Tuesday, August 31, 2010
Reducing Hesperus
Does a reductivist or 'identity' theory have to be eliminativist? Perhaps not. The theory could simply be asserting an identity. Take an early scientific discovery: the heavenly body that appears in the morning (Phosphorus) is identical with the heavenly body that appears in the evening (Hesperus). Is the theory that Hesperus = Phosphorus a reductivist theory? Nothing has been eliminated. Hesperus has not been eliminated because Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus, and Phosphorus has not been eliminated. By equal reasoning, Phosphorus has not been eliminated. So nothing has been eliminated. But is the theory reductivist? It seems to be lacking the asymmetry that we expect of a properly reductivist theory. It seems reasonable to assert that mental states are really brain states. But if this were merely an identity statement like Hesperus = Phosphorus, it would be just as reasonable to assert that brain states are 'really' mental states. Which seems odd.
Sunday, August 29, 2010
On artefactual identity
Following some severe strictures by Brightly on my earlier posts I offer reformulations of the 'aporetic set' of propositions, as follows.
A. If an artefact X1 has a replacement component, and X contained the replaced component, and the other components of X1 have been components of X since the replacement, and if the arrangement of components is the same in X1 as in X, then X1 = X.
B. If the components of Y are now the components of X, similarly arranged, then X=Y
C. If Fx and x=y, then Fy
D. If it is not the case that components of X = the components of Y, then it is not the case that X = Y.
E. Artifacts exist.
The only notion that may need elucidation is 'plural identity'. I propose the following definition: the x's = the y's if every one of the x's = some y, and every one of the y's = some x, which uses singular identity. Note I have made a significant change to C. That is because substitutivity is more fundamental than transitivity, and because (I think) we can derive transitivity. For let x = y, and y = z. The identity x = y allows us to substitute 'x' for 'y' in 'y = z'. Then x = z, which is transitivity.
We can then prove inconsistency as follows.
1. Suppose there are an X1 and an X such that A is true. Then X1 = X.
2. Suppose next that there is an X2 such that A is true regarding X2 and X1. Then X2 = X1, and from C above, X2 = X.
3. Repeat this process, ensuring that each replaced component is always one of the original components (and not a replacement component). Then, repeating this n times for the n original components, we have Xn such that Xn = X. Note that while all of the components of Xn are components of X (because of the identity, and because of C above), it is nonetheless true that at one time none of the components of Xn was a component of X. Indeed, it is true (again because of C above) that none of the components of X was at one time a component of X.
4. Take all the original components of Xn/X and reassemble them so that they are arranged exactly as they were when they were part of Xn/X, to make Y. Then (from B above) X = Y.
5. But from D above, since the components of Xn/X are currently different from those of Y, it is not the case that X = Y.
6. Thus X = Y and not X=Y. Contradiction.
A. If an artefact X1 has a replacement component, and X contained the replaced component, and the other components of X1 have been components of X since the replacement, and if the arrangement of components is the same in X1 as in X, then X1 = X.
B. If the components of Y are now the components of X, similarly arranged, then X=Y
C. If Fx and x=y, then Fy
D. If it is not the case that components of X = the components of Y, then it is not the case that X = Y.
E. Artifacts exist.
The only notion that may need elucidation is 'plural identity'. I propose the following definition: the x's = the y's if every one of the x's = some y, and every one of the y's = some x, which uses singular identity. Note I have made a significant change to C. That is because substitutivity is more fundamental than transitivity, and because (I think) we can derive transitivity. For let x = y, and y = z. The identity x = y allows us to substitute 'x' for 'y' in 'y = z'. Then x = z, which is transitivity.
We can then prove inconsistency as follows.
1. Suppose there are an X1 and an X such that A is true. Then X1 = X.
2. Suppose next that there is an X2 such that A is true regarding X2 and X1. Then X2 = X1, and from C above, X2 = X.
3. Repeat this process, ensuring that each replaced component is always one of the original components (and not a replacement component). Then, repeating this n times for the n original components, we have Xn such that Xn = X. Note that while all of the components of Xn are components of X (because of the identity, and because of C above), it is nonetheless true that at one time none of the components of Xn was a component of X. Indeed, it is true (again because of C above) that none of the components of X was at one time a component of X.
4. Take all the original components of Xn/X and reassemble them so that they are arranged exactly as they were when they were part of Xn/X, to make Y. Then (from B above) X = Y.
5. But from D above, since the components of Xn/X are currently different from those of Y, it is not the case that X = Y.
6. Thus X = Y and not X=Y. Contradiction.
Is Hume an eliminativist about objects?
Hume's philosophy is more radical than we imagine. He did not hold, as Locke held, a representative theory of perception such that our sense impressions are fleeting and perishable, but are representative of objects which are relatively permanent and durable. He held that, when we analyse and examine the world carefully, we find that the things we call tables, chairs and houses really cease to exist when we are not perceiving them. For such things are really identical with our perceptions or sense impressions. He says* "it is impossible for us distinctly to conceive, objects to be in their nature any thing but exactly the same with perceptions". But "it is a gross illusion to suppose, that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same; and it is this illusion, which leads us into the opinion, that these perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even when they are not present to the senses. " Only philosophical analysis can penetrate and expose this illusion. Even that analysis can fail. The illusion is so strong that as soon as philosophers have discovered it - namely discovered, like Locke and the seventeenth century philosophers of perception, that our sense-impressions are fleeting and impermanent - that they immediately invent a new set of impressions that have the required permanence. Thus the representative theory at once refutes and re-establishes the illusion.
Does this make Hume an eliminativist, or a reductionist? I have argued elsewhere that the distinction is arbitrary, and I shall argue that this applies to Hume's position also. If we define 'material object' as something which is mind-independent and permanent, then it is clear Hume is denying the existence of any such things. The only objects we are aware of, he says, are these fleeting and perishable sense-impressions, which have no continued and uninterrupted existence. So he is an eliminativist regarding material objects defined in this way. But as I have argued, we don't have adopt this definition. If we define 'material object' as something identical with our sense-impression, then uninterrupted existence turns into a mere accidental feature of objects. An accidental feature that, as Hume argues, may not apply to any object at all, just as 'carried by the ether' does not apply to light, as people once thought.
In summary: whether Hume is an eliminativist or reductionist about the term 'material object' depends entirely on how you choose to define the term. There are the observable phenomena - the sense impressions - and there is whatever unobservable X explains or underlies these phenomena. And that X can have any features you like. There are no 'essential features' of things that are essentially unobservable.
* A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I. 4. ii - "Of scepticism with regard to the senses". This section is essential reading for any understanding of Hume. People often don't read it because it occurs towards the end of the first book, and because there is a lot of focus on the causation stuff in Part III. Part IV, particularly sections 2-4, are by far the most interesting and enjoyable and indeed strange parts of the work.
[...] it is liable to the same difficulties; and is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity, that it at once denies and establishes the vulgar supposition. Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be identically the same, and uninterrupted; and yet have so great a propensity to believe them such, that they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they attribute these qualities.
Does this make Hume an eliminativist, or a reductionist? I have argued elsewhere that the distinction is arbitrary, and I shall argue that this applies to Hume's position also. If we define 'material object' as something which is mind-independent and permanent, then it is clear Hume is denying the existence of any such things. The only objects we are aware of, he says, are these fleeting and perishable sense-impressions, which have no continued and uninterrupted existence. So he is an eliminativist regarding material objects defined in this way. But as I have argued, we don't have adopt this definition. If we define 'material object' as something identical with our sense-impression, then uninterrupted existence turns into a mere accidental feature of objects. An accidental feature that, as Hume argues, may not apply to any object at all, just as 'carried by the ether' does not apply to light, as people once thought.
In summary: whether Hume is an eliminativist or reductionist about the term 'material object' depends entirely on how you choose to define the term. There are the observable phenomena - the sense impressions - and there is whatever unobservable X explains or underlies these phenomena. And that X can have any features you like. There are no 'essential features' of things that are essentially unobservable.
* A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I. 4. ii - "Of scepticism with regard to the senses". This section is essential reading for any understanding of Hume. People often don't read it because it occurs towards the end of the first book, and because there is a lot of focus on the causation stuff in Part III. Part IV, particularly sections 2-4, are by far the most interesting and enjoyable and indeed strange parts of the work.
