They do not reflect the views of more recent historians who view Tito as essentially a Stalinist, but rather adhere to and reflect the propaganda of the former Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The article about Tito is written in a child-like manner, reminiscent of Yugoslav primary school textbooks from the 1970s. This may be the result of the 'partisan' group of editors who control those articles, and the relative lack of interest from anyone else.
6. Cranks. These are individuals who have a passionate belief in some idea, theory or system that they developed on their own, and which has been rejected by the academic establishment. Naturally they turn to the encyclopedia which anyone can edit. Cranks have little power on Wikipedia, because unlike the rest they are not part of a larger group and can easily be picked off, and also there is no fraudulent secondary literature they can tap. Nonetheless they flourish in dark corners - I am glad to see that Boolean logic, which has nothing to do with George Boole, still survives, and that the Ancient Egyptian Race theory seems to be thriving, at least between periods of illness or coma. And how about this whole category of stuff which is completely deranged (" the Mental Plane is located between, and hence is intermediate between, the astral plane below and the higher spiritual realms of existence above").
Add to this the eccentric and perverse features of Wikipedia governance and software. First, the ability of any IP addresses to edit, which results in a tidal wave of crude vandalism every day. This in itself is not a problem, since there are about 500 administrators who instantly clear it up. The problem is rather the administrators, many of whom are retired ex-military types or police, and who are not interested in encyclopedias at all. They just enjoy whacking vandals. The problem is that they don't really distinguish between vandals and ordinary editors, and don't really understand the disputes at all. They have no theoretical interest in a dispute between a scientist and a homeopathist or chiropractor. But if they see either of them getting out of line, i.e. infringing Wikipedia's strict 'civility' rules, they whack them anyway.
Second is the fact that accounts are anonymous, and there is not even elementary identity checking. Thus a problem editor who has been 'blocked' can instantly register again. Furthermore, they can create multiple accounts ('sockpuppets' or 'socks') to give the illusion of strong support for error. This frustrates the supporters of truth, many of whom stoop to the same tactics. Worse, Wikipedia has evolved an elaborate secret police ('checkusers') whose job is to spy on accounts for 'sock'-like behaviour and block them if necessary. This deflects the administration from the real job of building a comprehensive and accurate reference work, moreover it encourages types who are intellectually unsuited for such work.
Which is, of course, why Wikipedia is nothing like a comprehensive and accurate reference work. How would we change this? Well, the theory (that small numbers of passionate devotees of error will always defeat an army of those with a feeble and weak interest in the truth) suggests abandoning the idea that 'anyone can edit'. It's fine if only 'disinterested' persons can edit, but as the different but connected meanings of 'interest' suggest, it is difficult to get disinterested people to do this. They simply aren't, er, interested. Another idea would be this. Levy a small 'falsity tax' on everyone. A majority of people would vote for this, if the tax were proportionate to their feeble dedication to the truth. The money from the tax would then pay for experts with a proven neutrality and lack of 'interest' to write articles. This is essentially the economic model of a university, a system invented in the Middle Ages, and which therefore existed long before Web 2.0.
*Edit war: long protracted dispute on Wikipedia. Sometimes between the forces of truth and error, more often between propopents of different kinds of error (such as environmentalists and oil company employees).
Thursday, July 15, 2010
The Cult of the Amateur: Lessig vs Keen
Many of Lessig's points are spot on, for example his criticism of Keen's sloppy grammar - "what is puzzling about this book is that it purports to be a book attacking the sloppiness, error and ignorance of the Internet, yet it itself is shot through with sloppiness, error and ignorance". He is probably right to say that policy makers should not be concerned (as Keen apparently is, p.115) when the costs of an activity drop because society has found a way to do the same activity more efficiently. There is no point in preserving the living of those who farm trees to make printed books if (I say if) exactly the same social benefit can accrue from disseminating that information through the internet.
