When therefore we demand whether anything be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing in different places.He infers from this the impossibility of a soul not existing from the death of its body in 1890 (say) to its rebirth in a different body in 1990 (say). Does this also refute the possibility of time travel? Dr Who gets into his trusty police box in 1999 and travels to the year 2101. He lives out the rest of his life in the 22nd century and never travels to the 21st century. Therefore, Dr Who never existed in the 21st century. But he exists at the end of the 20th, and exists again at the beginning of the 22nd. Is this inconsistent with Locke's maxim about the impossibility of two beginnings? It's odd. The maxim seems correct, and it seems impossible that the same thing cannot have two beginnings. It seems almost a logical truth. Yet the impossibility of time travel does not seem a logical truth at all.
Thursday, June 14, 2012
Is time travel possible?
Maverick quotes John Locke (great English philosopher and father of the American constitution) on the impossibility of two beginnings of existence, as follows.
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
Maverick on circularity again
Maverick repeats his circularity argument, which boils down to this:
(*) If concept F is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists.
He has still not replied to my detailed critique of his argument, however. My critique, in brief, was that not every sentence of the form of (*) contains a circularity. For example "If a man is a bachelor then he is a bachelor who is unmarried".
I gave another objection here, which he has also clearly ignored. The objection is that if the word 'exists' on the right hand side of this definition
Some philosopher is American = An American philosopher exists
is merely a copula, then we cannot 'descend to singulars' via 'American philosopher' but only via the subject of the left hand side, namely 'philosopher'. Maverick may object that 'exist' is not a copula, in which case I accept his argument – but that does not appear to be his argument.
(*) If concept F is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists.
He has still not replied to my detailed critique of his argument, however. My critique, in brief, was that not every sentence of the form of (*) contains a circularity. For example "If a man is a bachelor then he is a bachelor who is unmarried".
I gave another objection here, which he has also clearly ignored. The objection is that if the word 'exists' on the right hand side of this definition
Some philosopher is American = An American philosopher exists
is merely a copula, then we cannot 'descend to singulars' via 'American philosopher' but only via the subject of the left hand side, namely 'philosopher'. Maverick may object that 'exist' is not a copula, in which case I accept his argument – but that does not appear to be his argument.
Tuesday, June 12, 2012
Maverick discusses my reincarnation post
Maverick discusses my reincarnation post. He has spotted the obvious problem with my hypothesis that an ego can exist for a certain period, then cease to exist, then exist again, citing an 'authority' in his defence. It is probably easier to read his (elegant and clear) discussion of the problem rather than for me to attempt a garbled summary.
I am looking for scholastic discussion on what happens to souls while they are waiting for the judgment day, so more later. Meanwhile, here is Scotus' discussion in the Ordinatio II distinction 2 on the question of whether an angel (read: soul) can be in two places at one, and here is the same question discussed in the (probably earlier) Lectura. Maverick defends a similar idea.
[edit] The first argument is that if an angel (or soul) could be in different places, then it would be distant from itself, just as one place is different from another. This is because two things which are together in respect of some third thing, have to be together themselves, and conversely if they are not together, the third thing they are together with would be distant from itself. He replies, that the third thing to which the first two are compared is not limited in the respect in which the two things are compared to it, as is clear in the case of the soul in the right hand, and the soul in the left hand. The hands are distant from each other, but the soul is not distant from itself. Likewise, God is not distant from himself, and yet those things which are with God here (i.e. in Oxford), and those things which are with God in Rome, are distant from one another.
I'm not clear about the sense in which my soul is 'in' my hand, nor in the sense that God is 'with' someone in Oxford as well as someone in Rome. Is it the same as the sense in which this blog post is 'with' Bill in Phoenix, as well as with me here? And with Anthony, David and the other places where my readers are?
I am looking for scholastic discussion on what happens to souls while they are waiting for the judgment day, so more later. Meanwhile, here is Scotus' discussion in the Ordinatio II distinction 2 on the question of whether an angel (read: soul) can be in two places at one, and here is the same question discussed in the (probably earlier) Lectura. Maverick defends a similar idea.
[edit] The first argument is that if an angel (or soul) could be in different places, then it would be distant from itself, just as one place is different from another. This is because two things which are together in respect of some third thing, have to be together themselves, and conversely if they are not together, the third thing they are together with would be distant from itself. He replies, that the third thing to which the first two are compared is not limited in the respect in which the two things are compared to it, as is clear in the case of the soul in the right hand, and the soul in the left hand. The hands are distant from each other, but the soul is not distant from itself. Likewise, God is not distant from himself, and yet those things which are with God here (i.e. in Oxford), and those things which are with God in Rome, are distant from one another.
I'm not clear about the sense in which my soul is 'in' my hand, nor in the sense that God is 'with' someone in Oxford as well as someone in Rome. Is it the same as the sense in which this blog post is 'with' Bill in Phoenix, as well as with me here? And with Anthony, David and the other places where my readers are?