Friday, August 27, 2010
Radical versus conservative ontology
Before I move on to discuss the other assumptions that generate the conclusion that there are no artefacts, I realise there is something else to discuss. This is the distinction between what Steven Savitt calls 'ontologically conservative' or 'retentive' theory change, or reductionism, and 'ontologically radical' or 'eliminitavist' theory change, or eliminativism. This is explained well here. Ontological conservatism is when we revise our view of the entities posited by the original theory, without eliminating them. For example, our conception of light was transformed by the discovery that it is electro-magnetic radiation, and older explanations of it had to be rejected as incorrect or incomplete or misleading. But this discovery did not lead to abandoning the existence of light. Ontological eliminativism is when we drop completely the view that certain entities exist. For example, there is nothing in modern psychology that justifies the existence of malevolent spirits or demons. So we dropped demons altogether from our modern scientific ontology.
This is closely connected with what I discussed here about Inwagen's paraphrase argument. If his paraphrase of a story about ships is intended merely to change our view about ships (e.g. that they are not identical with their component parts, and that there is something singular over and above the parts corresponding to the grammatically singular 'a ship') then the paraphrase is ontologically conservative. It still affirms the existence of ships, just as the electro-magnetic theory affirms the existence of light, but it changes our view of what ships are, just as the electro-magnetic story changes our view about light. By contrast, if the paraphrase really 'loses ships', then it is ontologically radical. It challenges our common-sense ontology in a way that modern psychology challenged demons.
It is also connected with the 'aporetic' set of propositions I discussed earlier. (I have modified proposition B to meet an objections made by earlier comments).
A. An artifact remains numerically the same if one of its components is replaced, without replacing the others.
B. If the components of X, are now the components of Y, arranged in the same way, then X=Y
C. Identity is transitive (if X=Y and Y=Z, then X=Z)
D. If artifact a and artifact b have numerically different components at the same time, a and b are numerically different.
E. Artifacts exist.
If the four propositions A-D are true, artefacts do not exist, which is the ontogically radical position. Otherwise, one of more of these four propositions is false. This would revise our view about the fundamental properties of artefacts, which is ontologically conservative. This is by way of background. I will return to the original plan tomorrow, when I will discuss whether modifying our account of numerical identity could resolve the logical inconsistency between the five propositions above.
This is closely connected with what I discussed here about Inwagen's paraphrase argument. If his paraphrase of a story about ships is intended merely to change our view about ships (e.g. that they are not identical with their component parts, and that there is something singular over and above the parts corresponding to the grammatically singular 'a ship') then the paraphrase is ontologically conservative. It still affirms the existence of ships, just as the electro-magnetic theory affirms the existence of light, but it changes our view of what ships are, just as the electro-magnetic story changes our view about light. By contrast, if the paraphrase really 'loses ships', then it is ontologically radical. It challenges our common-sense ontology in a way that modern psychology challenged demons.
It is also connected with the 'aporetic' set of propositions I discussed earlier. (I have modified proposition B to meet an objections made by earlier comments).
A. An artifact remains numerically the same if one of its components is replaced, without replacing the others.
B. If the components of X, are now the components of Y, arranged in the same way, then X=Y
C. Identity is transitive (if X=Y and Y=Z, then X=Z)
D. If artifact a and artifact b have numerically different components at the same time, a and b are numerically different.
E. Artifacts exist.
If the four propositions A-D are true, artefacts do not exist, which is the ontogically radical position. Otherwise, one of more of these four propositions is false. This would revise our view about the fundamental properties of artefacts, which is ontologically conservative. This is by way of background. I will return to the original plan tomorrow, when I will discuss whether modifying our account of numerical identity could resolve the logical inconsistency between the five propositions above.
Thursday, August 26, 2010
More on 'Replacement Identity'
Not everyone is sure about replacement identity, the assumption that when a component of some artefact (or at least a very small component such as a brick) is replaced, the artefact remains the same. Some of these arguments are qualified by the assumption that the components are 'simple'. But what components are simple? An artefact like a bike is made from artefacts such as mudguards, wheels, brakes and so on. These artefacts (a brake e.g.) are built from other artefactual components such as rubber blocks, steel wingnuts, plastic cables and so on. An artefact such as a plastic cable is made of molecules. A molecule is not an artefact, of course, but it is complex, being made of atoms. An atom is made of sub-atomic particles and so on.
It seems entirely implausible that when a small sliver of material, or molecule or sub-atomic particle is shaved off the bike, the bike is no longer identical with the bike that existed before. So some qualified version of Replacement Identity must be true. But then the Transitivity of Identity kicks in. If the bike is the same bike after a tiny part has been removed and then replaced, then it is the same bike. And still the same bike after another part has been shaved off and replaced. And so on until the whole bike has been completely replaced. The enemies of (A) must bite the bullet. Either it is false, even for sub-atomic changes in composition. That seems implausible. Otherwise Replacement Identity + Transitivity gets us to the paradoxical conclusion. More on Transitivity later, as I promised.
It seems entirely implausible that when a small sliver of material, or molecule or sub-atomic particle is shaved off the bike, the bike is no longer identical with the bike that existed before. So some qualified version of Replacement Identity must be true. But then the Transitivity of Identity kicks in. If the bike is the same bike after a tiny part has been removed and then replaced, then it is the same bike. And still the same bike after another part has been shaved off and replaced. And so on until the whole bike has been completely replaced. The enemies of (A) must bite the bullet. Either it is false, even for sub-atomic changes in composition. That seems implausible. Otherwise Replacement Identity + Transitivity gets us to the paradoxical conclusion. More on Transitivity later, as I promised.
Bikes, now and then
In discussing temporal identity, there is a strong temptation to use expressions like 'the bike then' or 'the bike as it was yesterday' or 'the bike as it was at that spatio-temporal moment' - see the comments to my previous post. As though 'the bike then' refers to some different object than 'the bike now' or 'the bike today'.
These expressions don't make any sense to me. Surely 'then' and 'now' or 'yesterday' and 'today' are just adverbs modifying the verb, rather than an adjective modifying a referring phrase or description. Consider
This bike, which was repaired yesterday, has a new mudguard today.
The sentence contains just one subject: 'this bike'. It is modified by two predicates. The first - 'was repaired yesterday' - tells us something that happened at some previous moment to the bike. The second - 'has a new mudguard' - tells us something that is true of it today, now. It makes no sense to divide the subject into something that is or was 'the bike yesterday', and another, different thing, that is 'the bike today'. Both 'was repaired' - which is a predicate in the past tense - and 'has a new mudguard' - which is in the present tense - qualify this single bike. Or 'this bike now', if you really want.
If there really is an object such as 'this bike then', it is an object to which the predicate 'is now being repaired' applies. For it was true to say of the bike, then, 'this bike is being repaired'. By contrast, the past tense predicate 'was being repaired' applies to 'the bike now'. But as I say, modifying a subject expression by means of an adverb doesn't make sense.
The medieval writers keenly appreciated this. A noun or referring phrase has no tense attached to it. Its semantics does not include time. The sense of time is what a verb brings in. Hence past, present and future tenses, and hence qualifying adverbs like 'now' and 'then'.
These expressions don't make any sense to me. Surely 'then' and 'now' or 'yesterday' and 'today' are just adverbs modifying the verb, rather than an adjective modifying a referring phrase or description. Consider
This bike, which was repaired yesterday, has a new mudguard today.
The sentence contains just one subject: 'this bike'. It is modified by two predicates. The first - 'was repaired yesterday' - tells us something that happened at some previous moment to the bike. The second - 'has a new mudguard' - tells us something that is true of it today, now. It makes no sense to divide the subject into something that is or was 'the bike yesterday', and another, different thing, that is 'the bike today'. Both 'was repaired' - which is a predicate in the past tense - and 'has a new mudguard' - which is in the present tense - qualify this single bike. Or 'this bike now', if you really want.
If there really is an object such as 'this bike then', it is an object to which the predicate 'is now being repaired' applies. For it was true to say of the bike, then, 'this bike is being repaired'. By contrast, the past tense predicate 'was being repaired' applies to 'the bike now'. But as I say, modifying a subject expression by means of an adverb doesn't make sense.