However, I take issue with Lessig about the ghastly Wikipedia. Keen claims
Since Wikipedia's birth, more than fifteen thousand contributors have created nearly three million entries in over a hundred different languages—none of them edited or vetted for accuracy (p4).Spot on. Perhaps an exaggeration: no doubt some of Wikipedia's entries have been vetted for accuracy, and so (as we logicians know) it is literally false to claim that none have been vetted. But most of them haven't, and that will do. Keen disagrees:
this is absurdly false. Wikipedia is constantly edited, and attributionsNot at all. There are superficial attempts at vetting for accuracy, and the level of attempted vetting for accuracy is certainly vastly greater than ever before tried by humans. But trying is not the same as achieving. There have been 911 edits to the Wikipedia article Existence since the first version begun on 1 June 2001, 9 years ago. It is still much worse than the original version (which was not particularly good either). Regular readers of this blog will appreciate this is a subject I have some acquaintance with. The kind of 'vetting' that goes on in Wikipedia is merely superficial. And so it is (in my view) for pretty much all the articles on philosophy, and most of those in the humanities generally.
constantly vetted for accuracy. Indeed, for many of the articles, the level of
editing and vetting is vastly greater than any article published in any
encyclopedia ever.
Lessig suggests that Keen means Wikipedia is not "vetted" by experts.
Or exclusively by experts (for again, experts certainly participate inBut having read on, I didn't find any argument against this central claim - namely the claim that Wikipedia suffers from not being vetted by experts. In any case, I think the articles speak for themselves. Some parts of Wikipedia are good, much of it is written by amateurs (meaning: non-experts). But the parts that are written by amateurs are generally not good, and the parts that are good are mostly not written by amateurs.
Wikipedia). This is related to Keen's obsession (indeed, I'm sure if he has one,
his shrink must have a field day with this obsession) with "experts" and makers
of "taste." So central is this to Keen's argument, it deserves its own
heading.
Monday, July 12, 2010
Priceless
Monday, July 05, 2010
Truth in ten minutes
The idea that the truth will emerge if you open the means of promoting it to absolutely everyone is fundamental to how Wikipedia works, and (as the remark above proves) is an article of faith to most ‘Wikipedians’. But as I suggested here, truth is more fragile. There is nothing magical or complicated or difficult about recognising it yourself. The problem is to get it others to recognise it. Although it takes in general about 10 minutes to discover the truth about most matters, only one person in every thousand people is likely to spend that time. Of the rest, 9 people will find it so painful that they can get only as far as 3 minutes, and will spend the rest of the time and much more in opposing every attempt at publicising it. The remaining 990 people have only a minute to read about it, and thus are forced rely on the other 10. This is the best model for understanding Wikipedia.
Saturday, June 26, 2010
God and Allah
1. 'Allah' is an empty name, referring to nothing. If you are a Christian description theorist, you believe that all propositions containing 'Allah' have an implicit existence claim, and so are all false. If you are a (direct) referentialist Christian, you hold that all such propositions are senseless, since they cannot have truth-value.
2. 'Allah' refers to a supernatural and powerful (though not all powerful) being who is not identical with God. Thus all the claims of Islam implying an identity with God, such as this passage where Allah speaks to Adam and Eve, are false. Others may be true.
3. God and Allah are identical, but Islam says many things about God that are not true. The only true things are the those relating to the Old Testament. For example, Allah expels Adam and Eve from Eden: God did do this, and Allah is identical with God, ergo etc.
What if 'God' and 'Allah' are both empty names? Can we make sense of such claims to identity or difference? I favour a 'haecceity predicate' theory of proper names. Being the very individual that you are cannot be a property of you. Otherwise, as Bill Vallicella has pointed out, all sorts of absurdities follow. How could the the 'thisness' of an individual exist even if the individual whose thisness it is does not exist?
But if proper names are not descriptions, haecceity is clearly a predicate, since we can make a predicate from any proper name thus: '-- is identical to Socrates' (or 'God' or 'Allah'). That is the only way we can make sense of narratives like the Koran and the Old Testament, which mention the same supernatural being as the same being throughout.