Monday, June 11, 2012
On the logical possibility of reincarnation
Anthony asked what logical possibility is. I'm not sure, but I think a proposition is logically possible if it does not involve or imply a contradiction. In that sense, is the proposition "I have been reincarnated" logically possible? Does it fail to involve or imply any contradiction?
I think it is logically possible. The key assumption is that the term 'I' does not refer to my body alone. For being reincarnated means having once had a body that is numerically different from the one I have now. I say 'numerically different' because obviously my body was qualitatively different from how it is now. It used to weigh somewhat less, for example. So, having a body that was numerically different from the one I have now, means not identical to the body I had in 1980, or 1970. I don't think there is anything in the reference or meaning of 'I' that entails such an identity.
That's not to countenance disembodied egos or anything like that. The possibility of reincarnation does not require there to be a disembodied referent for 'I'. But if there are no disembodied egos, and if reincarnation takes place some time after the death of the previous body, there has to be a time when the 'I' does not exist. E.g. suppose my body used to be Napoleon's body. He died in (er, looks in Wikipedia) 1821. I was born in 19xx. So if that were the case, my ego would have temporarily ceased to exist in 1821, then was recreated in 19xx.
Does that mean I am the same person as Napoleon, if that were true? On the assumption that two egos cannot own the same body, then yes. Does reincarnation violate any basic non-logical principles, such as the principle of sufficient reason, or Ockham's principle? More later.
I think it is logically possible. The key assumption is that the term 'I' does not refer to my body alone. For being reincarnated means having once had a body that is numerically different from the one I have now. I say 'numerically different' because obviously my body was qualitatively different from how it is now. It used to weigh somewhat less, for example. So, having a body that was numerically different from the one I have now, means not identical to the body I had in 1980, or 1970. I don't think there is anything in the reference or meaning of 'I' that entails such an identity.
That's not to countenance disembodied egos or anything like that. The possibility of reincarnation does not require there to be a disembodied referent for 'I'. But if there are no disembodied egos, and if reincarnation takes place some time after the death of the previous body, there has to be a time when the 'I' does not exist. E.g. suppose my body used to be Napoleon's body. He died in (er, looks in Wikipedia) 1821. I was born in 19xx. So if that were the case, my ego would have temporarily ceased to exist in 1821, then was recreated in 19xx.
Does that mean I am the same person as Napoleon, if that were true? On the assumption that two egos cannot own the same body, then yes. Does reincarnation violate any basic non-logical principles, such as the principle of sufficient reason, or Ockham's principle? More later.
Sunday, June 10, 2012
Too schlocky?
Not even the Maverick had the gumption to post a link to a song by Fabian Forte. Nothing too schlocky for this place, however, so here is Gonna Make You Mine. (Filed under 'kitsch').
Logic and censorship
Can logic help us with arguments about sexual morality, censorship and so on? Only so far it can expose contradictions and fallacies. At some point in any such argument, someone will invoke a principle or universal proposition, and the problem with principles or universal propositions is that they do not allow exceptions. The proposition 'all swans are white' is false so long as there exists one black swan. It's quite binary. So anyone who asserts such a principle cannot allow any exception to it, without modifying it in such a way that it is still a principle, i.e. such that it contains no arbitrary exceptions or modifications or special pleading. For example, the guy arguing here is dangerously close to a principle:
That's how repressive regimes begin. First you start with the sexual content that offends people, then you move on to the religious content, and finally, the political content. Funny how it's always the people screaming "freedom" and "liberty" the loudest who are always trying to curtail it.This is called the 'slippery slope' argument. As soon as you are on the slope, you will always slide to the bottom, therefore you must not get onto the slope in the first place. In this person's case, being on the slope means having an image filter on Wikipedia, and the universal principle being "You must not filter out content that offends people". But such a principle allows no exception. Would this person not want to 'filter out' content such as child pornography or torture pornography or snuff pornography?
Friday, June 08, 2012
Philosophical passwords
I've been amusing myself on this site finding out what passwords people used to access the compromised site LinkedIn. Type in a password of choice, such as 'moonshine', and the page computes a 'hash' for that password, then sends the hash to the server database to see if it is there. Hashing is a very clever algorithm which converts a string of letters, i.e. your password, into a long alphanumeric code – the hash. The clever thing is that even if an attacker knows the hash code, and knows the hashing algorithm, they cannot in theory reverse engineer the hash and discover the original password. The algorithm is a so-called 'trapdoor function' that lets you go one way, but not the other. That is, you cannot compute the inverse of the function, even when you know the function.
In theory, that is, because if you choose a simple dictionary word or even a combination of simple dictionary words, it is easy to run a 'brute force' program that hashes every single simple dictionary word, or combination, until it finds a hash that matches. E.g. the SHA1 hash for the word 'moonshine' is befa39749509fd9ab56743e14f9d68d843ea4038, which if you Google it returns any number of sites that managed to crack it.
Testing for philosopher names I see that 'Aristotle' and 'Wittgenstein' and even 'BertrandRussell' were chosen passwords for LinkedIn members. Even, gasp, 'Animaxander'. However 'WilliamOckham' and 'DunsScotus' were not, although a Google search for their hashes shows that one clever site managed to crack them.