The medieval writers keenly appreciated this. A noun or referring phrase has no tense attached to it. Its semantics does not include time. The sense of time is what a verb brings in. Hence past, present and future tenses, and hence qualifying adverbs like 'now' and 'then'.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Identity in replacement
I will express the 'Ship of Theseus' argument using an 'aporetic' set of propositions. An aporetic set of propositions is where each proposition seems to express an obvious truth, but all of them together are logically inconsistent. As follows.
A. An artifact remains numerically the same if one of its components is replaced, and the rest remain the same.
B. An artifact is numerically the same if all of its components are numerically the same.
C. Identity is transitive (if A=B and B=C, then A=C)
D. If artifact a and artifact b have numerically different components at the same time, a and b are numerically different.
E. Artifacts exist.
It is fairly easy to show they can't all be true*. Therefore one of them is false. In particular, if we accept A-D, we have to drop E. There can be no objects that conform to our intuitive idea of an artifact, which is the implied conclusion of the Ship of Theseus story.
In this post and three later posts, I will examine the four assumptions A-D to examine if the proposition-set is really aporetic (usually what appears to be an aporetic set dissolves upon enquiry, when we find that one or more of the propositions are not obvious or self-evident at all).
I will begin with the assumption that an artefact remains the same, when one of its components is replaced. My son recently wrecked the mudguard of my bike so badly that it fell off and is still lying in the front garden. I plan to take the bike to the repair shop to fit a new mudguard. Will the bike plus new mudguard be numerically identical with the bike as it was with the old mudguard (this is precisely what Peter van Inwagen appears to deny)? The question appears to involve deep metaphysical concepts like temporality and numerical identity, which makes it tempting to challenge it (on the grounds that deep metaphysical assumptions involve doubt and uncertainty from their very nature). But the question is actually quite mundane. Suppose, after getting the bike repaired, I say
(*) This bike had its mudguard replaced at the repair shop yesterday.
Is that true? Surely, on the assumption that I did take this bike to the repair shop, and that the crappy and bent mudguard was replaced with a shiny new one, what I say is unquestionably true. Yet it involves both 'metaphysical' assumptions. It involves identity through the very structure of the proposition. Identity: this bike = the bike that was taken to the repair shop. Temporality: the present reference to 'this bike', and the past 'had' of 'had its mudguard replaced'. Without the 'metaphysical' assumptions embedded in the proposition, we could not make the most simple, mundane and matter-of-fact statements about our ordinary everyday life. Such as replacing mudguards on bikes.
Note also (see my previous post) that we cannot re-tell this story by means of expressions like 'bikewise arrangement of parts'. For it is false to say that this bikewise arrangement of parts (which includes the new mudguard) is the arrangement of parts taken to the repair shop (which included the old mudguard).
I conclude that the principle of identity under replacement - which involves merely the assumption that we can refer to an artefact that exists now (this bike) by means of a past tense statement (the artefact that was taken to the repair shop) - is unquestionably true. Tomorrow (or whenever I can be bothered to write it): the transitivity of identity.
* Roughly as follows. If artifacts exist, suppose that some artifact X exists. Then suppose we replace one of its component to give artifact X1. Then (from A above), X=X1. Then replace one another component in X1 to give X2, as in the Ship of Theseus story. From A above, X1 = X2. And from C above, X = X2. Repeat this process for all the n original components to give Xn. Then X = Xn, by the previous argument.Now take the n replaced components, and assemble appopriately to make artifact Y. From B above, X = Y. From transitivity, X=Y and X = Xn so X = Y. Xn and Y are co-existing, i.e. exist at the same time. But Xn and Y have different components (since Y is made from the original components of X, and Xn is made from entirely new and different components). Thus, from D above, Xn /= Y. Since X = Xn, X /=Y. Contradiction: X=Y and X /= Y.
A. An artifact remains numerically the same if one of its components is replaced, and the rest remain the same.
B. An artifact is numerically the same if all of its components are numerically the same.
C. Identity is transitive (if A=B and B=C, then A=C)
D. If artifact a and artifact b have numerically different components at the same time, a and b are numerically different.
E. Artifacts exist.
It is fairly easy to show they can't all be true*. Therefore one of them is false. In particular, if we accept A-D, we have to drop E. There can be no objects that conform to our intuitive idea of an artifact, which is the implied conclusion of the Ship of Theseus story.
In this post and three later posts, I will examine the four assumptions A-D to examine if the proposition-set is really aporetic (usually what appears to be an aporetic set dissolves upon enquiry, when we find that one or more of the propositions are not obvious or self-evident at all).
I will begin with the assumption that an artefact remains the same, when one of its components is replaced. My son recently wrecked the mudguard of my bike so badly that it fell off and is still lying in the front garden. I plan to take the bike to the repair shop to fit a new mudguard. Will the bike plus new mudguard be numerically identical with the bike as it was with the old mudguard (this is precisely what Peter van Inwagen appears to deny)? The question appears to involve deep metaphysical concepts like temporality and numerical identity, which makes it tempting to challenge it (on the grounds that deep metaphysical assumptions involve doubt and uncertainty from their very nature). But the question is actually quite mundane. Suppose, after getting the bike repaired, I say
(*) This bike had its mudguard replaced at the repair shop yesterday.
Is that true? Surely, on the assumption that I did take this bike to the repair shop, and that the crappy and bent mudguard was replaced with a shiny new one, what I say is unquestionably true. Yet it involves both 'metaphysical' assumptions. It involves identity through the very structure of the proposition. Identity: this bike = the bike that was taken to the repair shop. Temporality: the present reference to 'this bike', and the past 'had' of 'had its mudguard replaced'. Without the 'metaphysical' assumptions embedded in the proposition, we could not make the most simple, mundane and matter-of-fact statements about our ordinary everyday life. Such as replacing mudguards on bikes.
Note also (see my previous post) that we cannot re-tell this story by means of expressions like 'bikewise arrangement of parts'. For it is false to say that this bikewise arrangement of parts (which includes the new mudguard) is the arrangement of parts taken to the repair shop (which included the old mudguard).
I conclude that the principle of identity under replacement - which involves merely the assumption that we can refer to an artefact that exists now (this bike) by means of a past tense statement (the artefact that was taken to the repair shop) - is unquestionably true. Tomorrow (or whenever I can be bothered to write it): the transitivity of identity.
* Roughly as follows. If artifacts exist, suppose that some artifact X exists. Then suppose we replace one of its component to give artifact X1. Then (from A above), X=X1. Then replace one another component in X1 to give X2, as in the Ship of Theseus story. From A above, X1 = X2. And from C above, X = X2. Repeat this process for all the n original components to give Xn. Then X = Xn, by the previous argument.Now take the n replaced components, and assemble appopriately to make artifact Y. From B above, X = Y. From transitivity, X=Y and X = Xn so X = Y. Xn and Y are co-existing, i.e. exist at the same time. But Xn and Y have different components (since Y is made from the original components of X, and Xn is made from entirely new and different components). Thus, from D above, Xn /= Y. Since X = Xn, X /=Y. Contradiction: X=Y and X /= Y.
Reduction by re-telling
A reductionist argument might go as follows. If you can take any story that ostensibly involves the existence of X's, and re-tell it without mentioning X's and without 'losing something' in the re-telling, then conclude that there aren't any X's. It's a bad argument. Either the re-telling means the same, but avoids mentioning X's by name. In which case we haven't avoided mentioning X's at all. It's as though we translated a story about ships into German, thus avoiding use of the English 'ship' by using the German word 'Schiff'. We have avoided the English 'ship', but we haven't avoided mentioning ships. Or the re-telling really doesn't mention X's at all, in which case the requirement that we aren't 'losing something' (ships, e.g.) is violated. You can't fail to mention X's in a re-telling without failing to mention something that was in the original story, and so the argument is obviously not valid.
Yet this is precisely what Peter Inwagen's argument against the existence of ships appears to do, when he re-tells the story of the Ship of Theseus.
Perhaps I have missed his point, but it appears to be that we can re-tell the story of the ship such that there is nothing in the standard version of the story that is not captured in the re-telling, and the re-telling does not mention ships, ergo there is no need for ships. If that is his argument, it involves the obvious fallacy I describe above. He begins "Once upon a time, there were certain planks that were arranged shipwise". What does that sentence mean? Does it mean the same as 'Once upon a time, there was a certain ship'? Does the expression 'shipwise arrangement of planks' mean the same as the word 'ship'? In which case the re-telling does mention ships, just as a German version of the standard story would mention ships (although by the word Schiff, of course). Or does it mean something different, something that is not a ship? In which case there is something in the standard version of the story (which begins with the assertion that there was a ship) that is not captured in the re-telling (which asserts only the existence shipwise arrangements of planks). Either way, the conclusion does not follow. Either the re-telling does assert the existence of ships, in which case it does not imply the non-existence of ships. Or it doesn't, in which case something has been lost in the re-telling, and the requirements of the argument are violated.