Walters on Wikipedia
Friday, June 25, 2010
A Milanese interjection
The Betrothed (I Promessi Sposi) - Alessandro Manzoni.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
William of Ockham
Life
The article begins with the observation that Ockham was born in Yorkshire and not, as most standard reference works suppose, in the village of Ockham in Surrey. This curiosity was inserted by an IP address on 3 May 2010. The philosopher C. Delisle Burns proposed this in 1916, but I can find no modern reference work that says this. Some sources say that he actually came from Woking, which had a similar spelling in medieval times, but Wikipedia does not mention this at all.
The rest of Ockham's biography is not so bad. It mentions the usual things about being summoned to Avignon, the controversy among the Franciscans, leaving Avignon in 1328 for exile at the court of Louis IV. Biographies in Wikipedia are generally accurate and well-written, mainly because, I suspect, there is no difficulty about which order to set out the facts. You start with a birth, and end with a death, and there is stuff in between.
Philosophical Thought
When we turn to the work of a great person, it is much more difficult, because this requires understanding the work, and making a judgment about which parts of the work to emphasis and explain. This is particularly important with medieval philosophers because, mostly, we have very little information about their lives. We have an intimate and deep knowledge of what they thought, because we have their work. But this requires understanding their work, and so we turn to the work of Ockham according to Wikipedia.
The odd section on his philosophical thought begins "In scholasticism, Okham advocated a reform both in method and in content, the aim of which was simplification" which is straightforwardly lifted out of the Catholic Encyclopedia, and which illustrates an important principle of Wikipedia (and much of the Internet) that essays about more serious subjects (i.e. subjects unconnected with Pokemon, Star Trek episodes and 'porn star' biographies) are taken from out of copyright sources like the Catholic Encyclopedia, or the 1911 Britannica. The irony that an ultra modern high-tech medium like the Internet, when it reflects anything of importance, reflects the sometimes obsolete views of 19th century scholars.
Nominalism
The section on nominalism is mostly lifted from the Catholic Encyclopedia, except for the paragraph at the end, where the abrupt change in style signals an entirely plagiarised excerpt from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The strange claim that Ockham has been called a "terminist", to distinguish him from a nominalist or a conceptualist, is from the Catholic Encyclopedia. Thus the article combines what is probably wrong ('terminism' can be consistent with nominalism**) with the section from the SEP which is intended for an academic audience, and is impenetrable out of context.
Natural Philosophy
The whole section on Natural Philosophy is eccentric and strange, with a convoluted discussion of impetus theory, of the views of Mach and Whitehead, and of "the president of the Birmingham Scientific Society, George Gore". This section was added on 7 June 2007 by an editor who was later banned for promoting strange and eccentric views on the history of science. You can read the discussion here. It illustrates an important principle of Wikipedia, namely that many editors are like this, and eventually end up banned. Their reason for editing Wikipedia is to promote some pet theory that they could not get published in an academic journal, but will always be accepted by 'the encyclopedia that anyone can edit'.
Ontological parsimony
The next section also mixes up passages from the Catholic Encyclopedia and the SEP, in a way that is highly misleading. It says that 'Ockham's Razor' is formulated by him as “For nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is self-evident (literally, known through itself) or known by experience or proved by the authority of Sacred Scripture.” The sentence is lifted verbatim from the SEP, except the SEP does not claim it is a formulation of the principle. Rather it suggests it is a sort of exception to the principle.
The original version of the article also copied the SEP claim that Ockham does not accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In a strange edit here made in 2006, an editor changes this to 'accepts' the principle. This is the same editor who added the plagiarised sections from the Catholic Encyclopedia, and whose contribution history suggests many such insertions, including a whole article about the late Scholastic philosopher Zabarella. Note that Wikipedia now contradicts itself, for the article on Ockham's Razor still retains the claim that Ockham did not accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Theory of knowledge
The section on Ockham's theory of knowledge is clearly not plagiarised; the style is too amateurish and clumsy. As Dr Johnson once quipped: "Your work is both good and original. Unfortunately the parts which are good are not original, and the parts which are original are not good". (Or something like that).