The hash for 'consciousness' is e02c4a06f389ccdd0f5682e257af382928ce3110
Do I use philosophical passwords? No.
In theory, that is, because if you choose a simple dictionary word or even a combination of simple dictionary words, it is easy to run a 'brute force' program that hashes every single simple dictionary word, or combination, until it finds a hash that matches. E.g. the SHA1 hash for the word 'moonshine' is befa39749509fd9ab56743e14f9d68d843ea4038, which if you Google it returns any number of sites that managed to crack it.
Testing for philosopher names I see that 'Aristotle' and 'Wittgenstein' and even 'BertrandRussell' were chosen passwords for LinkedIn members. Even, gasp, 'Animaxander'. However 'WilliamOckham' and 'DunsScotus' were not, although a Google search for their hashes shows that one clever site managed to crack them.
The hash for 'consciousness' is e02c4a06f389ccdd0f5682e257af382928ce3110
Do I use philosophical passwords? No.
Consciousness and reincarnation
Anthony objects that where one was born is a matter of biology and circumstance. Well, if it is a necessary or logical truth that the referent of 'I' or 'myself' is identical with my body, then of course. But suppose it isn't – and I can't see any reason why it should be. Suppose, for example, that reincarnation is possible. That means that I, me, myself could be re-born after my bodily death into a different body, and some indeterminate future point in time. Then biology could not explain why I was reborn with that particular body, in that particular place, at that particular time. Obviously biology would explain why that body had the parents it happened to have, and why it had the particular DNA it had. But biology could not explain why I, the person I am referring to now by the personal pronoun 'I', was reborn in that body.
Contra: perhaps it isn't logically possible, on account of the principle of sufficient reason. The principle says that there must always be a reason why something happens one way rather than another. But there is no conceivable reason why I should be reborn in one body rather than another. To be sure, there are religious views about karma that attempt to give reasons for a particular kind of rebirth. But these are hardly scientific, i.e. as far as I know they are not based in unassailable principles known per se and aided by logic.
Reply: But then we are back to the original question: if there is no reason to explain why anyone should be reborn - i.e. born again – in one body rather than another, there is no reason to explain why anyone is born – i.e. born the first time – in one body rather than another. The principle of sufficient reason does not, on its own, establish that reincarnation is logically impossible.
Contra: perhaps it isn't logically possible, on account of the principle of sufficient reason. The principle says that there must always be a reason why something happens one way rather than another. But there is no conceivable reason why I should be reborn in one body rather than another. To be sure, there are religious views about karma that attempt to give reasons for a particular kind of rebirth. But these are hardly scientific, i.e. as far as I know they are not based in unassailable principles known per se and aided by logic.
Reply: But then we are back to the original question: if there is no reason to explain why anyone should be reborn - i.e. born again – in one body rather than another, there is no reason to explain why anyone is born – i.e. born the first time – in one body rather than another. The principle of sufficient reason does not, on its own, establish that reincarnation is logically impossible.
Thursday, June 07, 2012
Is slavery harmful?
Larry Sanger's recent post brought out the usual idiotic comments. But some thoughtful and clever comments too, in particular from someone called 'Carl Gombrich' who I suspect is the grandson of E.H. Gombrich. Some asked for evidence which supports Larry's implicit assumption that pornography is harmful to children. Gombrich replies, asking whether there is any evidence that slavery is harmful.
[…] as far as I know there is nothing we could really call evidence to show that slavery is bad, either collectively or for individuals kept as slaves. Are those refusing to move on restricting the access of children to pornography therefore in favour of legalising slavery until we have ‘evidence’ (presumably a longitudinal study over many years involving several hundred people, control groups etc) to show that slavery is harmful? Specifically that it is so harmful to individuals that it should therefore be outlawed? If they do not advocate such a move, why don’t they? That is the logic of the position: no evidence, no move.
But the important point is that slavery is bad, and the argument that it is bad was successfully made on moral grounds by previous generations in the West. That is why it is outlawed in many countries.
Now ask: is it better or worse for children to come across hardcore pornography? We are talking children, not adolescents searching out of curiosity or for arousal, but children, for whom sexuality is a very different thing. I would like to know the libertarian answer to this question. If you think it is better that children do not see hardcore pornography, then we should something about the fact that, increasingly, many of them do.
Wednesday, June 06, 2012
Conscious and the existence of consciousness
I'm beginning to think that my earlier idea that the entire universe had been created this morning was somewhat fanciful and implausible. It was immediately rejected by some commenters, by one of them on the grounds that there has to be a sufficient reason why the world was created this morning (together with a lot of stuff that makes it appear to be much older than one day old, such as dinosaur bones).
OK, but that's a different supposition from the idea that the world always existed, but that my consciousness came into existence this morning. Here's my puzzle. The world has existed for billions of years, and if consciousness exists at all, there must have been millions or billions of conscious beings. If my consciousness began to exist in 1955, why then? Why not in Victorian times? Why in England? Why not in the future? It's completely bizarre, and against the principle of sufficient reason. And if that principle cannot disprove my consciousness coming to exist in 1955, why should it disprove my coming to exist on 6 June 2012?