This casts some doubt on Vallicella's assertion here that Invagen "is a brilliant man". The argument does not strike me as brilliant at all. But perhaps I misunderstand it.
Yet this is precisely what Peter Inwagen's argument against the existence of ships appears to do, when he re-tells the story of the Ship of Theseus.
Once upon a time, there were certain planks that were arranged shipwise. Call then the First Planks. . . . One of the First Planks was removed from the others and placed in a field. Then it was replaced by a new plank; that is, a carpenter caused the new plank and the remaining First Planks to be arranged shipwise, and in just such a way that the new plank was in contact with the same planks that the removed planks had been in contact with, and at exactly the same points. Call the planks that were then arranged shipwise the Second Planks. A plank that was both one of the First Planks and one of the Second Planks was removed from the others and placed in the field and replaced (according to the procedure laid down above), with the consequence that certain planks, the Third Planks, were arranged shipwise. Then a plank that was one of the First Planks and one of the Second Planks and one of the Third Planks . . . . This process was repeated till all the First Planks were in the field. Then the First Planks were caused to be arranged shipwise, and in just such a way that each of them was in contact with the same planks it had been in contact with when the First Planks had last been arranged shipwise, and was in contact with them at just the same points. (Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell UP, 1990) 128-129)
Perhaps I have missed his point, but it appears to be that we can re-tell the story of the ship such that there is nothing in the standard version of the story that is not captured in the re-telling, and the re-telling does not mention ships, ergo there is no need for ships. If that is his argument, it involves the obvious fallacy I describe above. He begins "Once upon a time, there were certain planks that were arranged shipwise". What does that sentence mean? Does it mean the same as 'Once upon a time, there was a certain ship'? Does the expression 'shipwise arrangement of planks' mean the same as the word 'ship'? In which case the re-telling does mention ships, just as a German version of the standard story would mention ships (although by the word Schiff, of course). Or does it mean something different, something that is not a ship? In which case there is something in the standard version of the story (which begins with the assertion that there was a ship) that is not captured in the re-telling (which asserts only the existence shipwise arrangements of planks). Either way, the conclusion does not follow. Either the re-telling does assert the existence of ships, in which case it does not imply the non-existence of ships. Or it doesn't, in which case something has been lost in the re-telling, and the requirements of the argument are violated.
This casts some doubt on Vallicella's assertion here that Invagen "is a brilliant man". The argument does not strike me as brilliant at all. But perhaps I misunderstand it.
Monday, August 23, 2010
Argumentum ad baculum
Argumentum ad baculum: literally 'argument to the stick' or as we say 'appeal to force'. Wikipedia gives an odd example in its article here, claiming it is not fallacious.
If you drive while drunk, you will be put in jail.
You want to avoid going to jail.
Therefore you should not drive while drunk.
Surely it is fallacious? If you want to avoid going to jail, then it probably follows that you want to avoid driving while drunk (assuming that you know the consequences of driving drunk, and that you are rational enough to not want anything that is a consequence of what you don't want). But it doesn't follow that you shouldn't drive when drunk. 'Should not' or 'ought not' expresses a moral conclusion. This does not follow from any psychological assumption such as wanting or desiring. Now, the following version of the argument is probably valid
If you drive while drunk, you will be put in jail.
You should not be put in jail
Therefore you should not drive while drunk.
But that is different, because the second premiss contains an explicit moral judgment. I say it is 'probably' valid, because it relies on the assumption that if B is a consequence of A, and if you should not do B, then you should not do A. Which could be questioned.
As for the rest of the article, it made no sense at all. Many things in Wikipedia are well done. What is it about philosophy and logic that Wikipedia finds so hard?
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
Impersonal assertion
A fundamental objection to my position on assertion (that assertion is a part of the semantics of a declarative sentence) is that assertion must be personal. That is, the subject of verbs like 'assert', 'state', 'say' and suchlike must be a person. Thus no sentence - which is an impersonal, inanimate linguistic item - can assert anything. Thus assertion cannot be part of the semantics of a sentence.
I shall argue against this in two ways.
1. Even if we concede that the subject of an assertion must be personal, it does not follow that we cannot analyse a sentence in such a way that a sign for assertion is made visible. I claim that we can analyse the sentence 'Tom runs' as
It is true / that Tom runs
which means the same, but which contains the sign 'it is true'. The other part is the that-clause 'that Tom runs', which signifies the content of the sentence. This is the same content referred to in sentences such as 'Alice believes that Tom runs', 'Carol hopes that Tom runs', 'Bob doubts that Tom runs' and so on. But no one who utters these sentences asserts that content. If I utter 'Alice believes that Tom runs', I have asserted that Alice believes something. But I have not asserted the thing that she believes: I have not asserted that Tom runs, only that Alice believes this. But when I utter 'It is true that Tom runs', I have asserted that Tom runs. Which suggests that 'it is true' is a sign indicating that I am asserting the content itself, rather than saying something about it (such that it is a belief, or a hope, of someone). The sign 'it is true' is a symbol which, suitably connected with a symbol for the content, signifies assertion.
2. In any case, we need the idea of impersonal assertion for statements whose author is unknown. For example "The next sentence in Genesis says the earth was without form and void, and darkness over it.
In summary. We can analyse a declarative sentence into another sentence which means the same, but which has two main parts: a sign for the content of the sentence and another sign which is used to indicate or signify that the speaker is personally asserting the content, rather than saying something about the content. It is not unreasonable to call this an assertion sign. And sometimes - when the author of the original sentence is unknown - it is equally reasonable to say that the sentence impersonally asserts its content.
I shall argue against this in two ways.
1. Even if we concede that the subject of an assertion must be personal, it does not follow that we cannot analyse a sentence in such a way that a sign for assertion is made visible. I claim that we can analyse the sentence 'Tom runs' as
It is true / that Tom runs
which means the same, but which contains the sign 'it is true'. The other part is the that-clause 'that Tom runs', which signifies the content of the sentence. This is the same content referred to in sentences such as 'Alice believes that Tom runs', 'Carol hopes that Tom runs', 'Bob doubts that Tom runs' and so on. But no one who utters these sentences asserts that content. If I utter 'Alice believes that Tom runs', I have asserted that Alice believes something. But I have not asserted the thing that she believes: I have not asserted that Tom runs, only that Alice believes this. But when I utter 'It is true that Tom runs', I have asserted that Tom runs. Which suggests that 'it is true' is a sign indicating that I am asserting the content itself, rather than saying something about it (such that it is a belief, or a hope, of someone). The sign 'it is true' is a symbol which, suitably connected with a symbol for the content, signifies assertion.
2. In any case, we need the idea of impersonal assertion for statements whose author is unknown. For example "The next sentence in Genesis says the earth was without form and void, and darkness over it.
In summary. We can analyse a declarative sentence into another sentence which means the same, but which has two main parts: a sign for the content of the sentence and another sign which is used to indicate or signify that the speaker is personally asserting the content, rather than saying something about the content. It is not unreasonable to call this an assertion sign. And sometimes - when the author of the original sentence is unknown - it is equally reasonable to say that the sentence impersonally asserts its content.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Truth versus Equality
Larry Sanger is interviewed in Slate. Some familiar stuff, in particular from an essay he wrote in 2007, but it's worth being reminded - Larry generally gets Wikipedia theory right. He talks about "the complete disregard for expert opinion among a group of amateurs working on a subject, and in particular because of their tendency to openly express contempt for experts", leading to experts - people who make it their life's work to get things right - being driven away by people who have no respect for that kind of mission. He claims this is a worldview common to many programmers: no one should be regarded as more reliable on a subject than anyone else. He calls this "epistemic egalitarianism."
And he emphases a point that I have made frequently here (for example in this post), that Wikipedia is mostly good when it comes to the hard sciences, and particularly on the sort of facts and figures you might look up in Whittakers' Almanac, or the Guinness Book of Records, or Every Boy's Handbook, but a disaster when it comes to the humanities and social sciences.