Political Theory
The section on his political is reasonably written and seems reasonably accurate (although I am not an expert on this aspect of Ockham). It is however very brief, given the importance which experts attach to his work. if he really was one of the first medieval authors to advocate a form of separation between church and state, why does Wikipedia devote far less space (one sentence) than it does to the biography of a porn star?
Logic
The section on Ockham's logic is also remarkable for its brevity, considering that Ockham's fame rests mostly on his logical work, the magisterial and compendious Summa Logicae. It mentions only Ockham's anticipation of De Morgan's laws, and of many-valued logic. The latter claim is completely misleading. It illustrates the tendency of all reference work to emphasise the ideas of thinkers which anticipate, or seem to anticipate, later developments in philosophy and science, at the expense of other interesting ideas they may have had. No source is given; it probably comes from Ockham's defence of the 'traditional' interpretation of Aristotle (in Exposition in Librum Perihermenias I.6.15 - see the SEP article here). But it fails to mention that nearly all commentators on the famous 'sea battle' problem discussed by Aristotle were exercised by the problem of statements about future events, and by the possibility that such statements are neither true nor false. Thus the idea of a third 'truth value' did not originate with Ockham, and may have originated with Aristotle, depending on how you interpret Aristotle.
There is no discussion at all of how Ockham's nominalism is connected with his logic, of his use of supposition theory, nor of the way that Ockham really does anticipate the ideas of modern analytic philosophy in his view that you can address 'metaphysical' problems by carving up a sentence in the right way.
In summary: the Wikipedia article on William of Ockham, one of England's most illustrious and important philosophers, is woefully incomplete and inaccurate. It mixes blatant plagiarism with blatant falsehood. This is not surprising. What is surprising is the way that the respectable press eulogises Wikipedia, respectable institutions like the British Museum are entering into partnership with it, respectable donors like the Sloan Foundation are contributing large sums of money to it. This needs to change, although it is hard to see how.
* Permalink: version of 24 June 2010.
** Particularly in the case of Ockham's nominalism, defined as the view that we should not multiply entities according to the multiplicity of names.
Sunday, June 20, 2010
The Dumbest Generation
* http://www.dumbestgeneration.com/home.html
* http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-book5-2008jul05,0,6248930.story
Vaknin and Reagle on Wikipedia
As far as I can judge, the Wikipedia's coverage of the natural and exact sciences is pretty good. Its humanities articles are an unmitigated disaster, though: they are replete with nonsense, plagiarism, falsities, and propaganda. I know a bit about psychology, economics, philosophy, and the history of certain parts of the world. Articles dealing with these fields are utterly and sometimes dangerously unreliable.Correct (I will give some examples over the next week). Wikipedia articles about set theory, pure mathematics, physics and other exact sciences are pretty good, as far as I can judge. But almost any article about the softer sciences and the humanities, and particularly philosophy, is a disaster.
Vaknin also has insightful things to say about teenagers and encyclopedias. He disparages the citation requirements of Wikipedia, which the teenage editors are obsessive about. The problem is that without credentials and education, an editor cannot tell the difference between good and bad sources. And as I commented here, they rarely bother to check the sources. If you understand the citation rules, you can make up any piece of nonsense you like, using a citation that does not support it in any way, particularly if you use academic papers and books which are not online, or obscure or out of print publications.
Vaknin says that even when the claims are 'verifiable' (i.e. backed up by reliable sources), research is not about hoarding facts (which Wikipedia generally is about, look for any article at random and you will soon come across a list - usually a list of silly things). "Wikipedia articles read like laundry lists of information gleaned from secondary sources". True research "is about identifying and applying context and about possessing a synoptic view of ostensibly unrelated data." (My emphasis).