Why can't we suppose that my consciousness before this morning was embedded in President Obama, but that all my memories as Obama were wiped out and replaced by 'my' memories? Perhaps 'my' memories were really Obama's, but they were wiped out and replaced Obama memories when he moved to Obama's body.
This arose out of a conversation with my wife, who was wondering whether reincarnation was a good idea, given that you might be reincarnated as someone who had a tattoo, or a body piercing. I replied that in that case, you would be born with a mindset that liked a tattoo, or a body piercing. She said that was even worse. I wonder if Maverick has an answer to this, as he usually does.
OK, but that's a different supposition from the idea that the world always existed, but that my consciousness came into existence this morning. Here's my puzzle. The world has existed for billions of years, and if consciousness exists at all, there must have been millions or billions of conscious beings. If my consciousness began to exist in 1955, why then? Why not in Victorian times? Why in England? Why not in the future? It's completely bizarre, and against the principle of sufficient reason. And if that principle cannot disprove my consciousness coming to exist in 1955, why should it disprove my coming to exist on 6 June 2012?
Why can't we suppose that my consciousness before this morning was embedded in President Obama, but that all my memories as Obama were wiped out and replaced by 'my' memories? Perhaps 'my' memories were really Obama's, but they were wiped out and replaced Obama memories when he moved to Obama's body.
This arose out of a conversation with my wife, who was wondering whether reincarnation was a good idea, given that you might be reincarnated as someone who had a tattoo, or a body piercing. I replied that in that case, you would be born with a mindset that liked a tattoo, or a body piercing. She said that was even worse. I wonder if Maverick has an answer to this, as he usually does.
Direct reference and existence
Maverick asked me the other day what connection could possibly be between the theory of direct reference and existence. Well, there is certainly a connection between direct reference and the verb 'exists'. If the direct reference theory is correct, then this verb cannot take a singular term as a subject. So we can say 'An American philosopher exists', meaning that 'philosopher' is truly predicated of at least one singular term referring to an American, (e.g. 'William Lane Craig'). But we can't say 'William Lane Craig exists', because it is ill-formed. We can predicate 'exists' of general terms only. See the argument I gave here.
The direct reference theory is not to be confused with 'linguistic idealism' – whatever that is. The theory does not deny there is any 'extra linguistic reality'. It simply denies that 'William Lane Craig exists' is meaningful, in the strictest sense of 'meaningful'. If it means anything, the sentence means that the proper name 'William Lane Craig' refers to something. But if it referred to nothing, it would not be a proper name – for the direct reference theory says that whatever counts as a proper name must be meaningful (as opposed to a string of letters or an utterance), and that its meaning is what it refers to. Therefore if the utterance refers to nothing, it means nothing, and so cannot be a proper name. And the fact it refers to something guarantees that it refers to something in 'extra linguistic reality'.
As far 'existence', which is an abstract noun formed from the verb 'exists' – well, 'The existence of William Lane Craig' presumably alludes to the fact that 'William Lane Craig' refers to something. Simple.
The direct reference theory is not to be confused with 'linguistic idealism' – whatever that is. The theory does not deny there is any 'extra linguistic reality'. It simply denies that 'William Lane Craig exists' is meaningful, in the strictest sense of 'meaningful'. If it means anything, the sentence means that the proper name 'William Lane Craig' refers to something. But if it referred to nothing, it would not be a proper name – for the direct reference theory says that whatever counts as a proper name must be meaningful (as opposed to a string of letters or an utterance), and that its meaning is what it refers to. Therefore if the utterance refers to nothing, it means nothing, and so cannot be a proper name. And the fact it refers to something guarantees that it refers to something in 'extra linguistic reality'.
As far 'existence', which is an abstract noun formed from the verb 'exists' – well, 'The existence of William Lane Craig' presumably alludes to the fact that 'William Lane Craig' refers to something. Simple.
Monday, June 04, 2012
Consciousness and existence
Sometimes I ponder on the possibility of being born again into a different existence, without any memory (if materialism is correct) of my previous existence in this life here and now.
Then it occurred to me, on waking up this morning, that perhaps this had already happened, and that today was the first day of my conscious existence. To be sure, I have the recollection of a previous existence in this body, and there is a whole list of posts on this blog that I have been maintaining since 2006. But that could just be an implanted set of memories.
Perhaps the whole world was created today? Does anyone here have any evidence otherwise?
Then it occurred to me, on waking up this morning, that perhaps this had already happened, and that today was the first day of my conscious existence. To be sure, I have the recollection of a previous existence in this body, and there is a whole list of posts on this blog that I have been maintaining since 2006. But that could just be an implanted set of memories.
Perhaps the whole world was created today? Does anyone here have any evidence otherwise?