And of course it is useless and anything politically contentious. I spotted this gem last week, from the article Modern history of Cyprus.
And he emphases a point that I have made frequently here (for example in this post), that Wikipedia is mostly good when it comes to the hard sciences, and particularly on the sort of facts and figures you might look up in Whittakers' Almanac, or the Guinness Book of Records, or Every Boy's Handbook, but a disaster when it comes to the humanities and social sciences.
And of course it is useless and anything politically contentious. I spotted this gem last week, from the article Modern history of Cyprus.
"Efforts to get Turkey to end its occupation and re-integrate the Northern areasIt has been there for months and seems to be part of an ongoing war between the Greek and Turkish Wikipedian-Cypriots. This edit is curious.
into a Federal structure continue but to little avail, as Turkey continues to
ignore the UN and the European Parliament and continue it's illegal occupation
of the island. The Cypriot government, in accordance with the opinion and
rhetoric of the UN do not recognize any sovereignty that the puppet Turkish
administration have and therefore do not allow International flights or free
trade in the occupied sections of the island. Discussions are taking place to
try and remove these 'embargoes' as it has been argued they violate the human
rights of the citizens in the Northern areas in a similar manner that the
Israeli imposed embargo on Gaza does."
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Plural quantification and scholasticism
More discussion of plurals at the Maverick Philosopher. Very topical now, but it has been discussed before. Thomas Aquinas:
Aquinas was writing in the 1260's, but the idea is probably older than that. See e.g. Lambert of Auxerre:
Unde videtur quod quidquid potest facere unus, possint facere multi, et non e
converso, sicut multi trahunt navem quam unus trahere non posset - "it is clear
that whatever one can do, many can do, but not conversely. For example, many
persons drag the boat which one person could not drag". Summa Theologiae
III 67 a6 (See also Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 2 n. 11).
Aquinas was writing in the 1260's, but the idea is probably older than that. See e.g. Lambert of Auxerre:
Later, William of Ockham discussed the 'Apostles' example in his Summa Logicae II. 4.Similiter est suppositio confusa sed immobilis quando signum additur
termino communi in singulari vel in plurali et tenetur collective ut cum
dicitur: 'omnis homo trahit navem', positione facta quod omnes homines trahunt
navem et nullus per se, et similiter cum dicitur: omnes apostoli sunt
duodecim. "Similarly, confused but immobile supposition is when the
(quantifying) sign is applied to a common term in the singular or plural and is
understood collectively, as in 'every man drags the boat', assuming that all the
men are dragging the boat and none of them by himself. And similarly in 'all the
apostles are twelve'. (Logica, "De suppositionibus et de significationibus")
Sunday, July 18, 2010
How to tell a big lie
"What is most deceptive is not when you lie outright, but when you tell the truth, but not the whole truth. The most important question you can ask of any presentation, not necessarily 'oh is this person lying to me', but 'what isn't this person telling me'. Because if the person lies to you, you can check up on that. But if a person leaves something out, you have no way of checking - you don't know - what has been omitted".
Howard Zinn, interviewed by Truth in Numbers.
Howard Zinn, interviewed by Truth in Numbers.
Francesco Patrizi
The case of Francesco Patrizi, the Venetian philosopher, is a fine illustration of the nationalistic warfare that infests Wikipedia, and the inaccuracy and distortion and bias that follows as a result*.
The problem is that Francesco has at least three different identities. His place of birth was on the island of Cherso in 1529, which lies off the coast of Dalmatia, now in modern Croatia. The state of his birth was the Venetian Republic, which dominated the area until the early 1800s. His intellectual heritage is the Western philosophical tradition: he spent seven years at Padua studying Aristotelian philosophy, in Latin. He studied Plato, and seems to have had a knowledge of the original Greek texts, even owning a collection of Greek manuscripts [1].
Consequently, there is a war on Wikipedia about Francesco's identity. Is it defined by the Western intellectual heritage with its Latin and Greek origin? All that Francesco learned in his years at Padua and afterwards are derived from it. Is it the Republic of Venice, now in modern Italy? Francesco could not have been taught without the universities in Italy whose staff and administration were not paid for by Croatians. Or is it the modern state of Croatia, where his birthplace now lies?
Wikipedia, or at least its current version, defers to the first, calling him by the Latinised name of Franciscus Patricius. Adopting the second, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article [2] uses his Italian name. But in Croatia, of course, he is known as Frane Petrić, although (I am told) they made a mistake here: they used the Croatian diacritic sign on the consonant, invented only in the middle of the 1800s.
The whole issue presents problems when you are doing real history. How do we separate the contribution of an individual from the contribution of the tradition they are writing in? No intellectual contribution made by an individual, even by an original thinker such as Aristotle, is uniquely due to their special talent, although ability is a necessary condition. An equally important influence is individual teachers, who in Francesco's case would have been Italian. So in what sense does a country - a modern country like Croatia, say - own a persons's work?
The problem becomes particularly acute in a place like Wikipedia, where the only intellectual interest - that is to say, no intellectual interest at all - lies simply in a nationalistic dispute, in this case between Italians and Croatians. The talk page shows it beautifully. "He was Italian for culture and birth" says Giovanni Giove (presumably an Italian). "It is sad to see that User:Factanista has started an further edit war to imposte [sic] his nationalistic POV" says Giovanni. "It is you who is edit-warring " replies Factanista (presumably a Croatian). "I'm going to report the behaviour of User:Factanista to an administrator" says Giovanni. "Please do, you will be reported shortly yourself" objects Factanista.
The history of the article itself [3] is instructive. Hundreds of reverts and unreverts, as the intellectual battle unfolds. An Italian editor removes the word 'Croatian' [4] with the comment "oh please, lets avoid stupid national bickering". It is immediately reverted back [5] with the reply "then stop to deny his roots and ethnicity". Which of course makes it all the more absurd. What does ethnicity have to do with the work of a man who wrote, in Latin, about the Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato? It is different in the case of someone like Chopin who, though he studied in France and was influenced by the French tradition, wrote specifically Polish nationalistic pieces. This case, by contrast, is more like the case of Joseph Conrad, who was Polish but whose works are all in English. Or Wittgenstein, who was Austrian and who actually wrote in German, but who was taught by an Englishman** (Russell), and whose work was most influential in England where he lived and worked for most of this life. Ethnicity has very little to do with it.
What is really sad is how the article suffers as a result. In its current version (permanent link above) all but the first three paragraphs are copied verbatim from the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica article [6]. The introduction is mostly taken from the SEP article. I have commented on this irony before - that "an ultra modern high-tech medium like the Internet, when it reflects anything of importance, reflects the obselete views of 19th century scholars". None of the people who have edit-warred for at least four years over the ethnicity of this man, seem to have any interest in his thinking.
At least I found something valuable in my research today: When ethnicity did not matter in the Balkans by John Fine. About "The back-projection of twentieth-century forms of identity into the pre-modern past by patriotic and nationalist historians". Possible holiday reading.
*Many thanks to Peter Zuvela, who brought this to my attention.
** Wikipedia has Russell down as a Welsh philosopher, of course.
The problem is that Francesco has at least three different identities. His place of birth was on the island of Cherso in 1529, which lies off the coast of Dalmatia, now in modern Croatia. The state of his birth was the Venetian Republic, which dominated the area until the early 1800s. His intellectual heritage is the Western philosophical tradition: he spent seven years at Padua studying Aristotelian philosophy, in Latin. He studied Plato, and seems to have had a knowledge of the original Greek texts, even owning a collection of Greek manuscripts [1].
Consequently, there is a war on Wikipedia about Francesco's identity. Is it defined by the Western intellectual heritage with its Latin and Greek origin? All that Francesco learned in his years at Padua and afterwards are derived from it. Is it the Republic of Venice, now in modern Italy? Francesco could not have been taught without the universities in Italy whose staff and administration were not paid for by Croatians. Or is it the modern state of Croatia, where his birthplace now lies?
Wikipedia, or at least its current version, defers to the first, calling him by the Latinised name of Franciscus Patricius. Adopting the second, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article [2] uses his Italian name. But in Croatia, of course, he is known as Frane Petrić, although (I am told) they made a mistake here: they used the Croatian diacritic sign on the consonant, invented only in the middle of the 1800s.