Reagle, by contrast, is clearly a fan. Vaknin dismisses him entirely as a 'computer scientist'. I have only read his article on neutrality, and I was not impressed. It consists mostly of cursory remarks about 'neutrality', including a part about the X Windows System (what is that?), and a brief paragraph about the neutrality of Switzerland. It did not go on to ask the question implied by the title: whether Wikipedia is neutral. To do this, you need to take a reasonable sample of Wikipedia articles and compare them against some acceptable definition of neutrality. The article by James Hannam discussed in an earlier post did just that. Hannam took a definition of neutrality, namely, a topic balance which agreed roughly with the balance given by scholarly opinion, and found Wikipedia wanting. The entry on Alhazen is 7,000 words long and bristles with 126 footnotes. Major figures of the medieval Christian world such as William of Ockham* receive only 2,500 words.
I saw none of this critical approach in Reagle's essay. However, perhaps I should read more of his work and perhaps I am being unfair. The dispute is discussed in the Wikipedia signpost here, by Vaknin here. Reagle also has a weblog, and here is a video of one of his presentations.
*The entry on Ockham is also grossly misleading and incorrect. More later, perhaps.
The Fragility of Truth
But, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed forever, it may be thrown back for centuries. [...] It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake. Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it. (On Liberty, Chapter Two).Quite right. The truth, being recognisable as true, will pop up again and again, and be suppressed again and again, until a favourable accident allows it to prevail and flourish. It is a piece of Wikipedia nonsense that the magic pixie-dust of 'crowdsourcing' will instantly drive out falsehood and all error. The crowd is often wrong. It is often right, of course, but even then it can rarely be bothered to go to Wikipedia to correct the error. Only the obsessive and the insane are likely to do that, and the truth is mostly lost on those.
Saturday, June 19, 2010
On Burley and Wild Oaks
When I summarise a subject that is large and broad, like someone's life, or a period in history, I try to imagine that every other piece of information about that subject has been annihilated except for my summary, which alone will be handed down to posterity. What are the really really important things that people in the future will need to know about this man, or this period in history? Ottman and Wood include the bit about the forestry offence. And why not? It captured my attention, and perhaps it tells us something about Burley.
There is more on p.19. Burley had been granted two oaks in Sherwood forest, near his rectory in Pytchely, by Queen Philippa (wife of Edward III and founder of Queen's College). When his men cut them down in 1336, Burley was arrested and imprisoned, aged 60. He was pardoned in December of the same year by Richard de Bury. How he came to be granted the oaks, why he cut them down, and why the offence was so serious as to deserve imprisonment, is not explained.
Another snippet is the inclusion of Burley's evidence that people undertake great risks for the sake of excessive enjoyment. 'Secundo est notandum quod multi superabundanter quaerunt delectationes qui tamen non fugiunt tristitias superabundanter. Multi enim multas tribulationes labores et pericula sustinent propter delectationes consequendas: ut patet de multis incontintentibus, qui propter delectationes corporales consequendas patiuntur frigora et calores et multa pericula ambulantes solitarii per noctes hyemales in tempore frigidissimo ad consequendum delectationes corporales et voluptates, et tales magis negociantur circa delectationes quam circa tristitias" (Expositio super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis, Venice 1500, 115ra).
I translate: 'Second, it must be noted that many superabundantly seek pleasure, who nevertheless do not superabundantly avoid suffering. For many [people] undergo much hardship, effort and danger because of the bodily pleasure that results. As is clear in the case of many immoderate [people] who, because of bodily pleasure, endure coldness and heat* and many dangers walking alone on winter nights in extreme cold, for the bodily pleasure and enjoyment that is to follow. And such [hardships] are more endured because of the pleasure, than on account of the suffering'.
I am intrigued by what sort of bodily pleasures he had in mind. And what events prompted this idea? Ottman and Wood conclude "clearly Burley was an engaging as well as a useful author".
* I don't follow this.