Saturday, June 02, 2012
Success
So we drove down the A3, whizzing past the village of Ockham, where the real Ockham (reputedly) once lived, and aimed for the wilds. We reached Tilford, which is itself in a pretty rural part, and made enquiries with neighbours. There was a full-blown cricket match taking place on the green, and a ball landed a few feet away from where we were parked.
Then down a minor road for a few miles, ask some more neighbours, and we head down a dirt track for a while. And - right at the end of the track, just before you head into a dark pine wood with goblins - there it was. The house where Bertrand Russell wrote the early parts of Principia Mathematica. It is the place where he wrote this letter to Frege.
Russell moved there early in 1904 for the seclusion and have the freedom to think. He was still with his first wife Alys, who he treated pretty badly. He moved back to London (Ralston St, Chelsea) at the end of the year, so the letter to Frege (dated December 1904) must have been the last time he stayed in Tilford.
Neither the present occupier, who kindly showed me around, nor the neighbours knew of the Russell connection. However, the Hindhead area seems to have been a sort of writers' colony in the early twentieth century. Shaw lived there, as did the somewhat different writers J.M. Barrie and Conan Doyle. Harold Joachim, who wrote The Nature of Truth, and who coined the term 'Correspondence Theory' lived in High Pitfold just down the road, as did Russell's uncle Rollo.
I will ask the current owner if I can publish photos of the house itself - he was intrigued by the connection - but meanwhile there is a picture of the garden above, nicely set in splendid 4 acre grounds. Just the thing to look at while you are working on the theory of types.
Quidam philosophus Americanus est
Yesterday we looked at the argument from descent to singulars. There are two ways of descent, depending on whether we take the right hand or the left hand side of the definition below:
Against, consider the Latin translation of the definition above.
Against that. In reply, the Phoenician may object that a sentence like 'Quine exists' (or 'Quine is', if you like) is certainly meaningful. Then either (a) the proper name 'Quine' embeds a hidden subject and predicate Qa-Qb, just like 'American philosopher', and so 'Quine exists' really means 'Qa is Qb'. But that seems implausible. Or (b) the verb 'is' is genuinely a predicate, in which case the descent to singulars argument is valid.
PS today I drive to Rushmoor in Surrey, hoping to locate the place where Russell began work on Principia Mathematica, and where he wrote the letter to Frege that I discuss here. If this is successful, I may return with photographs.
Some American philosopher exists = Some philosopher is AmericanIf we take the right hand, we range over every philosopher and test whether they are American. E.g., we ask whether Quine is American. This test does not explicitly test for 'existence'. But if we take the left hand, we range over every American philosopher, and test for existence. This test explicitly invokes the concept of existence. E.g. we have to ask whether Quine exists. Therefore the definition above is circular. Even though 'exist' isn't explicitly invoked on the right hand side, it is implicitly and irreducibly part of the sentence.
Against, consider the Latin translation of the definition above.
Quidam philosophus Americanus est = Quidam philosophus est AmericanusThe only difference is word order. Latin is flexible about word order, as its semantics are given by inflection, unlike in English. So we can either put the copula 'est' at the end of the sentence, as on the left, or we can interpose it between 'philosophus' and 'Americanus', as on the right. The semantics, indeed the syntax of the two sentences is identical. What becomes of our argument? Well, it is invalid because it involves a mistake about logical form. We can only descend via the subject of a subject-predicate sentence, if all such sentences really have the logical form subject-copula-predicate. We obviously can't pretend that the subject and predicate are really a single subject, and that the copula 'is' is really a predicate. That was the whole point of Aristotle's remark about 'is' being used as a 'second element', which I discussed here. Therefore we cannot descend to singulars by ranging over individuals which satisfy subject and predicate together, and the 'descent' argument is invalid.
Against that. In reply, the Phoenician may object that a sentence like 'Quine exists' (or 'Quine is', if you like) is certainly meaningful. Then either (a) the proper name 'Quine' embeds a hidden subject and predicate Qa-Qb, just like 'American philosopher', and so 'Quine exists' really means 'Qa is Qb'. But that seems implausible. Or (b) the verb 'is' is genuinely a predicate, in which case the descent to singulars argument is valid.
PS today I drive to Rushmoor in Surrey, hoping to locate the place where Russell began work on Principia Mathematica, and where he wrote the letter to Frege that I discuss here. If this is successful, I may return with photographs.
Friday, June 01, 2012
Circularity and descent to singulars
Here’s a different argument for the circularity of the ‘thin conception’ of existence. First, some preliminaries. In scholastic logic (and in modern logic, for that matter) there is an explication of the truth conditions of general statements in terms of singular statements. The universal proposition ‘every man is running’ is explicated as a conjunction of singular statements ‘Socrates is running and Plato is running and .. etc’, where every man who exists is the referent of exactly one proposition in the conjunction. Likewise, the existential proposition ‘some man is running’ is explicated as a disjunction of singular statements thus ‘Socrates is running or Plato is running or .. etc’. This is called ‘descending to singulars’.