The whole issue presents problems when you are doing real history. How do we separate the contribution of an individual from the contribution of the tradition they are writing in? No intellectual contribution made by an individual, even by an original thinker such as Aristotle, is uniquely due to their special talent, although ability is a necessary condition. An equally important influence is individual teachers, who in Francesco's case would have been Italian. So in what sense does a country - a modern country like Croatia, say - own a persons's work?
The problem becomes particularly acute in a place like Wikipedia, where the only intellectual interest - that is to say, no intellectual interest at all - lies simply in a nationalistic dispute, in this case between Italians and Croatians. The talk page shows it beautifully. "He was Italian for culture and birth" says Giovanni Giove (presumably an Italian). "It is sad to see that User:Factanista has started an further edit war to imposte [sic] his nationalistic POV" says Giovanni. "It is you who is edit-warring " replies Factanista (presumably a Croatian). "I'm going to report the behaviour of User:Factanista to an administrator" says Giovanni. "Please do, you will be reported shortly yourself" objects Factanista.
The history of the article itself [3] is instructive. Hundreds of reverts and unreverts, as the intellectual battle unfolds. An Italian editor removes the word 'Croatian' [4] with the comment "oh please, lets avoid stupid national bickering". It is immediately reverted back [5] with the reply "then stop to deny his roots and ethnicity". Which of course makes it all the more absurd. What does ethnicity have to do with the work of a man who wrote, in Latin, about the Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato? It is different in the case of someone like Chopin who, though he studied in France and was influenced by the French tradition, wrote specifically Polish nationalistic pieces. This case, by contrast, is more like the case of Joseph Conrad, who was Polish but whose works are all in English. Or Wittgenstein, who was Austrian and who actually wrote in German, but who was taught by an Englishman** (Russell), and whose work was most influential in England where he lived and worked for most of this life. Ethnicity has very little to do with it.
What is really sad is how the article suffers as a result. In its current version (permanent link above) all but the first three paragraphs are copied verbatim from the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica article [6]. The introduction is mostly taken from the SEP article. I have commented on this irony before - that "an ultra modern high-tech medium like the Internet, when it reflects anything of importance, reflects the obselete views of 19th century scholars". None of the people who have edit-warred for at least four years over the ethnicity of this man, seem to have any interest in his thinking.
At least I found something valuable in my research today: When ethnicity did not matter in the Balkans by John Fine. About "The back-projection of twentieth-century forms of identity into the pre-modern past by patriotic and nationalist historians". Possible holiday reading.
*Many thanks to Peter Zuvela, who brought this to my attention.
** Wikipedia has Russell down as a Welsh philosopher, of course.
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Ochlocracy
Ochlocracy. It means 'mob rule' or perhaps 'crowdsourcing'. I'm going to write more about this later, having recently revisited Gustave le Bon's wonderful The Crowd.
Meanwhile here is what one philosopher said about the wisdom of the crowd.
"Philosophy: I'm a philosopher; why don't I edit the article on my subject? Because it's hopeless. I've tried at various times, and each time have given up in depressed disgust. Philosophy seems to attract aggressive zealots who know a little (often a very little), who lack understanding of key concepts, terms, etc., and who attempt to take over the article (and its Talk page) with rambling, ground-shifting, often barely comprehensible rants against those who disagree with them. Life's too short. I just tell my students and anyone else I know not to read the Wikipedia article except for a laugh. It's one of those areas where the ochlocratic nature of Wikipedia really comes a cropper".
By Wikipedia editor Mel Etitis, who is a well-known philosopher in real life. He left Wikipedia shortly after this comment in 2007.
Meanwhile here is what one philosopher said about the wisdom of the crowd.
"Philosophy: I'm a philosopher; why don't I edit the article on my subject? Because it's hopeless. I've tried at various times, and each time have given up in depressed disgust. Philosophy seems to attract aggressive zealots who know a little (often a very little), who lack understanding of key concepts, terms, etc., and who attempt to take over the article (and its Talk page) with rambling, ground-shifting, often barely comprehensible rants against those who disagree with them. Life's too short. I just tell my students and anyone else I know not to read the Wikipedia article except for a laugh. It's one of those areas where the ochlocratic nature of Wikipedia really comes a cropper".
By Wikipedia editor Mel Etitis, who is a well-known philosopher in real life. He left Wikipedia shortly after this comment in 2007.
Friday, July 16, 2010
Truth in numbers?
In my previous posts on truth [1], [2], I explored the idea that truth has no special benefit over falsity. "It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error". Here, I shall suggest that it is worse than that. Truth has powerful enemies, and there are forces systematically favouring error. As befits a scientific investigation, I shall present the theory, followed by evidence (using the example of Wikipedia once more) supporting it.
First, the theory: Those who support the truth are in a large majority. Of 100,000 people, probably all but ten would like to see the truth. But their interest is only feeble. The remaining ten support false beliefs of various kinds. They probably think these beliefs are true, but they are false for all that. And their false belief is passionate and determined. It follows that, if anyone is allowed to publicise their belief, and if there is a moderate cost to publicising it, such as arguing about it or being involved in an 'edit war'*, the proponents of error will always be victorious. For they are passionate in their error, whereas the others are only feeble in their truth.
Now, the evidence. No sane or normal or reasonable person contributes to Wikipedia, and so all contributors fall into the following broad classes: deviant, aficionado, quack, activist, cultist, crank. The reasons for their persistent interest, together with Wikipedia article examples, are as follows. I list them in approximate order of the power that belongs to them.
1. First are the deviants, usually the sexual deviants. The pedophile lobby has long been an active force on Wikipedia. They are powerful because, like everyone else, they are passionate about their sexuality, seeing it as in some sense normal, and also because no reasonable person is likely to edit articles about pedophilia, 'pederasty' and so on. Hence monstrosities like this, which is indistinguishable from monstrosities like (WARNING: pedophile website - not safe for work) this. See also the article about the PPA 'Wikipedia Campaign' at Wikisposure.
2. Aficionados ('fans') are a large and diverse group on Wikipedia. They are mostly harmless devotees of obscure subjects like Japanese comic books or American science fiction TV. The error lies not so much in the uncritical approach to the subject as the undue weight given to a subject which is essentially ephemeral and unimportant and unencyclopedic. This is probably harmless, although not in the case of Ayn Rand, who I have discussed before. The coverage of her ideas is extensive in Wikipedia, and out of all proportion to her real importance in philosophy, which is practically nil, particularly outside the United States. Aficionados are powerful in Wikipedia because they are mostly viewed as harmless, and because there is no 'weighting' policy in the encyclopedia. Quite reverse: they even have a policy: Wikipedia is not paper, and so there is no practical limit to the number of topics it can cover, or the total amount of content. The practice of a normal reference work, which is to assign pages in rough proportion to the received importance of a subject, does not apply here. Thus the academically marginal Ayn Rand receives more coverage than Aristotle, the father of Western philosophy and easily the most important figure in the Western intellectual tradition. The article on his Sophistical Refutations, for example, is no more than a list of contents. Compare this in size and scope with any article on the nonsensical and philosophically illiterate work of Rand, e.g. this.
3. Quacks are peddlers of fake cures, bogus medicine and psychological theory. There is plenty of this on Wikipedia. Their interest is commercial rather than idealistic. The Wikipedia administration does attempt to weed out blatant commercial advertising, but it is also corrupt. The subject that touches me the most is the rubbishy and fraudulent Neurolinguistic Programming. These articles had support at high levels of the Wikipedia administration, and so quite a few more neutrally-minded editors (including myself) were banned for attempting to trim them. See also EMDR, or Ken Wilber, or this lot, gulp.
4. Cults are groups with strange beliefs who have an interest in publicising their existence, recruiting new members, and usually suppressing the more unpalatable facts about their financial statements and other irregularities. Too many of these to mention, but some of the more amusing include the Brahma Kumaris, who seem to enjoy some support among Wikipedians, at least judging from the way that those who opposed them are so regularly blocked, simply for saying stuff like this ("You and your other adherents have wasted too much time of too many people's lives ... never mind mentioning the broken families and suicides that litter your religion's history"). The Scientologists did not fare so well, as is well known (their IP is currently blocked), but that is only because a group of prominent Wikipedians dislike scientology - it has nothing to do with any self-governing mechanism that prevents cults from promoting their views on the global electronic reference work. See for example Prem Rawat, defended for years by a prominent Wikipedia administrator, although he eventually came to grief.