With that in mind, let’s consider the thin definition of the term ‘exists’:
(def) ‘Some American philosopher exists’ = ‘Some philosopher is American’
It’s evident that we can descend to singulars in either of two ways. We can take the defininiens statement on the right, and descend to all the singulars falling under ‘philosopher’. For example, suppose the only three living philosophers are Plato, Socrates and Quine. Then the statement on the right explicates to ‘Plato is American or Socrates is American or Quine is American’. Obviously the first two are Greek, so they won’t do, but Quine is American so the disjunction is true.
However, the statement on the left, the statement to be defined, the definiendum is more difficult. We have to take all the singulars falling under ‘American philosopher’, and form a disjunction of the form ‘a exists or …’. Since the only American philosopher in our domain is Quine, that gives ‘Quine exists’. But we can’t define ‘Quine exists’ in terms of any non-existential statement. The problem is that the thin definition of ‘exists’ only works for general existential statements. The defining propositions must have the form ‘some F is G’, which is general. There is no equivalent explication for singular existentials. Therefore the ‘descent to singulars’ proves that we cannot eliminate the term ‘exists’ from our discourse, and the thin conception is therefore circular.
Will that do? Well no, but more tomorrow.
With that in mind, let’s consider the thin definition of the term ‘exists’:
(def) ‘Some American philosopher exists’ = ‘Some philosopher is American’
It’s evident that we can descend to singulars in either of two ways. We can take the defininiens statement on the right, and descend to all the singulars falling under ‘philosopher’. For example, suppose the only three living philosophers are Plato, Socrates and Quine. Then the statement on the right explicates to ‘Plato is American or Socrates is American or Quine is American’. Obviously the first two are Greek, so they won’t do, but Quine is American so the disjunction is true.
However, the statement on the left, the statement to be defined, the definiendum is more difficult. We have to take all the singulars falling under ‘American philosopher’, and form a disjunction of the form ‘a exists or …’. Since the only American philosopher in our domain is Quine, that gives ‘Quine exists’. But we can’t define ‘Quine exists’ in terms of any non-existential statement. The problem is that the thin definition of ‘exists’ only works for general existential statements. The defining propositions must have the form ‘some F is G’, which is general. There is no equivalent explication for singular existentials. Therefore the ‘descent to singulars’ proves that we cannot eliminate the term ‘exists’ from our discourse, and the thin conception is therefore circular.
Will that do? Well no, but more tomorrow.
Thursday, May 31, 2012
Reclaiming prudery
It's well known that 'queer theorists' successfully reclaimed the term 'queer', which used to be a term of abuse for homosexual, and turned it into a sort of verbal flag for the homosexualist movement.
Can we do the same thing for the term 'prude'? By far the most common statement I see on one side of the porn debate is 'I am not a prude' (the most common statement on the other side is 'I am against any form of censorship'). But I am always puzzled by what a 'prude' is. It seems like a term of abuse, given that so many people are so eager to deny being one. I have never seen anyone admit to being a prude. Is this because prudes are a bit like homosexuals were in the 1950s, and afraid to admit this. Should prudes come out of the closet? It's difficult to say, because whereas it was clear in the 1950s what 'homosexual' meant, it's not clear what 'prude' means.
So we can't reclaim a term if we don't know what it means. Time for some further research.
Can we do the same thing for the term 'prude'? By far the most common statement I see on one side of the porn debate is 'I am not a prude' (the most common statement on the other side is 'I am against any form of censorship'). But I am always puzzled by what a 'prude' is. It seems like a term of abuse, given that so many people are so eager to deny being one. I have never seen anyone admit to being a prude. Is this because prudes are a bit like homosexuals were in the 1950s, and afraid to admit this. Should prudes come out of the closet? It's difficult to say, because whereas it was clear in the 1950s what 'homosexual' meant, it's not clear what 'prude' means.
So we can't reclaim a term if we don't know what it means. Time for some further research.
A sound bite for circularity
Maverick has just posted a reply to my request for what he calls a ‘sound bite’ on his argument for circularity. Before I comment, a brief aside on my dislike of the term ‘sound bite’. In philosophy, particularly ‘Internet philosophy’, I frequently encounter it when I ask for a clear and concise explanation of or argument for the opponent’s position. “You can’t reduce my argument to a sound bite”. Well in that case I am not interested in the opponent’s argument, for it is not an argument at all. I suspect the underlying reason is a fear that the position really is incoherent, or that the underlying argument is invalid. There should be an informal fallacy ‘The Sound Bite fallacy’ named after it. And in any case I do not want a ‘sound bite’, which is simply a short slogan summarising a position or attitude such as ‘This was their finest hour’, often little more than a cliché. Note also my previous post, where I argued that the ‘circularity objection’ is actually more complex and difficult than Maverick originally implied, and that it is unfair to say I am being disingenuous, when I claim I fail to understand it. I feel he has now conceded that it is somewhat more complicated and less obvious than he originally suggested.
But anyway: Maverick has now given a pretty clear outline of his argument, which I copy verbatim below.
1. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated.'
2. If a first-level concept such as *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual.
3. Let the arbitrary constant 'a' denote an individual that instantiates *F.*
4. By LNC, a cannot both exist and not exist.
5. By LEM, a must either exist or not exist.
6. If a does not exist, i.e., if a is a Meinongian nonexistent object, then the link expressed in (1) between existence and instantiation is broken.
Therefore
7. If *F* is instantiated, then *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.
Therefore
8. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.'
9. A definition (analysis, account, theory, explanation) is circular iff the term to be defined occurs in the defining term.
10. 'Exists' occurs both in (8)'s definiendum and its definiens.
Therefore
11. The thin theory is circular.
Is it valid? Well, my first point is that the argument is even more complex than this, by reason of premisses (7) to (10). Consider the following, obviously invalid argument:
(1a) ‘Bachelor’ means the same as ‘unmarried man’.
(2a) (From 1a, definition) Every bachelor is an unmarried man.
(3a) Every bachelor is a bachelor who is an unmarried man.
(4a) ‘Bachelor’ means the same as ‘bachelor who is an unmarried man’.
(5a) ‘Bachelor’ occurs in the definiendum and the definiens of (4a)
(6a) The definition of ‘bachelor’ is circular.
What’s wrong with it? Well, from the fact that a definition occurs somewhere in the argument it doesn’t follow that whatever we derive from the definition can itself be turned into a definition. The universal proposition (3a) above is perfectly true and follows from the original definition, but it doesn’t follow that we can turn any old universal proposition into a definition. So the move to (4a), which turns the universal proposition into a definition, is blatantly fallacious.
Likewise, even if I grant the truth of the universal proposition corresponding to Maverick’s (7) above, i.e. “any F that exists is an F instantiated by an individual that exists”, it doesn’t follow that you can turn this into something that looks like a definition. Quite obviously not. In particular, Bill needs to avoid the charge that he has reintroduced the term ‘exist’ in (7) in much the same way that ‘bachelor’ has been reintroduced in (3a).
But anyway: Maverick has now given a pretty clear outline of his argument, which I copy verbatim below.
1. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated.'
2. If a first-level concept such as *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual.
3. Let the arbitrary constant 'a' denote an individual that instantiates *F.*
4. By LNC, a cannot both exist and not exist.
5. By LEM, a must either exist or not exist.
6. If a does not exist, i.e., if a is a Meinongian nonexistent object, then the link expressed in (1) between existence and instantiation is broken.
Therefore
7. If *F* is instantiated, then *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.
Therefore
8. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.'
9. A definition (analysis, account, theory, explanation) is circular iff the term to be defined occurs in the defining term.
10. 'Exists' occurs both in (8)'s definiendum and its definiens.
Therefore
11. The thin theory is circular.
Is it valid? Well, my first point is that the argument is even more complex than this, by reason of premisses (7) to (10). Consider the following, obviously invalid argument:
(1a) ‘Bachelor’ means the same as ‘unmarried man’.
(2a) (From 1a, definition) Every bachelor is an unmarried man.
(3a) Every bachelor is a bachelor who is an unmarried man.
(4a) ‘Bachelor’ means the same as ‘bachelor who is an unmarried man’.
(5a) ‘Bachelor’ occurs in the definiendum and the definiens of (4a)
(6a) The definition of ‘bachelor’ is circular.
What’s wrong with it? Well, from the fact that a definition occurs somewhere in the argument it doesn’t follow that whatever we derive from the definition can itself be turned into a definition. The universal proposition (3a) above is perfectly true and follows from the original definition, but it doesn’t follow that we can turn any old universal proposition into a definition. So the move to (4a), which turns the universal proposition into a definition, is blatantly fallacious.
Likewise, even if I grant the truth of the universal proposition corresponding to Maverick’s (7) above, i.e. “any F that exists is an F instantiated by an individual that exists”, it doesn’t follow that you can turn this into something that looks like a definition. Quite obviously not. In particular, Bill needs to avoid the charge that he has reintroduced the term ‘exist’ in (7) in much the same way that ‘bachelor’ has been reintroduced in (3a).
What should we do about Wikipedia’s porn problem?
By Larry Sanger here. The logic of arguments for and against porn is interesting, although I don't have a great deal of time to go into it now. The top level argument, as it were, is that people, i.e. all people, should have the right to see absolutely whatever they like, and that any restriction is an encroachment upon freedom. The objection to this is that not all people, namely young children, should have this right. Then we encounter all sorts of counter-objections and replies to the counter-objections. For example, what exactly is wrong with children seeing such images. If sex good or not? If it is good, why shouldn't children participate in the good, etc etc. Larry (who is a philosopher) covers some of these arguments in his post.
At least Augustine had a clear approach to this. Sex, or rather shame about sex, is the result of original sin. I'll look up the reference some time.
At least Augustine had a clear approach to this. Sex, or rather shame about sex, is the result of original sin. I'll look up the reference some time.