5. Activists are the supporters of extreme political movements. These are also numerous, but the force can be less strong with them because there are often equally extreme political movements who are bitterly opposed, and so they 'edit war' the talk pages of the articles concerned. See the archives of the articles on The Troubles, the thirty-year conflict in Northern Ireland, which was intellectually as violent as the actual troubles were physically bloody. Or Islamic Republic is the same as Arab Republic. However, the articles on Yugoslav communism, e.g. on Tito seem to have got by with their strange point of view unscathed. They do not reflect the views of more recent historians who view Tito as essentially a Stalinist, but rather adhere to and reflect the propaganda of the former Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The article about Tito is written in a child-like manner, reminiscent of Yugoslav primary school textbooks from the 1970s. This may be the result of the 'partisan' group of editors who control those articles, and the relative lack of interest from anyone else.
6. Cranks. These are individuals who have a passionate belief in some idea, theory or system that they developed on their own, and which has been rejected by the academic establishment. Naturally they turn to the encyclopedia which anyone can edit. Cranks have little power on Wikipedia, because unlike the rest they are not part of a larger group and can easily be picked off, and also there is no fraudulent secondary literature they can tap. Nonetheless they flourish in dark corners - I am glad to see that Boolean logic, which has nothing to do with George Boole, still survives, and that the Ancient Egyptian Race theory seems to be thriving, at least between periods of illness or coma. And how about this whole category of stuff which is completely deranged (" the Mental Plane is located between, and hence is intermediate between, the astral plane below and the higher spiritual realms of existence above").
Add to this the eccentric and perverse features of Wikipedia governance and software. First, the ability of any IP addresses to edit, which results in a tidal wave of crude vandalism every day. This in itself is not a problem, since there are about 500 administrators who instantly clear it up. The problem is rather the administrators, many of whom are retired ex-military types or police, and who are not interested in encyclopedias at all. They just enjoy whacking vandals. The problem is that they don't really distinguish between vandals and ordinary editors, and don't really understand the disputes at all. They have no theoretical interest in a dispute between a scientist and a homeopathist or chiropractor. But if they see either of them getting out of line, i.e. infringing Wikipedia's strict 'civility' rules, they whack them anyway.
Second is the fact that accounts are anonymous, and there is not even elementary identity checking. Thus a problem editor who has been 'blocked' can instantly register again. Furthermore, they can create multiple accounts ('sockpuppets' or 'socks') to give the illusion of strong support for error. This frustrates the supporters of truth, many of whom stoop to the same tactics. Worse, Wikipedia has evolved an elaborate secret police ('checkusers') whose job is to spy on accounts for 'sock'-like behaviour and block them if necessary. This deflects the administration from the real job of building a comprehensive and accurate reference work, moreover it encourages types who are intellectually unsuited for such work.
Which is, of course, why Wikipedia is nothing like a comprehensive and accurate reference work. How would we change this? Well, the theory (that small numbers of passionate devotees of error will always defeat an army of those with a feeble and weak interest in the truth) suggests abandoning the idea that 'anyone can edit'. It's fine if only 'disinterested' persons can edit, but as the different but connected meanings of 'interest' suggest, it is difficult to get disinterested people to do this. They simply aren't, er, interested. Another idea would be this. Levy a small 'falsity tax' on everyone. A majority of people would vote for this, if the tax were proportionate to their feeble dedication to the truth. The money from the tax would then pay for experts with a proven neutrality and lack of 'interest' to write articles. This is essentially the economic model of a university, a system invented in the Middle Ages, and which therefore existed long before Web 2.0.
*Edit war: long protracted dispute on Wikipedia. Sometimes between the forces of truth and error, more often between propopents of different kinds of error (such as environmentalists and oil company employees).
First, the theory: Those who support the truth are in a large majority. Of 100,000 people, probably all but ten would like to see the truth. But their interest is only feeble. The remaining ten support false beliefs of various kinds. They probably think these beliefs are true, but they are false for all that. And their false belief is passionate and determined. It follows that, if anyone is allowed to publicise their belief, and if there is a moderate cost to publicising it, such as arguing about it or being involved in an 'edit war'*, the proponents of error will always be victorious. For they are passionate in their error, whereas the others are only feeble in their truth.
Now, the evidence. No sane or normal or reasonable person contributes to Wikipedia, and so all contributors fall into the following broad classes: deviant, aficionado, quack, activist, cultist, crank. The reasons for their persistent interest, together with Wikipedia article examples, are as follows. I list them in approximate order of the power that belongs to them.
1. First are the deviants, usually the sexual deviants. The pedophile lobby has long been an active force on Wikipedia. They are powerful because, like everyone else, they are passionate about their sexuality, seeing it as in some sense normal, and also because no reasonable person is likely to edit articles about pedophilia, 'pederasty' and so on. Hence monstrosities like this, which is indistinguishable from monstrosities like (WARNING: pedophile website - not safe for work) this. See also the article about the PPA 'Wikipedia Campaign' at Wikisposure.
2. Aficionados ('fans') are a large and diverse group on Wikipedia. They are mostly harmless devotees of obscure subjects like Japanese comic books or American science fiction TV. The error lies not so much in the uncritical approach to the subject as the undue weight given to a subject which is essentially ephemeral and unimportant and unencyclopedic. This is probably harmless, although not in the case of Ayn Rand, who I have discussed before. The coverage of her ideas is extensive in Wikipedia, and out of all proportion to her real importance in philosophy, which is practically nil, particularly outside the United States. Aficionados are powerful in Wikipedia because they are mostly viewed as harmless, and because there is no 'weighting' policy in the encyclopedia. Quite reverse: they even have a policy: Wikipedia is not paper, and so there is no practical limit to the number of topics it can cover, or the total amount of content. The practice of a normal reference work, which is to assign pages in rough proportion to the received importance of a subject, does not apply here. Thus the academically marginal Ayn Rand receives more coverage than Aristotle, the father of Western philosophy and easily the most important figure in the Western intellectual tradition. The article on his Sophistical Refutations, for example, is no more than a list of contents. Compare this in size and scope with any article on the nonsensical and philosophically illiterate work of Rand, e.g. this.
3. Quacks are peddlers of fake cures, bogus medicine and psychological theory. There is plenty of this on Wikipedia. Their interest is commercial rather than idealistic. The Wikipedia administration does attempt to weed out blatant commercial advertising, but it is also corrupt. The subject that touches me the most is the rubbishy and fraudulent Neurolinguistic Programming. These articles had support at high levels of the Wikipedia administration, and so quite a few more neutrally-minded editors (including myself) were banned for attempting to trim them. See also EMDR, or Ken Wilber, or this lot, gulp.
4. Cults are groups with strange beliefs who have an interest in publicising their existence, recruiting new members, and usually suppressing the more unpalatable facts about their financial statements and other irregularities. Too many of these to mention, but some of the more amusing include the Brahma Kumaris, who seem to enjoy some support among Wikipedians, at least judging from the way that those who opposed them are so regularly blocked, simply for saying stuff like this ("You and your other adherents have wasted too much time of too many people's lives ... never mind mentioning the broken families and suicides that litter your religion's history"). The Scientologists did not fare so well, as is well known (their IP is currently blocked), but that is only because a group of prominent Wikipedians dislike scientology - it has nothing to do with any self-governing mechanism that prevents cults from promoting their views on the global electronic reference work. See for example Prem Rawat, defended for years by a prominent Wikipedia administrator, although he eventually came to grief.
5. Activists are the supporters of extreme political movements. These are also numerous, but the force can be less strong with them because there are often equally extreme political movements who are bitterly opposed, and so they 'edit war' the talk pages of the articles concerned. See the archives of the articles on The Troubles, the thirty-year conflict in Northern Ireland, which was intellectually as violent as the actual troubles were physically bloody. Or Islamic Republic is the same as Arab Republic. However, the articles on Yugoslav communism, e.g. on Tito seem to have got by with their strange point of view unscathed. They do not reflect the views of more recent historians who view Tito as essentially a Stalinist, but rather adhere to and reflect the propaganda of the former Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The article about Tito is written in a child-like manner, reminiscent of Yugoslav primary school textbooks from the 1970s. This may be the result of the 'partisan' group of editors who control those articles, and the relative lack of interest from anyone else.