Wednesday, May 30, 2012
It's not obvious what's obvious
"It ain't obvious what's obvious". Thanks to the Maverick for that insight by Hilary Putnam. I suppose everyone knows the mathematician's joke about the lecturer how - discussing some result - says 'That's obvious'. He then pauses, looks down, then goes off for about twenty minutes. Then he comes back and announces 'Yes, it's obvious'.
Judging from the comments, there's been a bit of misunderstanding about my position on the 'thin conception' of existence. I don't necessarily agree with the conception. My question is whether the brief arguments given by Maverick, and which seem as obvious as day to him, really are obvious. Now I think, pace Dr. Putnam, there is a simple test for obviousness. If you can state your position or argument in less than about five sentences, and if the terms are clear or well-defined, or have a common and undisputed meaning, if any assumptions underlying the position are beyond dispute, and if all deductive steps are valid, then it is obvious. Otherwise it isn't.
Now Maverick's argument, as I understand it, is this:
The thin conception of 'exists' is that 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated'
But if *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists
Therefore the thin conception of 'exists' is circular
This is deceptively simple, but fails my test for obviousness. Why? The subject of the conclusion is 'the thin conception of exists'. The predicate is 'circular'. The predicate of the conclusion is called the 'major term' and it is an undisputed rule of logic that the major term should appear in the premisses. Which of course it doesn't. This would probably be fine if the idea of a circularity were undisputed and clear, by I have argued elsewhere that it isn't. It is very slippery.
So what is needed is an argument of the following form:
The thin conception of existence is of form X
Any conception of form X is circular
The thin conception of existence is circular.
I would accept any argument of that form as 'obvious'. And I hope that clears me of any charges of being disingenuous.
Judging from the comments, there's been a bit of misunderstanding about my position on the 'thin conception' of existence. I don't necessarily agree with the conception. My question is whether the brief arguments given by Maverick, and which seem as obvious as day to him, really are obvious. Now I think, pace Dr. Putnam, there is a simple test for obviousness. If you can state your position or argument in less than about five sentences, and if the terms are clear or well-defined, or have a common and undisputed meaning, if any assumptions underlying the position are beyond dispute, and if all deductive steps are valid, then it is obvious. Otherwise it isn't.
Now Maverick's argument, as I understand it, is this:
The thin conception of 'exists' is that 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated'
But if *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists
Therefore the thin conception of 'exists' is circular
This is deceptively simple, but fails my test for obviousness. Why? The subject of the conclusion is 'the thin conception of exists'. The predicate is 'circular'. The predicate of the conclusion is called the 'major term' and it is an undisputed rule of logic that the major term should appear in the premisses. Which of course it doesn't. This would probably be fine if the idea of a circularity were undisputed and clear, by I have argued elsewhere that it isn't. It is very slippery.
So what is needed is an argument of the following form:
The thin conception of existence is of form X
Any conception of form X is circular
The thin conception of existence is circular.
I would accept any argument of that form as 'obvious'. And I hope that clears me of any charges of being disingenuous.
Tuesday, May 29, 2012
Analytic vs European
There is a further installment from the Maverick in the dispute about the thin conception of existence. Maverick asks whether I think the notion of a non-existent object is self-contradictory. I reply: we need to be shown that it is self-contradictory. The thin conception of existence is first and foremost a definition, and you can't argue against a definition as such. The only way of progressing is to show how the defined term in its ordinary (or perhaps philosophical) use is not consisent with the definition. But I am not seeing that in any of Maverick's arguments, and particularly the 'circularity' argument, which I entirely fail to understand.
One of his arguments, for example, is that there is an inbuilt assumption that the domain of quantification contains only existing things. But in what sense is he using the italicised 'existing' here? If in the sense that the Brentano defines it, then the domain does contain only existing things, but in the most trivial and non-circular way, for the word 'thing', by definition, means 'existing thing' or 'thing which is a thing'. If in some stronger sense, Maverick needs to explain what that sense is. Those of us trained in the analytic method are taught to give examples. Find a use of the verb 'exists' that is not consistent with the definition set out by Brentano. But I am not seeing that.
Maverick ends:
One of his arguments, for example, is that there is an inbuilt assumption that the domain of quantification contains only existing things. But in what sense is he using the italicised 'existing' here? If in the sense that the Brentano defines it, then the domain does contain only existing things, but in the most trivial and non-circular way, for the word 'thing', by definition, means 'existing thing' or 'thing which is a thing'. If in some stronger sense, Maverick needs to explain what that sense is. Those of us trained in the analytic method are taught to give examples. Find a use of the verb 'exists' that is not consistent with the definition set out by Brentano. But I am not seeing that.
Maverick ends:
Ed begs the question against me by simply stipulating that the meaning of the verb 'exists' shall be identical to the meaning of 'Some ___ is a --.' That is what I deny.Not at all. I am questioning his arguments to show that 'exists' has any meaning stronger than that. I would like to see an argument with numbered steps, with assumptions clearly labelled, with any deductive steps clearly identified. All I am seeing is European 'novelistic' gestures at an argument, with laboured repetition of the same point, and without logical justification of that point. Like CJFW, who I mentioned in an earlier post, I don't do Continental.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)