6. Cranks. These are individuals who have a passionate belief in some idea, theory or system that they developed on their own, and which has been rejected by the academic establishment. Naturally they turn to the encyclopedia which anyone can edit. Cranks have little power on Wikipedia, because unlike the rest they are not part of a larger group and can easily be picked off, and also there is no fraudulent secondary literature they can tap. Nonetheless they flourish in dark corners - I am glad to see that Boolean logic, which has nothing to do with George Boole, still survives, and that the Ancient Egyptian Race theory seems to be thriving, at least between periods of illness or coma. And how about this whole category of stuff which is completely deranged (" the Mental Plane is located between, and hence is intermediate between, the astral plane below and the higher spiritual realms of existence above").
Add to this the eccentric and perverse features of Wikipedia governance and software. First, the ability of any IP addresses to edit, which results in a tidal wave of crude vandalism every day. This in itself is not a problem, since there are about 500 administrators who instantly clear it up. The problem is rather the administrators, many of whom are retired ex-military types or police, and who are not interested in encyclopedias at all. They just enjoy whacking vandals. The problem is that they don't really distinguish between vandals and ordinary editors, and don't really understand the disputes at all. They have no theoretical interest in a dispute between a scientist and a homeopathist or chiropractor. But if they see either of them getting out of line, i.e. infringing Wikipedia's strict 'civility' rules, they whack them anyway.
Second is the fact that accounts are anonymous, and there is not even elementary identity checking. Thus a problem editor who has been 'blocked' can instantly register again. Furthermore, they can create multiple accounts ('sockpuppets' or 'socks') to give the illusion of strong support for error. This frustrates the supporters of truth, many of whom stoop to the same tactics. Worse, Wikipedia has evolved an elaborate secret police ('checkusers') whose job is to spy on accounts for 'sock'-like behaviour and block them if necessary. This deflects the administration from the real job of building a comprehensive and accurate reference work, moreover it encourages types who are intellectually unsuited for such work.
Which is, of course, why Wikipedia is nothing like a comprehensive and accurate reference work. How would we change this? Well, the theory (that small numbers of passionate devotees of error will always defeat an army of those with a feeble and weak interest in the truth) suggests abandoning the idea that 'anyone can edit'. It's fine if only 'disinterested' persons can edit, but as the different but connected meanings of 'interest' suggest, it is difficult to get disinterested people to do this. They simply aren't, er, interested. Another idea would be this. Levy a small 'falsity tax' on everyone. A majority of people would vote for this, if the tax were proportionate to their feeble dedication to the truth. The money from the tax would then pay for experts with a proven neutrality and lack of 'interest' to write articles. This is essentially the economic model of a university, a system invented in the Middle Ages, and which therefore existed long before Web 2.0.
*Edit war: long protracted dispute on Wikipedia. Sometimes between the forces of truth and error, more often between propopents of different kinds of error (such as environmentalists and oil company employees).
Thursday, July 15, 2010
The Cult of the Amateur: Lessig vs Keen
Someone here told me to look at here, where Lawrence Lessig replies to some of the criticisms of Internet 'culture' made by Andrew Keen in his book The Cult of the Amateur ("How Today's Internet Is Killing Our Culture and Assaulting Our Economy ").
Many of Lessig's points are spot on, for example his criticism of Keen's sloppy grammar - "what is puzzling about this book is that it purports to be a book attacking the sloppiness, error and ignorance of the Internet, yet it itself is shot through with sloppiness, error and ignorance". He is probably right to say that policy makers should not be concerned (as Keen apparently is, p.115) when the costs of an activity drop because society has found a way to do the same activity more efficiently. There is no point in preserving the living of those who farm trees to make printed books if (I say if) exactly the same social benefit can accrue from disseminating that information through the internet.
However, I take issue with Lessig about the ghastly Wikipedia. Keen claims
Lessig suggests that Keen means Wikipedia is not "vetted" by experts.
Many of Lessig's points are spot on, for example his criticism of Keen's sloppy grammar - "what is puzzling about this book is that it purports to be a book attacking the sloppiness, error and ignorance of the Internet, yet it itself is shot through with sloppiness, error and ignorance". He is probably right to say that policy makers should not be concerned (as Keen apparently is, p.115) when the costs of an activity drop because society has found a way to do the same activity more efficiently. There is no point in preserving the living of those who farm trees to make printed books if (I say if) exactly the same social benefit can accrue from disseminating that information through the internet.
However, I take issue with Lessig about the ghastly Wikipedia. Keen claims
Since Wikipedia's birth, more than fifteen thousand contributors have created nearly three million entries in over a hundred different languages—none of them edited or vetted for accuracy (p4).Spot on. Perhaps an exaggeration: no doubt some of Wikipedia's entries have been vetted for accuracy, and so (as we logicians know) it is literally false to claim that none have been vetted. But most of them haven't, and that will do. Keen disagrees:
this is absurdly false. Wikipedia is constantly edited, and attributionsNot at all. There are superficial attempts at vetting for accuracy, and the level of attempted vetting for accuracy is certainly vastly greater than ever before tried by humans. But trying is not the same as achieving. There have been 911 edits to the Wikipedia article Existence since the first version begun on 1 June 2001, 9 years ago. It is still much worse than the original version (which was not particularly good either). Regular readers of this blog will appreciate this is a subject I have some acquaintance with. The kind of 'vetting' that goes on in Wikipedia is merely superficial. And so it is (in my view) for pretty much all the articles on philosophy, and most of those in the humanities generally.
constantly vetted for accuracy. Indeed, for many of the articles, the level of
editing and vetting is vastly greater than any article published in any
encyclopedia ever.
Lessig suggests that Keen means Wikipedia is not "vetted" by experts.
Or exclusively by experts (for again, experts certainly participate inBut having read on, I didn't find any argument against this central claim - namely the claim that Wikipedia suffers from not being vetted by experts. In any case, I think the articles speak for themselves. Some parts of Wikipedia are good, much of it is written by amateurs (meaning: non-experts). But the parts that are written by amateurs are generally not good, and the parts that are good are mostly not written by amateurs.
Wikipedia). This is related to Keen's obsession (indeed, I'm sure if he has one,
his shrink must have a field day with this obsession) with "experts" and makers
of "taste." So central is this to Keen's argument, it deserves its own
heading.
Monday, July 12, 2010
Priceless
Once a corrupt bureaucracy makes a mistake, it can't even be mentioned. (Thanks to Barry Kort).
Monday, July 05, 2010
Truth in ten minutes
Well, Wikipedia now has a child protection policy, largely cobbled together as a reaction to the Fox News article about pedophile activism. The best part is the policy talk page where Wikipedians have been ardently discussing the rights of minorities to edit Wikipedia. “We should consider that such persons openly avowing pedophilia provide the world with a very rare perspective and a potentially useful resource.”
The idea that the truth will emerge if you open the means of promoting it to absolutely everyone is fundamental to how Wikipedia works, and (as the remark above proves) is an article of faith to most ‘Wikipedians’. But as I suggested here, truth is more fragile. There is nothing magical or complicated or difficult about recognising it yourself. The problem is to get it others to recognise it. Although it takes in general about 10 minutes to discover the truth about most matters, only one person in every thousand people is likely to spend that time. Of the rest, 9 people will find it so painful that they can get only as far as 3 minutes, and will spend the rest of the time and much more in opposing every attempt at publicising it. The remaining 990 people have only a minute to read about it, and thus are forced rely on the other 10. This is the best model for understanding Wikipedia.
The idea that the truth will emerge if you open the means of promoting it to absolutely everyone is fundamental to how Wikipedia works, and (as the remark above proves) is an article of faith to most ‘Wikipedians’. But as I suggested here, truth is more fragile. There is nothing magical or complicated or difficult about recognising it yourself. The problem is to get it others to recognise it. Although it takes in general about 10 minutes to discover the truth about most matters, only one person in every thousand people is likely to spend that time. Of the rest, 9 people will find it so painful that they can get only as far as 3 minutes, and will spend the rest of the time and much more in opposing every attempt at publicising it. The remaining 990 people have only a minute to read about it, and thus are forced rely on the other 10. This is the best model for understanding Wikipedia.
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